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ABSTRACT 
Growth policies (fiscal and monetary) remain the focal point of researchers and economic 
experts in history to date. It is tried to find why some countries’ growth stable and others remain 
unstable. Growth mainly related to the policies and institutions of a country besides a number of 
other variables. The countries have strong institutions and good governance achieved stability 
and known as developed countries whereas the countries keep weak institutions and poor 
governance are called developing economies. These countries needs correct growth policies i.e. 
counter cyclical growth policies.  
 Cyclicality of growth policies especially fiscal policy got much importance in the last few 
years. Counter cyclical fiscal policy again become the centre of research to overcome the crises 
(Feldstein, 2009). Likewise monetary policy got much importance. Counter cyclical growth 
policies are essential for developing economies like SAARC region for stability. The main 
purpose of this study is to analyze whether in selected SAARC countries’ (Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) growth policies are pro cyclical, counter cyclical or 
acyclical.  In order to evaluate the nature of these growth policies, the role of institutions 
(Economic and Political) and governance is also analyzed.  The study uses GMM and 2SLS 
techniques to evaluate the growth policies. It is found that growth policies of the region are pro 
cyclical. This shows that there is no significant role of institutions in growth. The governance is 
also poor. In the presence of weak institutions and poor governance, countercyclical growth 
policies cannot be adopted. Counter cyclical growth policies, strong institutions and good 
governance are the only source to bring stability in the countries of SAARC region.  
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Chapter 1 
Growth Policies, Institutions and Governance  
 Growth policies possess robust position in the progress and stability of an 
economy. Along with, fiscal and monetary policies have acquired prestigious status in 
gaining stability and control the cyclicality especially in developing region like SAARC 
(South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation). For stability, the role of institutions 
and governance is important. Being an introductory Chapter of the study, problem 
specification, objectives and hypotheses are also explained in this part of the study.  
1.1  Introduction 
Growth stability is an important objective of both developed and developing nations. 
In order to attain this objective, certain paths and policies are needed. Acemoglu et al. 
(2003a) explained that growth policies have significant role in acquiring the stability in 
growth. Sustained growth fetches stability for an economy. Growth policies (fiscal and 
monetary) are considered as essential tools to attain such targets. When there are 
upheavals in the economy, automatic stabilizers (progressive taxes and increasing or 
contracting the money supply) of both the policies execute and stability is regained.  
Mises (2006) explained that there are no miracles, in growth policies. After the 
Second World War, Germany started to rebuild as a powerful nation. The revival of 
Germany after defeat and heavy losses in the Second World War is considered a miracle. 
This miracle is due to the application of growth policies. Therefore, economic recovery 
does not come from a miracle; it comes from the implementation of growth policies that 
have significant role in acquiring the economic revival of Germany.  
These growth policies are the source of success towards achieving stability. It is 
found that the countries where growth policies are implemented, the stability is gained 
(IMF, 2000). The functions and responsibilities of the growth policies is part and parcel 
in attaining stability both in developed and developing countries of the world. However, 
after the financial crisis of 1999, by applying growth policies, the growth stability in the 
world is regained (TDR, 2012). The economies of the world which gave growth stimulus 
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to other parts of the world are those where monetary and fiscal policy maintained 
domestic and local demand growth (TDR, 2012). Though, these growth policies (fiscal 
and monetary) are not applied fully in the developing world. Therefore, the developing 
countries still face hurdles like high population growth rate, low GDP, low saving rate, 
low investment rate, increasing unemployment, rising government’s expenditure 
especially non development expenditure,  agrarian background and poor tax collection. 
With all these factors, the goal of economic stability is becoming more difficult. Coupled 
with these corrupt bureaucracy and inefficient government machinery makes the 
realization of growth policies like fiscal and monetary complicated and difficult. One of 
the robust sources of success is efficient execution of these growth policies. These 
policies are explained below.   
1.2  Fiscal Policy 
 Fiscal policy has significant role in attaining stability especially after the great 
depression. The classical thoughts are no more valid as the people had to face the 
problems of unemployment and destabilization. Keynesians’ thoughts acquired strong 
position to explain the role of government in economies. The Government’s major 
economic goal is to increase the rate of sustainable growth and this can be done by 
providing employment and political stability to business. 
   About the responsibilities of the government, there are three observations. 
These are known as Neoclassical, Keynesian and Ricardian equivalence (Bernheim, 
1989). First, Neoclassical paradigm considers that government participation in economic 
activity may crowd out private sector (Buiter, 1977). Secondly, Keynesians’ sight 
supports the vital role of government due to its multiplier effects (Fazzari, 1994). Lastly, 
Ricardian Equivalence argues for the impartiality of government deficits (Barro, 1989). 
Considering the above; the role of the government is increased especially in the 
developing countries like South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 
countries. A large part of SAARC region, remains under the British Raj for a long period. 
Under colonial rule, the people are ignored and exploited. A large majority of people are 
forced to live miserable life due to extractive policies of the Raj. After independence, it is 
the responsibility of their governments to adopt growth policies as fiscal and monetary 
for higher growth and stability. But current situation of the region is not in harmony with 
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the true implementation of these fiscal and monetary policies. Fiscal policy is a vigorous 
way to assess the role of government in the growth of a country. The scope of 
government excess or deficit is the most significant statistic determining the impact of 
fiscal policy on a country (Siegel, 1979).  In fiscal policy, the government expenditure is 
an important tool that can be used to gain the economic stability.  
Appropriate government expenditure can be helpful in improving economic 
conditions of the country. Singh and Sahni (1984) evaluated that government expenditure 
is significant source which brings stability in fluctuations of the economy. In order to 
meet expenditure, the governments in developing economies heavily depend upon 
revenues which are generated through taxation. Tax is a major source for the income of 
the governments in both developed and developing economies. Tax revenue is essential 
for any government to fulfill expenditures as health, defense, infrastructure and 
education.  In Solow’s (1956) steady state model tax policy has not given due 
importance. However, Romer (1986) explained that tax policy has long run impacts on 
economic growth. Therefore, tax policy has major role in both developed and developing 
countries. But in developing economies like SAARC, tax revenue is not sufficient to 
meet the expenditures. The main reason of shortage of revenue is small tax base and 
inefficient bureaucracy. Therefore these economies have to rely on other growth policies 
as monetary policy.  
1.3  Monetary Policy 
 In monetary policy, appropriate transmission of money brings stability in the 
economy. Therefore, one of the purposes of monetary policy is to control and regulate the 
money supply. Friedman and Hahn (1990) explicated that the monetary authority alters 
the money accumulation. It can be done through open market operations. In classical 
economics the role of money is just as for transaction. It has no significant role in 
economy. But thoughts about money change; increase in money will affect the prices and 
interest rate. As the supply of money increases economic activities enhances and output 
increases.  
The monetarists consider that monetary policy puts a more significant effect on 
economic activity whereas Keynesians consider that fiscal policy has greater impact on 
economic action. However, in order to attain economic stability; supply of money is 
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adjusted by the central bank of a country and this helps in achieving the price stability. In 
monetary policy, interest rate is also used as a tool to increase output level in the 
economy. By lowering interest rate, investment increases and vice versa. Therefore, 
interest rate and money balance support to economic stability. But, the developing 
economies have not utilized these tools judiously. In addition to money market, the 
banking system is also not completely developed in these countries. Certainly banks are 
the backbone of economy to attain the certain level of growth.  
These growth policies (fiscal and monetary) are effectively used by the developed 
countries but developing countries are still in a fix. Developed countries gain stability and 
control the cyclicality of business cycle through these growth policies.  
1.4  Cyclicality of Growth Policies 
These growth policies (fiscal and monetary) have significant role in attaining the 
stability in the business cycles of the developed economies. The conventional 
Keynesians’ thoughts show that there is counter cyclical fiscal policy during boom and 
pro cyclical through recession to capture the cyclical variations. Gavin and Perotti (1997) 
explained that there is procyclical fiscal policy in Latin American economies. The fiscal 
policy is expansionary in good and superior times and contractionary in bad times. In the 
same way, about monetary policy, the impression undoubtedly exists that developing 
economies are frequently tightening and hardening the monetary policy in bad times 
(Lane, 2003b). So, these policies act as pro cyclical or counter cyclical in developing and 
developed countries respectively. There are two main reasons why developing countries 
adopt the procyclical fiscal policy. First, deficiency in international credit markets that 
put off developing countries to get loans in bad times, second, political reason, that good 
times support extravagance and rent-seeking behavior. The first thought is supported by 
the studies of Gavin and Perotti (1997) and Guerson (2003), and the second thought is 
favored by Tornell and Lane (1998, 1999), Talvi and Vegh (2005), Alesina and Tabellini 
(2008). These growth policies are performed by the government through certain 
institutions. Therefore, the role of institutions is significant in attaining the economic 
stability.  
 
 
 5 
 
1.5 Institutions’ Performance 
A large number of countries are lagging behind in the process of growth from 
other countries of the world and their per capita GDP growth is not satisfactory. In 
addition to above growth policies, the serious issue of their slow growth is stemmed 
somewhere else. The problems of slow growth rate indicate merely the pattern of 
economic growth and per capita income, rate of growth among different countries at 
various times (Lucas, 1988). So, different countries have the different pattern and sources 
of growth. The difference can be seen in their institutional pattern of both developed and 
developing countries.  
Institutions are considered one of the main pillars of growth. Growth differences 
among countries are viewed differently by economists. Neo classical economists viewed 
the difference in per capita income, is due to the accumulation of different factor of 
production. North and Thomas (1973) examined that innovation, capital accumulation 
and education, are not reasons of growth; these are growth. In North and Thomas' view, 
factor gathering and novelty are only adjacent causes of growth. The primary clarification 
of comparative growth is dissimilarity in institutions. Institutional framework is also 
important in elaborating its impact on stability in growth.  
 Therefore the role of institutions has significant place in the process of growth 
stability. Country’s institutions are basically responsible for the progress of any country. 
There are three major classifications of institutions. First, institutions are regarded as the 
rules of the game (North, 1990). Second, institutions are identified as the players of the 
game (Nelson, 1994); with the regulations enforce, this explanation believes the role 
performed by those who have to employ the set of laws and make sure that these are 
esteemed by others and also by the organizations. Lastly, the third explanation believes 
that institutions are the self-enforcing balancing result of the game (Schotter, 1981). 
 In the same way, from a procedural viewpoint, the analysis of the association 
presented among institutional structure and economic performance has been initiated by 
the establishment of a special strand of investigation: the New Institutional Economics. In 
accordance with a number of scholars and researchers, Coase (1937) work can be 
declared as pioneer work, whose most vital importance is as the cost of transaction raises, 
hence institutions do matter. 
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As, institutions possess a major role in the development of a state. In the same 
way, state assists to build up the institutions. How the institutions are formed and 
developed, there are different concepts. North (1981) explained the difference among 
contract and predatory theory of the state in the evolution of institutions. In accordance 
with the first theory, the government and related institutions offer the legal structure that 
permits private contracts to assist economic dealings and transactions which minimize the 
transaction expenditure. However, the predatory theory narrates that the state is a device 
for shifting resources from one set of people to another. It is explained that superior 
institutions are those which at the same time support and help private contracts and give 
check and balance in opposition to expropriation by the government official or 
bureaucracy or other politically influential groups. In institutional building among 
developing countries, the role of colonial power is also dominant. The European nations 
have established huge colonial empire. In these colonies, these powers developed the 
institutions according to their own interest. The region where mortality rates are high, 
these powers do not settle there permanently and develop extractive institutions as 
Congo. These extractive institutions do not initiate protection of property right and no 
checks and balances are there in opposition to the government expropriation. On the other 
hand, the areas where weather conditions are favorable, as New Zealand and USA, these 
colonial powers develop good institution like Europeans institutions. These institutions 
are still working in these countries even after their independence (Acemoglu et al. 2001). 
It is obvious that good institutions like in USA and New Zealand make these nations the 
developed economies of the world and institutions in developing countries are the main 
cause of their slow progress. 
1.5.1  Economic Institutions 
 Different types of institutions work together, in the process of gaining stability. 
The economic difference in both developed and developing countries might be due to the 
differentiation in economic institutions. History of economic institution is very old. As 
Smith (1976) explained that commerce, trade and manufacturing activities cannot grow in 
an economy where there is no proper system of justice. In other words rule of law is 
essential for the progress of a country. Property rights are an important element in 
economic institutions. Property rights are customs and rules that guarantee the profits to 
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the invested capital.  When there is security of property rights, the society will prosper 
due to increased level of investment by the people.  
The economic institutions of developing countries are not functioning well. 
Property rights are not safe and contract enforceability is not seen in society, so these 
economies are still lagging behind. Though, there is conflict about the distribution of 
income and resource allocation among people. Strong conflict of interest may create 
disaster in society. In this serious situation, political institution presents different options 
to resolve this issue. A Power full political party plays ultimate role in taking economic 
decisions like resource allocation and contract enforcement. 
1.5.2  Political Institutions 
  Political institutions and the country’s economic system are closely associated.  
The rules and regulations come from the side of political parties. Generally, political 
leaders’ rules guide to economic rules. However, the causality runs both sides. 
Specifically, the property rights and contracts enforcement rules are precise and imposed 
by political leaders. Though, the organization of economic benefit will also affect the 
political arrangement. So, a given formation of property rights is reliable and consistent 
with a special set of political regulations. Any changes in the ruling of one will encourage 
transform in the other (North, 1990). Political institutions are significant and utmost need 
for both developed and developing countries. Political institutions enable the economic 
institutions to work efficiently. It is essential that the political institutions should be 
efficient and effective to apply the rules. These political institutions have their strong 
impact on stability. 
Acemoglu (2005) elaborated that political institutions set the stage for economic 
institutions. The role of political institutions is indirect. Political leaders provide the 
framework to economic institutions. Persson and Tabellini (2006) examined the impact of 
democracy on different economic aspects. First, democracy and economic liberalization 
Second, democracy has influenced the fiscal and trade policy and third, the impact of 
anticipated political restructuring on expected political reform. It is found that there is 
significant relationship between democracy and growth regression. In this global village, 
the decisions of political leaders have strong impact on the stability in growth of the 
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countries. Besides this governance has significant role in improving the performance of 
these institutions. 
 1.6  Governance 
Institutions serve as input to governance. It directs information regarding public 
goods and assists the government in making rules and regulations. The possibility of 
clashes is minimized and helps to execute the agreements through the judicial and legal 
system. Institutions give clear and apparent apparatus to govern businesses, so minimize 
corruption and bureaucratic hurdles (WB 2002; Grigorian and Martinez 2000). 
In present era, governance becomes main focal point of economists, policy 
makers and world organizations’ representatives. The World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) representatives now focus on governance conditions of developing 
countries. However, good governance has gained the position of hymn for patron 
organization and agencies and contributor economies (Nanda, 2006). There is a ground-
breaking use of governance indicators from the last two decades. These indicators are 
used to assess the performance of both developed and developing economies. As the use 
of these indicators increased, the number of indicators is also increasing. A huge work on 
governance indicators is done in a number of institutions as World Bank and 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Therefore, the first generation governance 
indicators are developed by World Bank and a number of economists as Hall and Jones 
(1999), Rodrik (1997) and Isham et al. (1997). The first generation governance indicators 
show the importance of governance indicators. These indicators draw our attention to the 
right issue of governance problems in both developed and developing countries. 
However, the creation of first generation governance indicators has difficulty to adjust 
with practical problems and do not give any superior grip on reform goals. The second 
generation indicators have certain procedure and try to cover the shortcomings of first 
generation governance indicators. Second generation indicators are characterized as 
transparent, accurate and specific (Knack and Manning, 2003). Civil liberties and 
Political Rights developed by Freedom House are also used as governance indicators. 
These governance indicators are used by a number of economists as Scully (1998) and 
Levine and Renelt (1992). These indicators started in 1973 which assist researcher to 
capture long period of time.  
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The common world governance indicators (WGI) are developed by Kaufmann et 
al. (2007) of World Bank. The WGI are developed through the aggregation of opinions of 
governance from 31 diverse data sources given by 25 various associations and 
organizations. These indicators calculate six proportions of governance: Voice and 
Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, 
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption. Governance now becomes 
part and parcel in every aspect of life. Governance is required both at macro and micro 
level activities. It helps to raise the efficiency of institutions at both levels. Governance, 
together with its social, political and economic magnitude, function at all level of human 
projects. It is also present at the family unit level, rural community, municipality and 
specified area or region (UNDP, 2000). At macro level, governance has to change the 
vision and methodology of building of the society overall. Being a part of this global 
village, every society accepts changes and set new aims and objectives for them. In the 
same way, at micro level individual and firm change their style of working.  
Overall the aim of growth policies (fiscal and monetary) is to increase the output 
level and bring stability in business cycles. For this purpose, counter cyclical policies are 
adopted by the developed countries, but developing countries adopt procyclical policies. 
One of the main reasons, why developing countries adopt procyclical policies is that 
developing countries have less access to International Financial Institutions. But an 
important aspect is neglected for a long time, with respect to growth stability, is the role 
of institutions in growth. Developing countries have weak economic and political 
institutions. The institutions of developing countries are brought up mainly by the 
colonial empires. The extractive institutions are developed by foreign rulers. So, the 
resources are dragged from these countries to their homeland. These institutions are still 
operating in these economies. Since institutions function as input to governance, weak 
and fragile institutions cause to poor governance in developing economies of the world.    
1.7 Problem Specification 
Growth stability is a significant source for measuring the competence of a 
country. It acquires the most noteworthy place in the success of a nation’s economic 
performance. So, it becomes the fundamental objective of all developed and developing 
states’ policy. Both fiscal and monetary policies are useful tools to bring out economies 
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from depression. However, at present the performance of the growth policies as fiscal and 
monetary policy over the business cycle got much importance. The traditional perception 
is that fiscal policy should be counter cyclical. But it is found in a number of studies that 
fiscal policy is procyclical in developing economies (Thorton, 2008). The economists’ 
analysis about fiscal policy elaborate that this policy works as an effective tool to bring 
harmony in the economy through increase or decrease in spending (Takagi 2009). The 
expenditure and revenue collection in major SAARC countries are far low than the 
developed countries like US and Japan. When there is shortage of revenue and low 
expenditure, there is less job opportunities and this enhance misery in developing 
economies. So the people of SAARC countries are not in a position to live an easy life. 
  In the same way, procycylical monetary policy is adopted by developing 
countries. When there is dearth of revenue and low tax base cannot be enhanced by the 
governments, procyclical monetary policy is adopted to bridge up the deficiency of fiscal 
policy. Money balance is increased in boom and fall in trough. This imbalances the 
economy and sufferings of the people increased. So, these countries are poor due to their 
poor growth policies. The roots of inefficiency of the developing economies like SAARC 
can also be traced in institutions and governance. Institutions now become the first and 
foremost source to achieve growth stability. Poor performance of institutions kept 
countries at the rear path of growth. The price of substandard institution and governance 
is mainly borne by the poor (World Bank, 2011). Corruption and low profile bureaucracy 
hinder the growth stability. Red tape is the legacy of colonialism. Countries can reach 
middle-income levels despite some corruption, but further growth requires much better 
institutions (Easterly 2001, Rodrik 2003). Institutions performance can be increased 
through governance. Governance is a significant technique to enhance the efficiency of 
institutions especially in developing region like SAARC. The study analyzes the relation 
of growth policies, institutions and governance among major SAARC countries. As 
cyclicality of growth policies fiscal and monetary remain an important source to bring 
stability and minimize the severity of life in the presence of efficient institution and 
governance.  
 
 11 
 
1.8  Objectives 
  The objectives of the study are: 
Principal Objective: The main objective of the study is to examine the role of growth  
  policies, institutions and governance. 
 To analyze either the growth policies are acyclical, procyclical or counter cyclical among 
major SAARC countries. 
 To assess the role of institutions in adopting the cyclical growth policies 
 To evaluate the role of governance in adopting the cyclical growth policies. 
 
 
1.9  Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: Growth policies (fiscal and monetary) are not pro 
cyclical in major SAARC countries.  
Hypothesis 2:  There is no significant role of institutions in adopting the  
    procyclical growth policies in SAARC countries. 
                   Hypothesis 3: There is no major role of governance in adopting the procyclical       
growth policies in SAARC countries 
 
                1.10       Rational of the Study   
         Growth policies (fiscal and monetary) become main source to attain stability. 
Stability controls cyclicality. By adopting counter cyclical growth policies, developed 
countries achieve the sustained growth targets. Whereas developing economies like 
SAARC adopt pro cyclical growth policies. So, there are hurdles to gain stability in 
these economies. To execute these policies, the role of institutions and governance is 
vital. In this region, institutions and governance is not up to the required standard. In this 
study, it is analyzed why these countries adopt pro cyclical growth policies.  
 
1.11  Organization of the Study 
 Chapter 2 describes the review of literature. Literature on growth policies, 
institutions and governance is explained. In Chapter 3, Theoretical considerations and 
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introduction of SAARC countries especially with reference to Pakistan, is explained. 
Chapter 4 gives explanation about data sources and methodology of the study. Empirical 
results are given in Chapter 5. It explains the cyclicality of fiscal and monetary policy in 
the perspective of institutions and governance. The main findings and policy implications 
are given in Chapter 6. But before focusing on study fully, it is essential to have a 
glimpse over the literature related to my study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 13 
 
Chapter 2 
This Chapter focuses on the most imperative contributions to research carried out 
by numerous authors on variables considered in this study. The main points, various 
aspects and methods employed by the researchers are elaborated. The study elaborates 
the thematic sections of research exertion of researcher, which deals with literature 
related to variables under consideration. 
Review of Literature 
In order to achieve policy objectives, governments, especially in developing 
countries, make every effort to gain targets set for policies, like fiscal and monetary. 
Neoclassical growth models entail that government policy influences merely the output 
level however not the growth rate (Judd, 1985). On the other hand, endogenous growth 
models include channels throughout which fiscal policy can shape long-run growth 
(Barro 1990, and Barro-Sala-i-Martin, 1995).  The studies held in 1980s and early 1990s 
as Barth-Bradley (1987) and Barro (1991) found a negative relation among GDP growth 
and consumption spending.  No doubt, the role of government spending is robust and 
significant especially in a business cycle. 
2.1 Cyclicality of Fiscal Policy 
Procyclical fiscal policy, is that policies which are expansionary in booms and 
contractionary in recessions. It is normally considered as potentially destructive for 
welfare. Due to this, macroeconomic volatility increase, and investment in human capital 
fall, and obstruct growth. (IMF 2005a, 2005b). From the last fifteen years, it becomes a 
hot issue that fiscal policy is countercyclical among developed countries and pro cyclical 
in developing countries. Gavin and Perotti (1997) examined the truth that in Latin 
America, fiscal policy seemed to be pro cyclical. Talvi and Vegh (2005) after that 
declared that, Latin-American countries adopt pro cyclical policies; procyclical fiscal 
policy appeared to be the rule in all over the developing economies.  
Calderon (2004) explained that optimal stabilization policy is countercyclical. The 
purpose of such policy is to keep total output near to its potential output. On the other 
hand it has been conventionally argued that emerging economies are not capable to take 
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up countercyclical monetary and fiscal policies. Panel data fixed effects and regression 
analysis is used for eleven emerging countries including Chile. It is found that economies 
with higher credibility, as shown by lower country risk levels, are capable to carry out 
countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies. On the other hand, countries with less 
credible policies have to face larger cyclical fluctuations by using procyclical policies. 
For Chile, it is found that both monetary and fiscal policies have been mainly 
countercyclical later than 1993. So, developing countries must adopt countercyclical 
growth policies to achieve stability.  
Talvi and Vegh (2005) explained the role of fiscal policy in both developed and 
developing countries. Fiscal policy in Group of Seven (G7) countries is countercyclical, 
however, in developing countries, it is highly procyclical. A fiscal policy model that 
includes a political deformation is introduced. Simple correlation is used to examine the 
relationship between government spending, GDP and political institutions. Developing 
countries adopt procyclical fiscal policy during boom. The governments in developing 
countries are not able to create enough additional resources during expansions which urge 
it to borrow less through recessions. So, the focal point of policy implication is to save 
handsome amount of surplus for rainy season. As Hagen and Harden (1995) and 
Eichengreen et al. (1996) have suggested to establish a national fiscal council which 
would be an autonomous body and collect handsome amount during boom period of 
business cycle. 
 Manasse (2006) examined the functions of shocks, rules, and institutions as 
feasible basis of procyclicality in fiscal policy. The study covers the period from 1970 to 
2004 and the effects of fiscal policy are observed for 49 emerging and industrial 
countries. Both parametric and nonparametric approaches are used. There are four main 
findings. First, the feedback of the representatives of the governments towards the 
business cycle; It depends on the condition of the economy; fiscal policy might be 
acyclical through economic bad times, whereas it is principally procyclical all through 
good times. Second, fiscal rules are inclined to decrease the deficit bias on average, and 
appear to improve, countercyclical policy. Yet, it is also found that fiscal structure do not 
put forth sovereign effects as the excellence of institutions is accounted for. Third, strong 
institutions are connected to a lower deficit bias, but their impact on procyclicality is 
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diverse in good and bad times. Fourth, fiscal policy in developing countries is procyclical 
even during in boom; however, fiscal policy is really counter cyclical in developed 
countries. The major differentiation is that shocking times in developing economies are 
worse than bad times in industrial economies. The function of institutions must be 
improved to adopt counter cyclical policies in developing countries.  
 Sturzenegger and Werneck (2006) examined the relationship among 
procyclicality and fiscal federalism in the Argentine and Brazil. The level of pro-
cyclicality of federal fiscal strategy has been examined by the performance of 
government. In order to examine whether the relation is cyclical or procyclical, panel 
data is used for the period of 1992-2002. Simple correlation method is applied to analyze 
the cyclical components of fiscal variables as revenues, expenditure, and output. It is 
found that the spending of sub-national governments is procyclical in both economies.  In 
both countries, the major cause of procyclicality is the highly procyclical pattern of tax 
revenues, gathered by sub national governments. So it is not the pattern of flow of federal 
transfers but their tax structure is a main source of cyclical fiscal policy. Therefore, tax 
structure and government spending pattern help to adopt countercyclical fiscal policy. 
 Adedeji and Williams (2007) evaluated that fiscal policy in Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Guinea, Gabon, and the Republic of Congo (CEMAC) and West 
African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) is influenced by past years fiscal 
policy. Panel data, fixed effects and the difference and system generalized method of 
moments estimators (GMM) techniques are applied and capture the period of 1990-2006.  
It is found that the coefficient of the lagged debt stock is noteworthy and positive. 
Different measures of economic performance such as growth, trade openness and per 
capita GDP are found to be important factors in elaborating fiscal efficiency. Trade 
policy and debt should be used effectively to adopt counter cyclical fiscal policy. 
  Strawczynski and Zeira (2007) examined the cyclicality of fiscal policy of Israel. 
This study covers the period from 1959 to 2005. Simple regression technique is used. As 
Israel is an advanced developed industrial economy and it is general perception that fiscal 
policies are counter cyclical in developed countries. But in case of Israel, it is different 
and fiscal policy is procyclical. It can be explained that in the years1973 to 1985 there is 
fiscal chaos in Israel. In this era, public expenditure raised up to 75 percent of GDP. The 
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debt attained the level up to 150 percent of the GDP. It is found that deficits are counter-
cyclical, generally in recessions. Expenditure and investment are pro-cyclical. Though, 
both the deficit and expenditure become more countercyclical after 1985. This can be 
interpreted that Israel, in these days, in a phase of change from pro-cyclical to counter 
cyclical fiscal policy. 
 Alesina et al. (2008) evaluated that Fiscal policy is procyclical in numerous 
developing economies. In this study, there are 83 countries and it covers the period from 
1960 to 2003.  Procyclicality is determined by consumers. Consumers watch the state of 
the economy but not the rents grabbed by dishonest governments. When there is a boom, 
people optimally require additional public goods or lower tax rate, and it encourages a 
procyclical bias in fiscal policy. Panel data fixed effect is used to observe the 
procyclicality. Procyclicality of fiscal policy is clearer in countries where corrupt 
governments are functioning. These governments are accountable by consumers through 
democratic institutions. Procyclicality of fiscal policy is common in corrupt democracies. 
So, in developing countries, it is required to improve their institutions and their 
efficiency. 
 Thornton (2008) examined the role of fiscal policy in African countries. Simple 
regressions are applied for 37 low-income African countries for the time period of 1960–
2004. It is found that government consumption is extremely procyclical. It is explained 
that government consumption is further procyclical only in those African countries that 
are further dependent on foreign aid and corruption prevail. Fiscal policy is less 
procyclical in countries with uneven income division and that are more democratic. For 
low income countries, it is better to rely less on foreign aid and try to improve their own 
resources as increase output in industrial and agricultural sector. In this way, it is the need 
to increase their trade and minimize corruption.  
Lledo, et al. (2009) examined cyclical pattern of government expenditure in sub-
Saharan African, developed and developing countries and explains deviation among 
countries. Annual data in an unequal panel for 39 years from 1970 to 2008 is used, in this 
study. There are 174 countries, 44 are in Sub-Saharan African countries (SSA), 33 are 
developed countries, and 97 are non-sub-Saharan African developing economies. System 
and Difference GMM is applied. It is found that government expenditure is a little more 
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procyclical in sub-Saharan Africa than in other developing economies.  But it is also 
found that procyclicality has turned down in African countries in current years, especially 
in the decade of 1990s. Better fiscal space and improved approach to concessional 
financing, proxied by lower external debt and by larger aid flows respectively, looks to be 
important factors in minimizing procyclicality in the area. The role of institutions is not 
obvious: changes in political institutions have no significant effect on procyclicality. 
There is need to improve the institutions’ function side by side fiscal policy tools. 
Khan (2010) evaluated the cyclicality process of fiscal policy. The impact of capital 
flows and the effects of corruption and democracy are also evaluated. There are 28 
countries (11 high income, 2 upper-middle income, 11 lower-middle income and 4 low 
income countries) and covers the period of 1950 to 2009. This study examines the nature 
of macroeconomic policies taken up by these Asian economies. Correlation and 
regression techniques are used to analyze the policies. There are four stylized facts, first, 
fiscal policy and capital flows are pro-cyclical in lower income countries and counter 
cyclical in higher income countries. Second, monetary policy is acyclical in lesser income 
economies and counter-cyclical in higher income countries. Third, emerging East Asian 
countries demonstrate pro-cyclical fiscal policy than South Asian and Middle Eastern 
countries. Fourth, there is a positive correlation among corruption and pro-cyclicality of 
fiscal policy. Developing countries must seek to adopt counter cyclical pattern of 
government consumption, interest rate and private credit policies should be in accordance 
with advanced countries. Corruption is main hurdle in developing economies, so strict 
rules are essential to overcome this shortcoming.  
 Slimane et al. (2010) explained that the feasible fiscal policy is countercyclical. 
The main aim is to maintain the output level near to its potential level. However, it has 
been highlighted that developing countries are incapable to run countercyclical fiscal 
policies. There are two groups of thought, one, the inadequate access to domestic or 
external resources may hold back the ability of government to chase expansionary fiscal 
policy in tough time. The second group of thought makes clear that optimal fiscal policies 
are connected with institutional theories. The argument suggests that countries pursuing 
poor fiscal policies have weak institutions. The major objective is to examine empirically 
that Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries are able to conduct countercyclical 
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fiscal policy, which is influenced by the quality of their institutions. System Generalized 
Method of Moment (GMM) and difference GMM is applied. It is found that government 
expenditure in MENA region is procyclical. It is also explained that MENA countries are 
unable to run countercyclical fiscal policies as these countries have weak institutions and 
a little contact to international and domestic credit market. Better institutions and sound 
economic policies are required for countercyclical fiscal policies.  
Hathroubi and Rezgui (2011) analyzed the cyclicality of fiscal policy in Tunisia. 
Annual and quarterly data is used in the study. For smoothing trend in variables, Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) filter is used. The regression technique is used which confirm the 
procyclical posture of public investment in Tunisia. But, consumption does not look to 
react systematically to the cyclical advancement of GDP. The consumption pattern and 
tax structure should be in line with the countercyclical fiscal policy.  
2.2 Cyclicality of Monetary Policy 
 Monetary policies are generally planned to stable business-cycle fluctuations, 
which are commonly known as optimal policy (Woodford, 2001). However, 
countercyclical and procyclical policies are adopted by developed and developing 
countries respectively.  
It is common phenomenon that central banks in the developing world tend to 
increase interest rates during recessions and decrease in expansion. It is also found that 
procyclical monetary policies are the main source to create the economic fluctuations in 
emerging countries (Lane, 2003b and Kaminsky, et al. 2004). However, Central banks in 
OECD countries generally execute counter-cyclical monetary policies (Sack and 
Wieland, 2007; Lubik and Schorfheide, 2007).  
 Dolado (2001) evaluated the effects of monetary policy on the economy of Spain. 
The study uses the simple Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR) model and the time 
period is 1977-1997. The study explains the nature of monetary policy either procyclical, 
countercyclical or acyclical. Besides this monetary policy shocks impact is also evaluated 
and sectoral analysis is also performed. Construction and services sectors show greater 
cyclical impacts of monetary policy.  The monetary policy shows the tendency of 
procyclical.  
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 Calvo and Reinhart (2002) explained that emerging economies do not 
employ the countercyclical monetary policies as when the domestic economic situation 
contracts, then capital outflows takes place and the central banks favors to increase 
interest rates.  
 Gerrard et al. (2003) examined a model of Kenyian economic growth from 1965 
to 1997 with two purposes. The first one is to show the cyclical shocks which are faced 
by developing economies. In order to estimate these shocks, the local nominal adjustment 
is needed under both irreversibly fixed and free exchange rates. An evaluation of these 
counterfactual nominal adjustments recognizes the short-run inferences for an economy. 
The second major aim is to estimate the consequences of the economic growth of Kenya 
in the absence of the lack of a rational monetary order. The monetary policy is found 
procyclical.  
2.3  Combined Fiscal and Monetary Policies 
 In the perspective of developing countries, it is frequently viewed that there is 
absolute fiscal supremacy and the central bank is submissive to the fiscal authority 
(Fischer and Easterly, 1990; Calvo and Vegh, 1999). 
 Taylor (2000) examined the counter cyclicality impacts on U.S. economy. 
Countercyclical effects of fiscal policy are examined via the automatic stabilizers. 
Monetary policy has been performing well in current decades and aggregate demand 
remains close to potential output. It is due to follow the Fed’s inflation targets. Simple 
OLS is used to evaluate the effects of fiscal and monetary policies. The automatic 
stabilizers signify such an expected and systematic reply, setting out rule like system to 
modify in taxes and consumption. Empirical evidence suggests that monetary policy has 
become more responsive to the real economy, suggesting that fiscal policy could afford to 
become less responsive. It is suitable in the current American circumstances for 
discretionary fiscal policy to be saved plainly for longer-term issues, requiring less 
frequent changes.   
Plessis (2007) evaluated that the economy of South Africa has practiced a phase 
of significant stabilization since 1990s. This study applies structural (SVAR) technique to 
argue the cyclicality of fiscal and monetary policy. It covers the period from 1994 to 
2006. It is generally accepted that monetary policy has significant role in stabilizing the 
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economy. However, the role of fiscal policy is not so strong in this regard. Particularly, a 
structural VAR model is developed, instead of the reduced form models normally applied 
in the literature for South Africa. The dynamic relations among monetary and fiscal 
shocks on the demand side and supply shocks on the other are added. It is found that 
monetary policy has stabilizing role whereas fiscal policy is playing procyclical role 
especially in current period. However, it is also suggested that fiscal policy has a little 
destabilizing effect on output. The government expenditure should be lesser in boom to 
behave counter cyclically. 
 Abdullah et al. (2008) examined the association among fiscal policy, institutions 
and economic growth in 13 Asian countries. Pedroni’s Cointegration technique is applied 
and the time period is 1982 and 2001. It elucidates three different ways throughout which 
fiscal policy can impact long run economic growth in Asian economies. The first way is 
as the apparatus of fiscal policy has effects on the real per capita GDP and the second 
way is as the institutions incorporated in mechanism of fiscal policy influences the real 
per capita GDP. The last is as institutions interrelate with cumulative government 
consumption expenditure and cumulative of fiscal policy impacts the real per capita 
GDP. The Pedroni Cointegration outcome found a long run association among fiscal 
policy, institutions and economic growth. It is found that there is an affirmative and 
statistically significant effect of health and education expenditures, cumulative of 
government expenditure, aggregate of fiscal strategy and institutions on per capita GDP. 
It is also found that the defense expenditure, taxation and budget stability are 
considerably and negatively associated to real per capita GDP. Besides this, it is found 
that collective government expenditure and cumulative of fiscal strategy variables work 
together with institutional variable and have a prospective affect on long-run growth. 
 Raj et al. (2011) analyzed the performance of interaction among fiscal and 
monetary policies in India. The study used the quarterly data from 2000Q2 to 2010Q1. 
The selection of period is influenced by the operating process of monetary policy in 
India. There is a prototype change in the early 2000 with the opening of liquidity 
adjustment capability and the interest rate becoming the major monetary policy device. 
From 1997, for fiscal deficit, the routine monetization is abolished. The fiscal domination 
over monetary policy is also eased significantly. The Reserve Bank is also forbidden 
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from buying government securities in the market. Granger causality tests are applied and 
it is found that fiscal policy carries on influencing significantly monetary policy 
unilaterally. In the same way, the impulse response functions exhibits that monetary 
policy is highly responsive to shocks in inflation and it reacts speedily in a counter-
cyclical way. Though, the reaction of fiscal policy exhibits a pro-cyclical inclination to 
inflation and output shocks. It is suggested that expansionary fiscal policy is valuable in 
increasing the level of output over the potential level only in the short run. In the long 
run, fiscal policy expansion directs to economic slowdown. It is clear that fiscal deficit 
leads to minimize the level of savings and investment in the economy, also crowding-out 
more competent private sector investment through public sector consumption. 
 Takats (2012) examined that emerging market economies (EMEs) have 
traditionally faced serious challenges in applying countercyclical policies. The study 
covers the time period from 2000 to 2011.  In order to capture the cyclicality, Taylor 
(1993 and 2000) is used for macro economic growth policies. In addition, the EMEs got 
the lesson that the business cycle generally relied on both monetary and fiscal policy. The 
countercyclical strategies lay the foundation for EMEs to stable the output level and in 
this way add to the stability of the worldwide economy. However, counter cyclicality is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for macroeconomic stability. Lastly, there is 
sufficient space for upcoming research on the counter cyclicality of EME economic 
strategies.  
2.4   Institutions 
The role of institutions is dynamic in achieving growth targets. Institutions are 
major source in attaining growth stability and now economists focus to a large extent on 
the role of institutions. The current literature has validates role of institutions. As Mauro 
(1995), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001), Easterly and Levine (2003) 
Roderik (2004) are agreed that the role of the institutions is essential for growth. Besides 
this, a number of indices are developed by the economists to assess the role of 
institutions. The most common index is Gwartney et al. (1996) which is frequently used 
in empirical studies. It is an economic freedom index. A number of studies, Goldsmith 
(1997), Easton and Walker (1997), Ayal and Karras (1998), Dawson (1998), De Haan 
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and Sturn (2000) and Ali and Crain (2002) show that economic freedom has significant 
role in accelerating per capita GDP 
Scully (1988) explained the rate of growth in per capita output and economic 
growth efficiency with a measure of political and economic freedom. In this study there 
are 115 countries and the time period is 1960 to 1980. In this study, simple OLS approach 
is applied. It is found that politically more open societies are better performer in the 
world and these economies are performing the role of leader. The countries which follow 
the role of law, secure property rights and market forces play role in the allocation of 
resources grow 3 times higher from the societies which are less opened and restricted 
property rights and strict laws regarding the market forces. 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) examined the connection among politics and economic 
growth. For this purpose a plain model of endogenous growth is used. The time period is 
from 1960 to 1985 and 64 countries are used in this study. Simple OLS and two stage 
least square (2SLS) approaches are applied. It is found that there is a sturdy demand for 
reallocation of sources in countries where a huge part of the population does not have 
entrance to the resources of the country. This clash over division will commonly retard 
economic growth. The empirical results support this suggestion. It shows that inequality 
in earnings and land distribution is inversely related with economic growth. In fact, 
growth itself changes income division. The severe technical problem is that when income 
division changes with the passage of time, there is no need to observe each voting 
judgment in separation. Current voting will affect economic growth and its distribution in 
the coming period.  In the same way, social choices of future depend on current voting. In 
order to develop a welfare state the redistribution of wealth is essential. Politics play a 
significant role in achieving the target. 
Barro and Lee (1994) analyzed the role of democracy and economic growth. It is 
a panel study of 100 countries for the time period of 1960 to 1990.  Simple regression is 
used to evaluate the relationship of democracy and economic growth. With regard to the 
purpose of growth, the cross-country examination shows constructive effects of the rule 
of law, open markets, lower level of government expenditure, and highly skilled human 
capital. Regarding the impacts of development on democracy, the study makes clear that 
increase in living standard, calculated through a real per capita GDP, life anticipation, 
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and schooling significantly increase the likelihood that political organizations will turn 
into additional democratic in the end. The study elucidates that the advanced countries 
can export democratic institutions to poor developing countries. The study shows that 
democracy is not the only solution to economic development. Democracy may have a 
fragile optimistic effect for developing countries which begin with a small number of 
political rights. It also shows that political autonomy is likely to minimize with the 
passage of time if developing nations do not maintain their living standard.  The common 
conclusion is that the developed countries, especially the western nations, should export 
their economic system (free markets) to developing nations. When economic freedom is 
strengthened in a poor country, after that economic growth would increase and then the 
developing nation would develop into more democratic. Consequently, the transmission 
of western economic mechanism would also be the efficient way to increase the role 
democracy in the world. 
Knack and Keefer (1995) examined the effects of property rights on economic 
growth. Simple regression is used and the time period is from 1960 to 1989. The major 
indicators used in the study are contract enforceability and risk of expropriation. There 
are three major findings. First, for institutions that defend property rights, the Gastil index 
and political violence indicators are used but these are inadequate proxies. Second, 
institutions that care for property rights are vital to growth. The impact of institutions on 
growth carries on even after calculating for investment. It is found that the safety of 
property rights affects the amount of investment. Third, as institutions are significant for 
conditional convergence. The coefficient on initial income, from which conditional 
convergence to capital is examined; there is an increase in economic effect in the 
occurrence of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and Business Environment 
Risk Index (BERI) indices of institutional superiority. In this fast moving world, every 
factor has to play ultimate role in economic growth; institutions are key element in the 
progress of developing economies. 
Mauro (1995) analyzed the effects of corruption on economic growth. In this 
study, a newly collected data base is used. This data is comprised of subjective indices of 
bureaucratic integrity and effectiveness. The negative connection among corruption and 
investment and growth, is noteworthy. In this study, there are 68 countries and it cover 
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the period from 1960 to 1985. OLS and 2SLS approaches are used in the study. There are 
9 indicators to check the efficiency of institutions; political change, political stability, 
opposition group, stability of labor, legal system, relationship with neighboring countries, 
terrorism, red tape and corruption. If Bangladesh has to progress the honesty and 
effectiveness of its bureaucracy to the rank of that of Uruguay, then the investment rate 
have to increase at the rate of 5 %. The ethnolinguistic variable is used as instrumental 
variable to control the endogeniety issue. It is found that bureaucratic competence really 
basis high rate of investment and growth. Since institutional inefficiency continues in due 
course, inefficient and bad institutions in the past has played a substantial function in 
production of low economic growth and this situation leads to current poverty.  
Alesina et al. (1996) examined the association among political instability and per 
capita GDP growth. There are 113 countries for the period 1950-1982. OLS and 2SLS 
techniques are applied in this study. It is explained that political instability is the root 
cause of the downfall of prosperity. Moreover a model is estimated where political 
instability and economic growth are mutually determined. The key outcome of this study 
is that the countries where fragile and weak governments prevail, there is slow increase in 
growth and vice versa. Therefore, political stability is essential for economic growth. 
Posner (1998) explained that a developed modern country’s success depends on 
sound legal system. Property and contract rights are important pillars of legal system. 
There is a need to develop such a legal structure which is helpful to increase the 
investment in the country and fulfill the need of powerful judiciary. In case of formal 
institutions, legal reforms are expensive but the relative cost is too low. As this institution 
protect property rights and contract enforcement. However, the informal option is also 
very important in the protection of rights. Black listing is a major source to disrupt the 
fame or image of an institution. So the role of legal system is significant in attaining the 
sustained growth level. In the developing countries these rights are not protected so the 
investment level is also too low.  
Hodgson (2000) examined the policy issues of institutional economics. It includes 
appreciation and evolving system. The most important feature of this is that an individual 
is publicly and institutionally comprised. However, from Veblen to Galbraith, it is 
commonly thought that person is shaped by culture and institutional conditions. The main 
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focus is on the coherent choice of the person. It is considered that the individual choice is 
the best one in current circumstances. Still there are constraints to adopt the new 
approach. Social supremacy and knowledge are the main tools of economic investigation. 
So institutionalism is the most powerful and useful foundation to face the hardships of 
structural changes and economic growth. It is useful to solve the long run problems and 
especially the problems of developing countries. However on the other hand individual is 
not the best judge of welfare matters. This theoretical observation contains subject of 
power, knowledge and wellbeing is the center of institutionalism. It is still a stimulating 
and fundamental issue today.    
Hodgson (2002) examined that the major aim of this study is to raise a few 
theoretical questions regarding the procedure of institutional evolution. The first and 
foremost problem is methodological issue. It is discussed that any such effort is confused 
by the inevitable requirement of assuming the former existence of other institutions, as 
language. Now a day it is also observed that different research program are started on 
new institutional economics. The major example is Aoki’s (2001) work. As when it is 
accepted that human action can merely be understood as rising in a situation with a few 
pre-existing institutions, then it is easy to concentrate on the special effects of 
institutional restrictions and descending causation upon persons and to realize how 
relations among individuals provide rise to new institutional economics. The proposal is 
that the emergence and strength of institutions can be improved by procedures during 
which institutional ways and restrictions guide to the shape of agreeing habits of thought 
and behavior. Such point of view highlights an additional imprecise approach to the 
development of institutions. As taking into account an undefined evolution of institutions 
and person liking and disliking, then it is a significant opinion for old institutionalism. It 
is found that a thorough procedure of downward causation is missing. Associations are 
also made with other results which highlight the role of restrictions in universal behavior. 
In this study, the potential role of the government in the appearance and maintenance of 
institutions is measured, especially in money and property. It is discussed that rationale 
for this action may be presented when the institutions has lack of enough natural self-
policing instruments. Prominently, with the fall of the research program which tried to 
makes clear all institutions from different aspect, some of the previous limitations among 
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the old and the new institutional economics have been removed. As well, reassessment 
must be given to a number of the viewpoint of the German historical school, regarding 
the position of the government in strengthening and sustaining some institutions. 
Especially Sened’s (1997) powerful argument that the government’s machinery is 
essential to maintain the institution of property.  The return of institutional economics in 
the closing quarter of the twentieth century is one of the most significant and productive 
growth in social science. Though the arguments presented here are temporary rather than 
closing and final results. However, there is a need to start a robust future research 
program which will consider the function and boundaries of the government in 
institutional development. 
 Acemoglu, et al. (2003a) examined that countries inherited extractive institutions 
from their Colonial rulers have high volatility in growth after the war. Europeans do not 
like to settle and develop institutions in countries where these powers have to face high 
mortality rate. The study covers the period of 1970 to 1997. For institutional variable, 
constraints on executive are evaluated. Generally, it is found that the main cause of the 
large cross-country differences in instability is institution, and no one of the typical 
macroeconomic variables show to be the primary source through which institutional 
causes lead to economic instability. These macroeconomic problems, just like the 
instability and the disappointing macroeconomic performance, suffered by these 
countries, are symptoms of deeper institutional causes. This viewpoint does not propose 
that macroeconomic policies do not matter. Distortionary macroeconomic policies are 
ingredient of such disturbance. Political institutions are also possessing strong position to 
explain the distortion in developing countries. 
 Acemoglu et al. (2003b) explained the differences in European mortality rates and 
the effect of institutions on economic growth. The colonial power implemented very 
different colonization policies in diverse colonies, with different allied institutions. In 
areas, where Europeans have to face high mortality rates, they could not settle themselves 
there permanently and set up extractive institutions. The sample of 60 countries of 
colonial power is taken in the study. Both OLS and 2SLS approaches are used to evaluate 
the effects of colonial institutions on per capita GDP. It is found that in countries like 
Congo where mortality rate of troops is high, the European establish extractive 
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institutions, whereas in NewZeland, Australia and USA establish European like 
institutions. It is found that there are large effects of institutions on income per capita. 
Now, the newly independent countries have to reorganize their institutions according to 
their needs as institutions are significant to attain higher level of economic growth.  
 Ali (2003) examined the impacts of institutions on growth. This study applies 
different procedures of institutional quality to detain the function of institutions in 
elaborating growth differences across economies of the world. In this study there are 48 
countries and the time period is 1975 to 1994. Simple regression is applied to see the 
effects of institutions on growth. It gives sufficient proof that the institutional atmosphere 
in which an economic action occurs is a significant determinant of economic 
development.   
 As there is high association between the institutional variables,  so a compound 
index of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) variables index of institutional 
quality (IIQ) and one for the Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI) variables 
are included into  main regression equation. When these variables are included, the 
coefficients of both the variables are statistically significant. Though, the impact of 
institutions on growth is responsive. Additionally, as the investment-GDP ratio is applied 
as the dependent variable, both ICRG and BERI remain helpful and robust. 
 The pragmatic outcome of this study shows that such economies have significant 
levels of growth which possesses robust level of judicial effectiveness, small levels of 
dishonesty and corruption, efficient bureaucracy and secured property rights. The 
outcome also shows that economic independence is a significant determinant of growth 
and investment. Besides this, economic freedom is an indicator of fine institutions. 
Economic freedom and excellent institutions are part and parcel and remains only in the 
atmosphere of high institutional quality.  In order to attain higher level of growth, 
developing countries should develop their institutions up to the required standard. 
Corruption, bribery, black marketing, inefficient judiciary system, bureaucratic 
inefficiency and poor property rights are the major drawbacks of developing economies. 
So, developing economies are needed to improve their institutional efficiency. 
Hodgson (2003) examined the efforts of John Rogers Commons (1862–1945) 
who give the old custom of American institutional economists with an organized 
 28 
 
theoretical base. Generally, Commons’ input to institutional economics is extremely 
noteworthy and vital. A warm tribute should be given to Commons for trying to give 
institutional economics with the organized theory that is not contributed by Veblen, 
Mitchell, or any other American institutional economist. A serious attempt is made to 
give a reliable tool for policy makers. However his effort at theoretical front is not so 
strong and powerful. Commons neither gave a Veblenian technique nor produce a 
sufficient choice to it.   A flourishing growth in a Veblenian technique is made very 
complicated with the change in existing academic judgment, away from instinct-habit 
psychology and Darwinian methods of judgment. As well, the increase of positivism and 
behaviorism produced poor conditions for the growth of institutionalism beside 
Veblenian approach. Commons’ reaction to these conditions is leaving of instinct-habit 
psychology and an entrance of a number of features of behaviorism.  
Acemoglu et al. (2004) built the empirical and theoretical base of different levels 
of growth. In this case, it is elucidated that different economic institutions are the root 
cause of differences in economic development and it is shown through graphs. It is 
demonstrated that institutions are fundamental cause for difference in economic growth 
in case of Korea as it is divided into two parts. It is further supported by the colonization 
powers in the world. It is also examined that why economic institutions differ across 
countries. Economic institutions establish the inducement and the constraints on 
economic agents. As diverse groups and individuals naturally get advantage from 
different economic institutions, there is usually a disagreement over such social and 
economic choices. These problems are tried to solve with the help of political power. So, 
the allocation of political authority in society is consecutively determined by political 
institutions and through the distribution of economic resources. Political institutions 
assign de jure political power, whereas cluster of people with more economic power 
classically have greater de facto political power.  
A suitable theoretical structure, a dynamic one, with political institutions and the 
allocation of resources as the state variables is developed. These variables alter with the 
passage of time as present economic institutions influence the allocation of resources. On 
the other hand, groups with de facto political authority now struggle to alter political 
institutions to boost their de jure political power in the coming time. So, economic 
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institutions encouraging economic growth and political institutions assign power to 
people in the perspective of broad-based property rights enforcement. So, economic and 
political institutions have robust role in the development of a country. 
Glaeser et al. (2004) examined the role of political institutions in economic 
growth and on the other hand human capital and growth tends to increase institutional 
efficiency. It makes clear which factor has important role in the development of 
institutions. This study covers the period from 1960 to 2000. Simple OLS technique is 
used. It is found that human capital is a fundamental and robust source of growth than 
institutions. Poor economies get rid of poverty due to good policies of dictators as China. 
Then at the later stage, these developing economies improve the political institutions. 
However, democracy must be strengthened on priority basis. Constraints on the 
government are also essential to improve the human capital efficiency. 
Banerjee and Iyer (2005) examined the colonial land revenue institutions 
established by the Great Britain in Sub continent. It demonstrates that differentiation in 
chronological property rights institutions guide to continuous differences in economic 
output. The study covers the period from 1956 to1987. OLS and instrumental variable 
(IV) techniques are used to see the impacts of land revenue institutions.  The regions in 
which proprietary rights about land are allotted to landlord have considerably lesser 
farming investments and output in the post independence period than regions in which 
such proprietary rights are given earlier to the cultivators. These regions too have 
drastically lesser investments in the field of health and education. These dissimilarities 
are not due to by omitted variables or endogeneity dilemma; these perhaps occur due to 
diversity in historical institutions which direct to very unusual policy preferences. 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) examined that institutions are important elements 
of economic and financial growth. Contracting and property right institutions have great 
importance in economic growth of a nation. However, for long run economic 
performance, there are a few studies available to show which institution has better impact 
for economic growth. For contracting institutions, the legal formalism is used as proxy 
and for property rights institutions,   
Polity IV’s constraint on the executive measure, Political Risk Services’ 
assessment of protection against government expropriation in a country, and the Heritage 
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Foundation’s assessment of private property protection is used. Two Stage Least Square 
(2SLS) is used in this study. Using this instrumental variables strategy, it is found that 
there is robust evidence that property rights institutions have a major influence on long-
run economic growth, investment, and financial development, while contracting 
institutions appear to affect the form of financial intermediation but have a more limited 
impact on growth, investment, and the total amount of credit in the economy. Since, 
enforceable contracts among the state and persons are not feasible, therefore, property 
rights institutions restraining behavior by the government and elites have significant 
effects on economic growth. Better and organized effective institutions can enhance the 
output level in an economy. 
Hicken et al. (2005) examined the role of political institutions in the process of 
economic growth. In current era, the stress is on institutional hindrances which cause to 
change the policy. In this study there are 44 countries and it covers the period from 1997 
to 2003. Simple regression is applied in the study. This study focuses on the very 
important subject, what are the effects of political institutions on the government’s 
reaction on exogenous shocks especially in the field of economics. In order to broaden 
the focus, the study show the cases when there is a shock hit the economy outwardly, an 
obligatory exchange rate depreciation and changing in the accountability of the head of 
the state are strongly related with post shock economic growth recovery than to changes 
in hurdles to policy transform. It is found that political institutions have significant effects 
on growth. 
Keefer (2005) evaluated the role of three important pillars of political economy, 
collective deed, institutions and political market deficiencies in the growth of a country. 
It is clearly explained by the studies that who wins or loses in the procedure of policy 
making. It is evident that there is no essential association among political resolution 
making and efficiency. When applied to developing economies, political economy 
investigation have confirmed that frequently disastrous policy options and living 
circumstances do not due to lack of resources but to a certain extent from local political 
and social conditions.  It is also suggested that growth is merely weakly effected by 
constitutional preferences. In the same way, the literature on institutions show, the most 
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significant clarification of complementary development results links political checks and 
balances to the reliability of government obligations. 
Lissowska (2006) examined a few advances in institutional economics with the 
occurrence of market evolution. Market transition shows a number of inefficiencies of 
existing economics with its misleading faith that a market economy can be constructed 
suddenly with institutions. No doubt, transition obviously emphasizes the significance of 
institutions in the economies of the world. A primary challenge that both the approaches 
(new institutional economics and evolutionary institutionalism) face, is the procedure of 
institutional development in case of primarily constructivist and after that further 
unplanned change. Both the approaches try to face the challenge and get reasonable 
accomplishment.  
The investigation validates the function of institutional economics. This study 
presents the two major institutional techniques to elucidate the procedure of institutional 
evolution. The present position of research in this field is an addition of confirmation and 
limited hypotheses significant to interrelations among formal and informal rules. This 
research is covered both diachronic associations (effects of the legacies, and adaptations) 
and synchronic associations (complementarity compare with conflict among the three 
essentials). A reliable theory of institutional transform which takes into account 
understanding of transition is still to be developed. It appears that potential development 
depends on the selection of correct research instruments. 
Acemoglu et al. (2007) explained the major determinant of differentiation in 
richness across economies. The major element which depicts this difference is per-capita 
income and this is due to difference in institutions. However institutions frequently 
continue for longer time period and have unplanned impacts on the economy. Institutions 
are the reflection of combined choices and these differences are shown in political 
system. So, in the process of maturity, institutions show political disequilibria. Low 
economic performance is the result of poor political institutions. In order to come out of 
this phenomenon, certain instrument and techniques are required. Deep understanding of 
the problem and perfect collective vision is necessary. No doubt it is a difficult task. In 
the international perspective, there are certain tools and approaches available. By 
improving democracy and certain rules and regulations in Africa will enhance economic 
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growth and the efficiency of economic institutions. In the same way, policies of IFIs and 
other institutions are not guarantee of 100% success. These policies are developed not in 
keeping with the ground realities as majority of people in Latin America are not satisfied 
with Washington Consensus. The only source of success is to improve the efficiency 
level of institutions, especially, political institutions, with excellent reforms. It can 
scarcely be deprived of, that the quick take-off of economic growth in China, following 
1978 is a product of policy and institutional reforms. Economic growth takes place due to 
change in political scenario. The institutional method is the most vigorous source to make 
the people of developing economies prosperous.  
Hodgson (2007) evaluated that conventional economics is altered thoroughly 
since the 1980s. It gives chances to the economists to involve the evolutionary and 
institutional economics in current scenario. These openings are come out when there is 
extensive disappointment with neoclassical economics. It is the time of exit from old 
thoughts. A foremost priority for both the evolutionary and institutional economists is to 
build up a theoretical substitute to replace the neoclassical techniques. No success is 
achievable without main growth on this border. Whereas empirical and policy research 
work are not suitable alternate. It is essential to defy older theories with new ones. This 
study also highlights the significance of interdisciplinary discussion, together with 
psychology, sociology, history and philosophy. The experts have a little know how in the 
extensive basic of enquiry in social sciences. Academic insight and span of knowledge is 
mandatory in addition to technical capability. Therefore it is the need of the time to 
reconsider the nature and limits among social sciences.  
Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) examined the causal relationship between 
economic growth and political institutions. The conservative understanding in the 
political economics is that per capita income has a causal impact on democracy. Different 
econometric techniques as pooled OLS, fixed effects and GMM are used to see the 
impact of democracy on growth.  It is found that there is no causal effect of per capita 
income on democracy. This finding is contradicted to a large number of past studies. It is 
interesting to see why there is positive cross country relationship among democracy and 
per capita income. In this study, it is explained that this is due to the similarity in 
economic and political policies of the countries. The countries follow the capitalism and 
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communism economic system. However, in this study, it is explicated that there are a few 
cautions in elaborating the results. Though result do not give proof for a causal effect of 
income on democracy, such an impact might be there, however, functioning at lower 
frequencies  over the prospects of 100 years  or this causal effect might be uncertain due 
to some other characteristics. The outcomes do not mean that democracy has no impact 
on economic growth. Lastly, as it is highlighted that the significance of chronological 
development pathways, yet it is not suggested that there is strong and robust determinism 
among political institutions of different countries. The result, fixed effects and the 
occurrence of divergence generates an inclination, although a number of other factors 
affect the equilibrium of political institutions. The prospective effects of political 
institutions on economic growth, the feasible conditional connection among income and 
democracy, and the effect of different time-varying and human factors on the 
development of political institutions emerge to be significant areas for prospect research.  
Gagliardi (2008) presented an evaluation of the major literature which has 
considered the ways through which institutions effect economic growth. The main 
significance in writing on this subject is that institutions become a current issue among 
economists. Institutions are now major element in shaping economic efficiency. The 
development of institutions improves economic growth. The theoretical advances 
contained by the New Institutional Economics and the practical verification of several 
studies, obviously propose that a nation’s economic growth significantly depends on its 
institutional structure. A theoretical approach suggested in literature is explained by 
North (1990). The analysis of institutions from a historical viewpoint, as Alston (1996) 
has elucidated, that much of the growth pathway of societies is accustomed by their past, 
so, it is essential to consider the precise historical background. The key meaning of 
North’s analysis is that institutions have impact on economic efficiency through the level 
of transaction costs and profitability. In other words, institutions establish the occasion 
and give a steady arrangement to human contact by minimizing ambiguity. The empirical 
study of Acemoglu et al. (2001) gives a support to the chronological theoretical approach 
as the results show that present institutions, have a large impact on present per capita 
income. Certainly, taking into account this result, it is said that good policies may 
perhaps execute inefficiently in the short run if it is applied in low quality institution. 
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Another diagnostic structure of institutional subject is the comparative institutional 
method. The significant feature is not only the interdependencies presented across 
economic, political and executive spheres, however as well those occur across institutions 
connecting different spheres. This method is used to examine two great issues: first, 
concentration has been specified to the self-enforceability of institutions as in the shape 
of norms, second, the origins and suggestions of endogenous institutions as banks, 
industries and merchant association. There are also some restrictions implied through 
faith. In this regard, Aoki’s (2001) study of institutional connections explain that 
institutions may alter the information and structures of model, so make trustworthy 
tactical choices of agents. The idea of institutional complementarity has a number of 
inferences in terms of policy implication as it suggests that any structural modification 
should consider the consistency and reason of the entire institutional organization 
(Amable, 2000). So, bearing in mind the significance of such results, potential 
investigation should develop the possibility of empirical studies and to give a deep 
understanding of the instruments driving special types of institutions. One thing is clear 
and there is no need to further reevaluate that the institutional structure intensely 
influence economic efficiency. 
Haggard et al. (2008) examined the relationship among role of law and economic 
growth. The most fundamental point is that the expression rule of law is used in a large 
number of ways. By using in empirical studies, diverse and even conflicting results are 
shown. As, the rule of law is used to provide security, then developing economies have to 
face a number of hurdles, as in the form of the government’s capability. On the other 
hand, States dictate and press out private action or not succeed to give convincing 
declaration to private representatives; in such economies, institutional check on the 
government of these countries, are compulsory. However, the crisis is not just a 
terminological one. In case of using institutions, the endogeneity problem is highlighted. 
The primary issue of the new institutional economics is that investment, trade openness, 
financial growth, and economic growth will undergo without security of property and 
contracting rights. Both the rights are not attained through simple procedure. Property 
rights consist of a difficult and complex links both institutions and political deal. In an 
easy way, Property and contracting rights depends upon institutions. There are two 
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instructive explanations are presented commonly. First, in spite of the enthusiasm of the 
growth policy, judicial system should be effective; care should be implemented in the 
beginning of an unknown legal system. Since Upham (2006) highlighted that it is a grave 
mistake to visualize law as a technology which can be eagerly transferred in another 
place. Sometimes institutions borrow from the other countries may produce good results 
and vice versa. Second, it is feasible that a robust formal legal system, having powerful 
checks on corruption is the most competent resolution to the difficulty of insecurity of 
property and contracting rights. However, in developing economies, still the role of 
informal institutions is significant. This evaluation has taken a very influential view of 
the rule of law. Although the most vital point is that the rule of law has great importance 
not only as a value in its own but as a provider to other values, as human autonomy and 
freedom.  
Rodrik (2008) explicated that governments can find a number of new things to 
learn from the projects where it focuses attention and on the other hand a few important 
aspects are neglected. The focal point of reforms in the developing economies is 
stimulated from getting prices right to getting institutions right. However true reformers’ 
function in their own ways and have complete awareness about impacts of current steps 
of the government. Sometimes difficulties and hardships lie in a different place. On the 
other hand, there are will be numerous sources to eliminate a constraint. Sometimes 
political solution is the best option to remove the problem. Lastly, the nature of the 
obligatory limitation changes with the passage of time, so there is a need to change the 
focus. No single institution is the only solution to solve the complicated problems of the 
real world especially of the developing world. 
Hodgson (2009) explained the nature and development of the old and the new 
institutional economics and believe the possibility of discussion or yet convergence 
among these two schools. The initial form of individualism of the new institutional 
economics is being challenged from inside and outside the new institutional economics 
school. An enlargement inside the new institutionalism is one of main reason of internal 
criticism. Such advances inaugurate latest grounds for a productive and stimulating 
conversation among the old and the new institutionalism. The conversation inside 
economics is further enlarged by the appearance of several other important schools of 
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thought as evolutionary economics and legal political nation.  In the coming few decades, 
the form of institutional economics will be different from the prominent features of the 
decade of 1980s and 1990s. The expansion of different shapes of institutionalism matches 
with a feasible gestalt change in the social sciences. It is far away from concept of 
incremental transform and stability in systems where the whole things potentially impose 
on other things which have restricted connection with social system (Ostrom 1986; 
Mirowski 1991; Crawford and Ostrom 1995; Dopfer et al. 2004; Arthur 2006). In order 
to fulfill this shift, though, the notion central to the discussion of economics ought to be 
inferred as: markets are taken as particular institutions or systems of regulation, rather 
than the common atmosphere of human communication. Persistent but unsound healings 
of the market as the normal or perfect order continue in a few fractions of the new 
institutional economics. (Fligstein, 1996 and Smith, 1992).  
Petrovic and Stefanovic (2009) examined that the purpose of institutional 
economics is to facilitate more sensible understanding of economic phenomenon. 
Institutional economics become known at the last part of the 19th and the start of the 20
th
 
century in the U. S. It achieved the greatest authority in the mid-thirties. The originator of 
this dogma, also recognized as old institutional economics, is Thorsten Veblen. At the 
end of decade of sixties, institutional approach reappears as an attractive form of 
economic investigation. Furthermore, as Veblen discards typical economics, particularly 
neoclassical analysis, and leading economists of new institutional economics 
acknowledge neoclassical theoretical structure. The research agenda is an attempt to 
modify some core assumptions of neoclassical economics, so as to formulate this 
theoretical approach further pragmatic. The major dissimilarity of institutional approach 
regarding mainstream is in culturological understanding of economic representatives. The 
composite nature of economic agents guides to their inadequate performance, resulting in 
manifold equilibrium or even unbalanced states of the system. An additional point of 
opponent, present in Veblenian era, narrates to formalistic techniques, inherent to 
neoclassical economics. Formalism of an earlier rationalist form cannot be greatly 
cooperative in illuminating the nature of social authenticity. In keeping with Wilber and 
Harrison (1978) the major uniqueness of institutionalism are holism, systemic technique 
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and evolutionism. These procedural features considerably disconnect old institutional 
economics from the mainstream.  
Stefanovic (2009) explained the relationships among old and new institutional 
economics. First, old institutional economics depicts neoclassical economics to 
fundamental condemnation. However, new institutional economics is greatly additional 
reasonable when condemning mainstream economics. Furthermore, new institutional 
economists visualize the research agenda as an expansion of neoclassical analysis. 
Second, conceptualizing institutions in these two schools is diverse. Old institutional 
economics makes clear institutions throughout compound socio-psychological 
investigation, and utilizes idea of habits and custom broadly. New institutional 
economists keep away from this theoretical structure. Representatives of new institutional 
economics declare that individual dealings are greatly based on context, and the best 
estimation for the agents' related nearby is the institutions of civilization. Third, in old 
institutional economics, the approach towards institutions is not consistent. As Veblen 
and Ayres accomplished that institution inhibit technical growth and preserve presented 
social relations. The experts of neo-institutional economics view a few positive impacts 
of institutions as help in absorption to innovative technology. Fourth, the ordinary 
characteristic for both strings of institutional economics is persistence on institutions as 
the key of economic examination. 
Fifth, functional explanation of institutions is similar in both schools of institutional 
economics; institutions are structure and constrict human performance. 
 Carlin (2009) examined the current studies in economic growth to find out how 
the institutional quality affects the efficiency of reforms. Nations that have effectively 
developed like capitalist countries have resolves the difficulty of the association among 
the government and the private sector. These countries have developed strong legal 
system though it took a long time to acquire this status. Whereas contracting institutions 
have dissimilarity in pattern of specialization and therefore get advantage over the others. 
In this situation, reforms have unexpected impacts on resource allotment. So, different 
reforms are required for diverse contracting institutions. In 1948, when the money reform 
occurred in West Germany, remarkable effects are observed. This is not as the reforms 
immediately develop institutions; however, it provides the solution to start the 
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functioning of the formal and informal institutions which are already existed. In the same 
way, when transition took place in the previous Soviet countries, it is proved that the 
reforms effects are slower and the cost is higher, as policy maker expected. An 
observation is seen that this is due to the ignoring the function of institutions. The author 
has tried to explain the study with robust arguments. In order to find the role of 
institutions, single path approach is applied while the old rules are banned. Property right 
institutions are separating from contracting institutions. There is a serious problem to find 
the suitable owner for large scale organizations and how the multinational corporations 
fulfill this gap. Suitable protection of property right is a good signal for foreign investors 
to invest in the country. Though, it is not essential that foreign investors fulfill the 
productivity requirement at the initial level.  The relationship among the government, 
foreign investors and local agents in generating well functioning standards of behavior is 
yet to be recognized. 
2.5 Governance 
 Qureshi (1999) elucidated the relationship among Governance, Institutional 
restructuring, and Economic Growth. There are two precise features of governance, first, 
the procedure by which authority is implemented in the administration of a country’s 
economic, public and social possessions, second, the capability of a government to plan, 
prepare, and execute policies. The first needs honesty and an assurance to a pure and 
competent administration. The second demands the option of properly competent and 
skilled manpower. Poor governance is common in developing economies. Corruption 
destroy economies, it minimizes the capability of the government to enforce essential 
regulatory controls and checks to accurate the market system. In this way, the role of the 
government is minimized and poverty is increased. The Mahbub ul Haq Human 
Development Centre has created Human Governance Index (HGI). This index tries to 
calculate humane governance by utilizing numerous indicators as economic, political, and 
civic and community governance. Economic governance is evaluated by merging diverse 
measures of fiscal policy as budget deficit, monetary policy as inflation rate; trade policy 
as current account deficits. Political governance is determined by indicators like 
corruption, excellence of the civil service, law and order condition, and communal and 
racial tensions. According to the first HGI, this is developed for 58 developed and 
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developing countries as well as Pakistan and three additional South Asian countries. 
Pakistan ranked 52 out of 58 countries. In the same way, the role of institutions is 
important in implementing the policies and reforms. The serious issue of developing 
economies is poor performance of institutions. So, good governance and efficient 
institutions are essential for the development of a country especially like Pakistan. 
 Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) examined that Per capita income and the excellence 
of governance are robustly correlated among countries of different parts of the world. It 
covers 175 economies of the world and the period is 2000-01.  An empirical approach, 
OLS and IV is applied which permits to split the correlation into two parts. In the study, a 
recently up to date set of worldwide governance indicators is used. This study is 
important to understand the association among per capita income and governance in the 
Latin American countries and the Caribbean region. First, a powerful positive causal 
effect is found from good governance to high per capita income, second, a feeble and still 
negative causal effect is found in the reverse way from per capita income to governance. 
The prior result validates existing evidence and shows the significance of good 
governance for economic growth of countries. The later result is latest and put forward 
the lack of virtuous circles, where higher level of income guide to more improvements in 
governance. In a few Latin American countries, negative effects of per capita incomes on 
governance are found. It is essential to take significant actions to improve governance 
when such deadly elite class forms public policy for the country. 
 Bloom et al. (2004) explained the significance of governance as a major solution 
to Asian economic progress. In the decade of 1990s, good governance is mainly limited 
to the Eastern countries of the Asia. However in the last decade, and in spite of the rising 
pressures due to economic globalization, population expansion and urbanization, the 
governments of South Asian countries have started to catch up. There is lesser 
government interference in business activities and joining with information and 
communications technology (ICT) to smooth the progress of private sector throughout 
the formation of clusters as in Bangalore and Hyderabad of India. In South Asian 
countries, the governments have started to use ICT to accelerate the democratic 
procedure and get better transparency. However, there is more need to work to improve 
the governance indicators. As, the case of corruption, bribery and the rule of law these 
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economies far behind from developed countries of the world. It is also found that East 
Asian countries have observed fall in business assurance in governance systems. A 
balanced technique is needed to extend the advantages of growth. In conditions of 
governance, it means to give businesses free will and freedom to function without 
ignoring the institutions and laws that control markets. It shows to open the economy for 
international trade and FDI without damaging the local industries of the country. This 
also shows that social capital should increase and the effort to reduce poverty level is 
appreciated. However, there is still need that all stakeholders should perform their role in 
governing the society.  So the role of the governments in bringing all the participants to 
the table to evaluate the affect of governance on country and then also take decision for 
future directions. As the single performer with the authority of a popular consent, 
government must take and suggest an ample vision that includes the interests and benefits 
of the entire society. Now a day the private sector, social capital and civil society are 
becoming important and significant determinant of governance system. The relationships 
and associations between these stakeholders function will have a powerful impact on 
future growth in Asia. 
Roy (2005) examined the significance of definite governance dimensions to attain 
higher level of economic growth. The crisis of governance is now the dominant feature of 
Bangladesh economy to maintain economic growth and social improvement. The study 
examines the condition of different governance dimensions in Bangladesh for the period 
of the period 1996-2004. OLS and 2SLS econometric techniques are used in the study. It 
is found that the efficiency of Bangladesh for governance dimensions of political, 
institutional and Information and Communication Technology (ICT), governance 
proportions reveal a harsh condition. Fragile governance is not helpful atmosphere for 
businessmen to invest for long term. However, Bangladesh has completed advancement 
among the 1990s in the excellence of macroeconomic administration in the form of 
exchange rate steadiness, minimized inflation and balance of payment arrangement. The 
development in macroeconomic strategies and worsening governance are both pragmatic 
in the economy of Bangladesh. However, there is success in governance at macro and 
micro stages: in the field of political governance, there are three consecutive free 
elections underneath caretaker governments, imposing ban to utilize the polythene bags, 
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and minimizing deceitful actions in public assessments. From the point of view of the 
economy and the investors, the development of governance and macroeconomic 
strategies should not be divided. If not, there will stay a danger that the country’s growth 
may not be improved and the poverty remain sizeable for the coming a few decades. In 
order to face the test of good governance, Bangladesh requires making and efficiently 
executes its governance policies to get better institutional governance. The transformation 
to develop governance requires a sturdy support from the government officials, civil 
society, industrial class and the local privileged class. It is expected that the major 
political parties in Bangladesh will commence measures to get better the governance 
efficiency to gain higher level of economic growth. 
 Sharma (2007) evaluated the institutional underperformance of developing 
countries of the world. These countries have feeble and illogical governance, poor 
security of civil autonomy, and insufficient legal structure to warranty property rights. In 
the same way there is inefficient contract enforcement and higher the transaction costs 
which remove the economies of investment and output growth. The journey toward 
democracy and free open market has captured a major part of the world from the last few 
decades. The capability to react efficiently to these confronts rely much on country’s 
institutional framework. Construction and rise of these institutions is a prerequisite for 
good governance. Since, without good governance, the targets of sustained growth level 
are not achieved. Research demonstrates that democracy has greater impacts on economic 
growth. Consecutively, good governance is not only the source to the encouragement of 
human rights and security of civil liberties, however good governance is greatly 
associated with economic growth.  
 Dash and Raja (2009) explained the relationship between economic performance 
and good governance. Economic efficiency is strongly related to the existence of 
excellent institutions. Though, the excellence of governance has also been recognized as 
a vital source to affect economic growth. Institutions perform a significant role in 
elaborating the changes in economic efficiency across Indian provinces, however not in 
the case of changes in per capita GDP. Is it depicting that institutional alteration is no 
more significant? It might appear to be contradictions as the Indian provinces that have a 
privileged index of industrialization also maintain a higher level of per capita GDP. It is 
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suggested, as institutional factors perform a major part in influencing economic 
efficiency, so provincial governments should try to improve the governance to acquire 
the higher level of economic growth. 
Mehanna et al. (2010) examined the sustainability of the fundamental association 
among civic and public governance and the level of economic growth for a sample of 23 
economies in the MENA. The study covers the period from 1996 to 2005. This study 
highlights the importance of an economy’s maturity and the surrounded institutional 
learning-by-doing occurrence since a forecaster of the quality and excellence of 
governance. GMM econometric technique is used in the study. The results of 
econometric technique authenticate the hypothesis and explain that the affect of the level 
of economic growth on governance is poor and weaker than the affect of governance on 
economic growth. These results propose that economies in the MENA area ought to 
prefer governance reforms whereas busy in growth encouraging policies for economic 
growth in MENA economies.  
Akram et al. (2011) elucidated that the prevalent poverty is caused by two major 
reasons. These are poor governance and income inequality in Pakistan. This study tries to 
find out the long and short run affects of poor governance and inequality on income 
division and poverty. The time period of the study is 1984-2008. Autoregressive 
Distributive Lag (ARDL) technique is applied to find out the short and long run 
relationship. There is significant relation between poor governance and poverty in the 
long run but no sign is found in the short run. Governance must be improved to minimize 
the poverty. Governance accelerates not only the pace of work but also the quality is 
improved. Having a thorough review of literature, it is vital to elucidate the theoretical 
frame work and introduction of SAARC countries and their fiscal and monetary policies. 
The literature review makes clear that the developed countries adopt counter 
cyclical growth policies. The institutions and governance is good and these help to gain 
stability in developed countries. Whereas in developing economies like SAARC 
countries; pro cyclical growth policies are adopted. There is acute need to adopt counter 
cyclical growth policies and the role of institution should be improved and corruption 
level must be minimized. After a detailed review of literature, theoretical considerations 
and introduction of SAARC countries are explained in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
Theoretical Considerations and Introduction of SAARC 
Countries 
With Reference to Pakistan 
 Theories about growth policies and cyclicality are explained in this part of the 
study. It is also explained that institutions are the ultimate sources which assist the 
government to gain stability. Policies (fiscal and monetary) of SAARC countries are 
made clear.   
3.1 Growth Policies  
There is no macroeconomic policy or plan in the initial 160 years of economic 
history. The economic thoughts and ideas of Smith, Ricardo, Mill, Marshall, and Pigou 
concern with the allocation of resources among different factors of production. Likewise, 
output fluctuations generate business cycle. This is a momentary disequilibrium which 
damage and disturb economic activities and are known as classical and neo classical 
thoughts. However, after Great Depression, fiscal policy is considered as the main source 
to bring stability in the economy. So, depression can be minimized via expansionary or 
contractionary fiscal and monetary policy. It might generate economic cyclicality 
(Garnaut, 2005). Thus, growth policy is the need of both developed and developing 
countries of the world in order to achieve stability.     
The economies of the world which follow the policies of economic experts have 
gained the higher level of economic growth. However, the LDCs fail to follow the 
policies of professionals according to their circumstances (Harberger, 1985). The process 
of growth policy is significant as it provides the paths and ways to achieve certain level 
of growth. Easy logical rules and regulations of growth policies assist the factors of 
production to increase the productivity. The basic principle of growth policy is that the 
government should look after and protect people against the local and foreign violence 
and aggression. It is the responsibility of the government to protect the possessions and 
property of the people under its control and resolve clashes. So, the people should be free 
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to follow the different aims and goals in life (Greaves, 1995). It is the utmost need of the 
developing countries to adopt such growth policies which enhance economic activities. 
Fiscal and Monetary policies are commonly adopted by the governments of developing 
economies for stability. 
3.1.1 Growth Policies and the Business Cycle  
Since the last three decades, a large number of economists predict the long term 
pattern of economic growth, by keeping in view the business cycle. Ups and downs in 
cycles do not disturb the economists in building the economic models. (Abreu and 
Brunnermeier, 2003). Cyclicality of growth policies (fiscal and monetary) is significant 
in selecting the correct long run path to acquire the economic targets.  
 However, the risks in selecting the exact fiscal and monetary policy are very high 
(Lucas, 2003). After the great depression of 1930, these policies gained much 
importance. Keynesian approach is remained part and parcel of economic policies in 
many countries of the world. The traditional Keynesian policy suggested that fiscal 
policies are countercyclical. However, fiscal policy may be countercyclical, acyclical or 
procyclical. Barro (1979) explained that fiscal policy should be impartial over the 
business cycle. Such policy must react only to unexpected changes that influence the 
government’s budget limitation.  
Cyclicality is a common phenomenon in the process of economic growth. 
Countries adopt counter cyclical, acyclical or procyclical growth policies. The 
neoclassical theory makes it clear that there are four reasons for government expenditure 
to act as counter-cyclical. a) In order to level the government expenditure, it is supposed 
that expenditure should fall throughout booms and rises throughout recessions. b) keep 
away from overheating the economic conditions of the economy. c) For prudential 
motive, observe carefully the lasting and momentary changes in the level of economic 
actions. d) There is the obviously counter-cyclical social insurance module of 
government consumption. Unemployment assistance and social programs are negatively 
connected with the cyclicality. Though, developing economies adopt procyclical growth 
policies. Procyclicality of growth policy (fiscal and monetary) is due to weak domestic 
financial structure, mounting debts, and low credibility in their growth policies (Lane, 
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2003a, Talvi and Vegh, 2005 Kaminsky, et al. 2004). The cyclicality of policies are 
explicated by a number of variables. 
 For the cyclicality of fiscal policy, government expenditure, tax revenue, primary 
balance, government expenditure ratio to GDP, tax revenue ratio to GDP and primary 
balance ratio to GDP are the indicators to assess the cyclicality of fiscal policy. In order 
to evaluate the cyclicality of monetary policy, short term interest rate, money balance and 
real interest rate are the indicators to evaluate the cyclicality of monetary policy 
(Kaminsky et al. 2004). A number of studies use the government expenditure as a proxy 
for cyclicality of fiscal policy, as Alesina, et al. (2008), Woo (2009), Lledo et al. (2009), 
Ilzetzki (2011) and Badinger (2012). 
It is found that fiscal policy in Latin American economies has been differentiated 
as lenient throughout boom and stiff during recession. Lane (2003a) explained that the 
pro-cyclicality is stricter for developing economies than for developed economies. Lane 
(2003a) explained about the OECD countries that spending groups are differentiated by 
various levels of cyclicality. As pro cyclical fiscal policy is found in the economies where 
output is more volatile and political conditions are not stable. Alesina and Wagner (2006) 
elucidated that the developing countries adopt pro cyclical growth policies due to the 
weak institutions. The governments in developing economies adopt such policies due to 
poor institutions (Slimane et al. 2010). So, the weak institutions in the developing 
countries are the main reason in pursuing procyclical fiscal policy. The countries 
practicing poor fiscal policy too have weak institutions, pervasive corruption, be deficient 
in the application of property rights, negation of contracts, and prevalence of political 
institutions which do not restrain their politicians (Acemoglu, et al. 2003a). But, the 
importance of the institutions is now recognized fully. It does not take into consideration 
entirely in the empirical studies of the economists.  
3.1.2 The Role of Institutions 
Institutions are the structure of rules, laws or ordinary rights within which persons 
perform like inmates. Institutional economics links to Hume. Taking indication from 
Hume and the modern terminology, business ethics deal with the rules of conduct come 
up from difference of interests. However, economics concerns with the similar rules of 
behavior imposed by the collective economic sanctions of profit or loss. Institutional 
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economics is frequently concern with the comparative merits and effectiveness of 
constraints (Commons, 1931). Institutions are part and parcel of every society. How these 
institutions are evolved in history. What are the characteristics of successful societies? 
How societies evolve good qualities in history. A Historical and Comparative 
Institutional Analysis (HCIA) is developed on the lines of Aoki (1996). HCIA is an effort 
to discover the function of history in institutional appearance and change. There are two 
ways to analyze the institutions. First, game theory is applied to evaluate the evolution of 
institutions. The second method is to evaluate through cultural and social features (Greif, 
1998b). Institutional Economics brings together economic science; it explains how 
different parts of economics are interrelated to the whole economic theory (Hamilton, 
1919). The role of institutions in economic growth always keeps an important position in 
the history of economics. From 1840 to 1930, the Germans flourished the institutional 
economics and in the decades of 1940s and 1950s, the Americans explained the role of 
institutions in economic growth. The institutional economics thoughts are based upon the 
ideas of Veblen and Commons. The institutional structure is the product of individual’s 
action in the society (Hodgson, 2009). The role of both individuals and institutions is 
significant in economic stability. 
Every individual has different taste, thinking and liking and disliking. These are 
institutional variables and have complex role in economics (Veblen, 1919). The role of 
institutions is first fully explicated by North (1990). There are three major approaches to 
make clear the issue of institutions. The first and foremost approach is the elaboration of 
institutions from the historical perspective and this task is started with the work of North 
(1990). The second approach is known as comparative institutional analysis, evaluated by 
Aoki (2001). The third approach is analyzed as imperfect information theory. Institutions 
are elucidated in the form of strategic behavior (Bardhan, 2000).   
According to the institutional economics theory, the institutional structure and 
framework of a country has a major role in making and implementing economic policies. 
The economies have poor policies due to poor institutions. So the economic and political 
institutions perform the low standard work. In the presence of corruption, weak property 
rights and law and order situation, it is difficult for developing countries to fully utilize 
fiscal and monetary policies (Acemoglu, et al. 2003a). These growth policies have been 
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effectively used by the developed countries with sound institutions. Institutions perform 
their role efficiently when these are deep rooted and independent to play their assigned 
tasks. The countries where there is supportable security and protection, every person 
willing to invest and work hard to increase his income, however where there are the 
issues of security and threat, common man will not take interest to work and bury his 
possessions.  
In the same way, the neo classical economists do not pay due attention to the role 
of institutions in the growth process. An additional, but more robust and significant issue 
of neo classical thoughts is to reduce the economic activity to only technical production 
purpose and do not pay attention to the property rights and sense of security (Rodrik, 
2000). The role of institution in the growth is enhanced by a number of economists. 
Institutions have certain role in almost every economic activity.  Wolf, Jr (1955) 
examined that institutions motivate or hamper the process of economic growth. 
Particularly, institutions effect economic growth via the calculation of cost of economic 
agents, knowledge, relations of workers and motivation factors. So, Institutions have 
important position in attaining the economic growth. Further, the relationship among 
institutional structure and economic efficiency is also made clear through an approach of 
New Institutional Economics (NIE). The pioneer work is done by Coase (1937). When 
transactions become expensive then institutions have to perform their role. This thought 
is also explained by Williamson (1975). The transaction ought to be the decisive 
foundation of analysis as it includes in itself the three major laws, conflict, mutuality and 
order (Commons, 1931). 
However, NIE is also analyzed by Alchian (1950) and North and Thomas (1973). 
It is also explained in a study of the World Bank (2002) that the major challenge for 
development policy in the twenty-first century is the provision of efficient market 
supporting institutions. Nelson and Sampat (2001) explained three special applications of 
institutions as a variable. The institutions have deep rooted effects on economic growth.  
a) The rule of the game is the first approach linked with North (1990). This technique is 
also found in Coase (1964) work. According to this technique, institutions are well 
defined rules and regulations which can predict the certain type of behavior from 
individual. The institutions assist and help individuals to perform their assigned role. b) 
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The second technique is linked with Williamson (1985) and it is already presented by 
Coase (1937). According to this technique, institutions are taken as governance 
structures. The importance is given to the ownership designs, hierarchies and cultural 
issues. One solution presented by this approach is to give guarantee the property rights. c) 
The third technique of institutions is linked with the work of Axelrod (1984). In his 
widespread investigation of co-operation, it is found, how co-operation can appear in a 
world of self interested agents. In this situation, institutions can determine information 
and the solution of problems in a decentralized method (Dixit, 2009). In the same way the 
two types of institutions has two types of effects on economic growth. Type 1; 
institutions capture the rules of the game and this type of institutions are supporting to 
economic activities. Type I; institutions contain the institutions of property rights as 
recommended by Rodrik (2000). The superiority of Type one institutions may be 
captured by the quality of the indicators such as rule of law, agreement enforceability, 
threat of expropriation, authority and responsibility, judicial capability and neutrality, and 
faith. The type II; institutions have also been analyzed by Rodrik (2000). These types of 
institutions measure the institutions like governance structure. Regulatory institution is 
one of the examples of type II institution. The excellence of Type II institutions can be 
captured by the worth of indicators as bureaucratic efficiency, policy predictability, law 
and corporate governance, and accountability.    
Rigobon and Rodrik (2005) explicated that the relationship between economic 
institutions, political institutions, trade openness and the different levels of income. The 
ordinary least squares approach is used to explain the relationship between economic, 
political institutions and total output. Both political and economic institutions have 
significant effect on economic growth.  
However, the developing economies adopt procyclical policies due to poor 
performance of institutions. The theories of institutions explain the lack of strong legal 
and political institutions and the coexistence of various influential groups in country. 
Therefore, the general pool problems and disintegration can be inclined to affect the 
decision-making procedure of fiscal policymakers (Tornell and Lane, 1999). In this 
study, SAARC countries’ economic and political institutions are examined. These 
institutions play robust role in stability of these countries.    
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3.1.3 Governance  
The most important issue of the present developing world is governance. Poor 
governance in developing world not only deteriorates the economic conditions but 
disrupting the present and the future of these countries. Governance is a difficult and 
multifaceted concept. As Keefer (2009) explained that there is no complete definition of 
governance which helps to arrange the literature on governance. Weiss (2000) explained 
the seven definitions of governance. In the same way, the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD, 2009) discussed seventeen definitions of 
governance.  
The thought of governance is not new. Initial debate reverts to at least 400 B.C, to 
the Arthashastra. It is an excellent piece of writing on governance credited to Kautilya, 
the chief minister to the emperor of India. Kautilya gives major pillars of governance 
which are justice, ethics, and anti-autocratic. It is also stressed that emperor must protect 
the assets of the state and people. It is also the duty of the emperor to increase, preserve 
and maintain the assets and wealth of the state and people (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2008).  
The present concept of governance evolved through history.  
 The power and command to guide society has been diffused away from king 
towards elected representatives, administrators, civil servants and leaders. This change 
takes a long time struggle. Eventually, economic growth has pooled with varying values, 
traditions and institutions. For this the structure, the nature, resources and exercising 
authority all over society, in government, organizations, associations and families are 
resettled. These drastic changes require governance. Democracy is the first result of the 
long and hard struggle of the people. Thus the increased productivity alters the modes of 
governance (OECD, 2001). With the changing pattern of economic growth, the style, 
ways and methods of governance are improved.  
In order to measure the governance, there are a number of governance indices and 
indicators are developed. There are almost 180 governance indicators used in different 
parts of the world (World Bank, 2007). However, the governance could not get due 
importance till late 1990s, especially focused by the World Bank. As, World Bank 
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president Wolfensohn made clear that World Bank must review the policy of loan. It will 
be associated with political performance as less corruption (Arndt and Oman, 2006).  
The governance indicators are developed to assess the performance of institutions 
from different perspective like rule based governance and outcome based governance. A 
rules-based indicator assesses whether there is laws and legislation about a certain issue 
like corruption or have anticorruption agency. An outcome based indicators shows 
whether the laws are implemented or not. It also shows whether there is political 
interference in executing these laws against corruption (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2008). 
Therefore, the most common and popular governance indicators are developed 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), the World Bank’s 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment index (CPIA), the World Bank and  
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), Freedom House’s 
political right and civil liberty index and the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI). 
Therefore, the role of governance is significant in attaining higher level of 
economic growth. The focal point of governance is the private sector, state and civil 
society. These are essential elements to acquire sustainable economic growth. The state is 
responsible to give encouraging political and legal surroundings to the people. The 
private sector creates jobs for the people of the country and civil society increases the 
communication between social and political segment of the society. Society has its own 
role in the process of economic growth. Developed societies have developed institutions 
and institutions are sources for governance. For developing countries, governance is the 
utmost need for growth. There are two approaches, market enhancing governance and 
growth enhancing governance. Market enhancing governance assists to minimize the 
transaction cost. Growth enhancing governance enables the institutions to accelerate the 
movement of assets to productive sectors of the economy by adopting new technologies 
(Khan, 2007).  
Institutions are contributor to governance in the subsequent ways: (1) direct 
information concerning public goods. This also facilitates government control well (2) 
decrease the possibility of clashes and assist to put agreements into effect (3) give clear 
and apparent methods to govern businesses, this can be achieved through minimizing the 
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corruption red tap (4) provide competitive atmosphere via efficient regulations (5) 
institutions give guarantee through a structure of incentives and fines, so to develop 
required behavior for economic growth (WDR, 2002).  
In the same way, the OECD establishes a committee, the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC), this committee set the order of priority, effective and accountable 
governance, protection of human rights and the rule of law for the development of a 
country (Knack and Manning, 2003).  
3.2 An Introduction to SAARC Countries 
South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) consists of 8 
independent countries, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutn, India, Pakistan, Maldives, Nepal 
and Sri Lanka. SAARC was founded in 1985. The total area of SAARC is 5130746 KM
2
, 
(www.SAARC-Sec.org). The SAARC area is differentiated by various land forms. It is as 
of tropical to moderate, and as of moist to dry. People in South Asia are living together 
for centuries. This region is a combination of different religions and culture. The major 
part of the SAARC remains under colonial British Raj for two centuries. South Asia 
comprises a number of countries of extremely unequal size. It is collection of the huge 
economy of India, with a population of 1.2 billion, that stands fifth in the world in 
industrial output, to the small Maldives, having a population of about 300,000 and an 
economy mostly depends on fishing and tourism. The SAARC tolerates the distinction of 
being home to more than 400 million (20 percent) of the world’s poorest people. There 
are about 50 percent of the world’s underfed offspring (Haq and Haq, 1998). Being a 
under developed region, the economic growth rate is not consistent. There are ups and 
downs in the economies. This region gained growth and minimized the poverty level to 
some extent. But the current situation in SAARC is also depressing due to international 
and natural causes. The worldwide financial crisis reduces the volume of economic 
growth, fuel and food price rises in 2008, and this raises poverty in the region. The 
natural disasters further deteriorated circumstances in South Asia. In Bangladesh, poverty 
level increase from 35 percent to 40 percent in 2008. In India, the poverty moved from 30 
percent to 36 percent. Increasing poverty can also be observed in Pakistan and Sri Lanka. 
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Both the two nations have faced burdens of terrorism and civil war which increases the 
poverty level in these countries (Hossain et al. 2010).   
3.2.1 SAARC Countries: Fiscal and Monetary Policy 
3.2.1.1 Bangladesh 
Bangladesh is flourished under the shine of cultural grandeur and suffered under the 
ruin of war. The area now comprises of Bangladesh is remained under the Muslim rulers 
for more than five centuries from 1201 to 1757 A.D. Then, British ruled over this part of 
Sub-continent for 190 years. With the extinction of the British rule in August, 1947 this 
part of land is divided into India and Pakistan. Bangladesh was then a part of Pakistan 
and is known as East Pakistan. After 24 years it separated from Pakistan and becomes an 
independent state in 1971.  
Bangladesh is situated in the north eastern part of SAARC region. The neighboring 
countries are India which is to the west, north and northeast whereas Myanmar is to the 
south-east and the Bay of Bengal is to the south. The total area of the country is 147570 
sq. k.m. There are hill on the north east and south east of the country. The country mainly 
consists of plains. There are three main rivers, Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Meghna. 
Bangladesh is a low-lying riverine earth. Humid monsoons, floods and cyclones impose 
serious harm in the delta area. There is a hot and humid summer from March to June; 
rainy monsoon spell from June to October; and a cool winter from October to March. 
Islam is main religion. Bangla is national language and Takka is currency. 
In the era of 1970s the economy is deteriorated due to independence struggle. A 
number of reforms are introduced after the first decade of independence. The policy 
transformation in the 1980s is largely directed towards extraction of food and agrarian 
grants, privatization, financial openness, and extraction of import constraints (Ahmed 
2003). With regard to fiscal policy, such steps are taken; there are more revenue 
mobilization and a larger control on the current expenditure. Budget deficit is carefully 
handled in spite of reducing foreign aid. In the same way, private sector is not forced to 
crowd out. The government of Bangladesh faces serious hardships to continue such 
policy. These difficulties enhance when foreign aid also fell. Up to 1980s, foreign aid has 
significant role to fulfill the government expenditure. The foreign aid is reduced rapidly 
in the decade of 1990s (Osmani et al. 2003). Due to less foreign aid, the government has 
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to fulfill the gap through taxes. But tax to GDP ratio is also low in Bangladesh. Hence, 
another way for the government is to minimize or divert expenditure in such sectors 
which assist to increase the GDP. The government of Bangladesh has slowly withdrawn 
from the direct involvement in production sectors. Now, the government spends money in 
health, education and infrastructure sectors (Mahmud et al. 2008).   
But increasing fiscal deficit becomes major issue for the stability of the economy. 
Fiscal deficits are generally funded by getting loans from the banking system and foreign 
aid. Domestic private borrowings are restricted. Fiscal deficits are, therefore an 
independent source of money supply and normally are not related to the demand side 
factors of the economy (Hossain: 1988). 
In order to raise money to meet the expenditures, the government use monetary policy 
as an effective source. The Bangladesh Bank (BB) issues an order in 1972 about the 
monetary policy. The major purpose of the monetary policy is to bring price stability, 
sustained growth level and increasing employment level. In the first two decades fixed 
exchange rate is used. This generated high inflation rate in the economy. In 2003, the BB 
issued a new order about the monetary policy. According to this order, new tools are used 
as broad money, reserve money, reserve requirement ratio and interbank rate to achieve 
the growth and stability.  
   3.2.1.2 Bhutan 
Bhutan is a small Himalayan empire located among China and India. The 
geographical hurdles permitted the kingdom to keep its independence all through the 
past. Prehistoric goods and items are found which show that there are settlements in this 
region dating back to 2000 B.C. The total area of Bhutan is 38,394 square kilometers. 
The country is landlocked and no access to any sea port. Bhutan has one of the most 
dreadful mountainous topography in the world. It ranges from 100 to 7500 meters high. 
The climate is different in different parts of the country. Summer with monsoon rains and 
dry and harsh winter are the characteristic of the climate. Forests cover almost 72 percent 
of the land and rich ecosystem. 
The King, Wangchuck, J. D. (1952-1972) established extensive political, common, 
social and economic improvements. The institutions like National Assembly, the judicial 
system, the Royal Advisory Council and the establishment are developed by the King. 
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Five year development plans are introduced by the King from 1961. Bhutan became the 
member of UN in 1971 (9
th
 Five year Plan). 
Planned development program is started in Bhutan, in 1961. However, current public 
finance systems are developed later. The modern public finance structure is started 
working from the launching of third five year plan in 1970. At the initial stage the 
government heavily dependent upon the aid from Indian government. This aid is linked 
with royalties of forests. The taxation structure remains undeveloped till 1980s as it takes 
a long time to come out from the hands of feudal lords. Corporation tax is introduced in 
1982. In 1986, Chhukha hydro electric power project becomes the major source of 
revenue of the government. The regular share in total revenue is 30 percent for the decade 
of 2000.  
 The role of the government in the development process is exceptionally large. 
Private sector is not given due importance. Besides provision of infrastructure and social 
services, the government also produces the consumer goods and services. In the same 
way, the budget deficit is kept within control by adopting two common strategies. It is the 
top priority of the government to fulfill expenditure through the revenue generated 
domestically. The government tries to fulfill capital expenditure according to the 
availability of foreign resources. This is the fiscal policy which is adopted by the 
government. However, due to fall in revenue and increasing expenditure make it difficult 
to follow the same path. In the decade of 1990s, Bhutan really has extra revenue than 
expenditure on the average, but throughout the period 2000-01- 2003-04 the shortfall 
increases up to 2 percent of the GDP (World Bank, 2011). 
 The role of money in Bhutan’s economic system is not too old. Till 1960, barter 
system remains in use in villages. The trade is limited to Tibet. In early 1960s, trade is 
opened with India; here money is used as a source of exchange. Indian rupee is used for 
transaction. This is the regular start of Bhutan’s trade with the Indian economy. The first 
paper currency is developed in 1974 by The Royal Government of Bhutan (RGOB). This 
currency is pegged with Indian rupee. Indian rupee is used side by side with Bhutan’s 
own currency. Royal Monetary Authority (RMA) is developed in 1983. Then the central 
bank is given authority to issue notes and keep foreign reserves. In 1984, to control the 
issue of liquidity of money, the significant tool of cash reserve ratio is introduced by the 
 55 
 
government. In 1988, the RMA is assigned with a special task to be the bank of the 
government. The bank has to keep the government deposits and provide finance 
whenever it is demanded. 
3.2.1.3 India 
India is the largest country of SAARC region both in population and area. The total 
area is 3.29 million sq K.M. India becomes an independent state on 15
th
 Aug, 1947. The 
majority of population is Hindu. For centuries, India has been under severe attacks of 
invaders from Iran, Central Asia, Arabs and the West. Therefore, the living style of 
Indian people has captivated and modified by the influences of such invaders. The 
economy of India is growing rapidly; there is more than 7 percent economic growth in 
the decade since 1997. The major neighboring countries are Pakistan, Bangladesh, China 
and Bhutan.  
The Legal system of India is one of the oldest legal systems in the world. The 
current legal system has its roots in the legislature developed during the Colonial era. A 
written constitution is adopted in 1949. From 1947 to 1991, the Constitution of India has 
deep effects on legal structure of the country. But after four decades, Import Substitution 
Policy has no significant role in the economy; economic reforms are introduced in 
different segments of the economic institutions of India. Regulatory authorities are 
formed to enhance the performance of different organizations as electricity, 
telecommunication and capital markets.  The constitution of India is amended in 2004 
which enhances constitutional protection for property rights and state declares to protect 
human rights (Burke et al.2006).  
In the initial years of independence, the main focus of economic growth policies 
is to increase sustained economic growth to minimize income inequality.  From 1950-67, 
the major focus of economic growth is to increase investment, economic growth and 
improve social justice. From 1967-1980, a known policy of Import substitution is adopted 
and an increasing control of the government in the economy (Acharya et al. 2003). In 
order to attain these targets, fiscal and monetary policies are essential sources towards the 
path of success. The structure of fiscal and monetary policy in India linked with the 
provisions of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934. Fiscal policy dominates the monetary 
policy (Raj, 2011). The Indian Constitution gives the structure for fiscal policy. India has 
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a known federal form of government. The government’s authority to tax and spend is 
divided into three parts. The central, provincial and local governments have the authority 
to collect tax. In the decade of 1980s, the main aim of fiscal policy is to move private 
savings to accommodate to the expenditure and investment requirements of the public 
sector. Due to the problem of balance of payment of 1991, the government started to 
liberalize the economy. The economy is opened for foreign investors and FDI is 
appreciated, minimized the trade barriers, the private sector are supported and the 
structure of quotas is removed (Supriyo De, 2012). Therefore, India attained significant 
growth targets. For this purpose monetary policy also performed major role.  
Reserve Bank of India is established in 1935, according to the Indian Act, 1934. 
The primary function is to issue notes, regulate credit and secure the monetary stability. 
So price stability and as result growth stability are main objectives of monetary policy. 
Monetary policy structure has remained under continuous change. In the decade of 1960s, 
inflation is volatile due to structural changes in the economy. In the decade of 1970s the 
inflation remains at higher level due to expansionary fiscal policies. In 1998, the central 
bank has adopted a multiple approach and different variables as credit, output growth, 
trade openness, FDI and fiscal situation is used to develop a feasible monetary viewpoint. 
Monetary targeting approach is not successful in India as reserve bank has no direct 
control on money (Mohanty, 2010).  
3.2.1.4  Nepal 
The state is divided into three major geographical areas. These areas are the 
Himalayas, the Hills and the plain land which is known as Terai. The total area of this 
country is 147,181 sq km.  The Himalayan area is the northernmost area of the country. It 
expands from east to west and it is about 15 percent of the whole land area of Nepal. In 
this area, there are 16 districts of Nepal are situated. This region is known as the habitat 
of beautiful animals and plants. Hills are situated between the Himalayas and the plains. 
It covers 68 percent of the land area of Nepal. There are 39 districts in this region. The 
Plain land covers 17 percent area of Nepal. These are fertile lands. It is 100 to 300 meters 
above the sea level, 48 percent population lives in these lands. 
In 1951, the Nepali monarch has finished the old system of rule (inheritance of 
emperor) and introduced a cabinet system of administration. So, in 1990, a system of 
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multiparty democracy is established. A rebellion is raised by Maoist extremists in 1996. 
After a decade of civil war, the King dissolves the cabinet and the ultimate power of the 
King. Elections are held in 2008. The newly elected Assembly elected the first president 
of the country, in July 2008. There are two major political parties in the country, known 
as the United Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist and the second party is Nepal-United 
Marxist-Leninist (CIA fact book, 2012).  
Earlier to the 1950s, the feudal lords struggle for economic growth at the cost of 
the rural population. The pace of economic growth is very low. But under the system of 
Panchayat, a series of 5-year plans tried to force government control over all parts of the 
economy. Yet, due to poor infrastructure, geographical hardships, and wide spread 
corruption, the majority of population especially in rural areas still lagging behind. The 
major source of revenue of the government of Nepal is land tax and a tariff on trade 
before 1951. This dependency on the income of middleman and trade tax does not 
increase revenue sufficiently. This petty income is not enough to use for the welfare of 
the people. So, in the late 1950s, different types of taxes are introduced as income, sale 
and property tax. Now, corporate income tax is 25 percent of the total revenue. 
Progressive income tax is introduced in the economy. Different kinds of taxes are further 
introduced in the economy just to increase the revenue for the government, as value 
added tax and sales taxes. However, the income generated through taxes is not enough. 
Tax structure has certain weaknesses. Import related indirect tax make up 50 percent of 
tax revenue. Nepal’s tax to GDP ratio is lower than the tax to GDP ratios of low income 
countries (LICs). In the regional perspective, Nepal’s tax revenue ratio is lower than 
other Asian countries by 2-3 percent points, and even to Sri Lanka (Dobrescu et al. 
2011). In the decade of early 1980s, the government increases the expenditure but it 
generates instability. The government expenditures are increasing rapidly than revenue. 
Fiscal deficit is 2.8 percent for the year of 2010 (ADB, 2010).    
From the foundation of the central Nepal Rastra Bank (1956), Nepal starts to 
acquire control of its foreign reserves. Before this the Central Bank of India performs the 
essential services about reserves. Up to 1960, the Central Bank of India and Indian Rupee 
functioned in Nepal. The Naples economy is disturbed with the fluctuation in Indian 
Rupee. Therefore the Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB) has to perform fully to maintain stability 
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in the economy. The Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB) Act, 2058 obviously states the main goal 
of Monetary Policy. Overall, main targets of the monetary policy is to maintain and 
arrange the liquidity for sustained economic growth; hold the inflation inside a attractive 
limit; and keep an encouraging balance of payment.  
Nepal Rastra Bank starts implementing the monetary policy since mid 1960. The 
major instruments for monetary policy are credit control, interest rate, margin rates, 
refinance rate, and cash reserve ratio. In the decade of 1970s, liquidity prerequisite, credit 
ceilings rules and credit programs with guidance are launched. Open market operations 
developed in the decade of 1990s. Cash reserves and bank rate are significant monetary 
policy tools, developed in late 1990s (Khatiwada, 2005). 
3.2.1.5  Sri Lanka 
 The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, former name is Ceylon. It is an 
island in the Indian Ocean about 28 kilometers away from the southeastern coast of India. 
The total population is 21 million; Sinhalese make up 74 percent of the population.  
 In 1815, the British conquered the Sri Lanka and it becomes a Crown Colony. The 
British developed a plantation economy which is based on tea, rubber, and coconut. In 
1931, the British gives Sri Lanka a limited self-rule government. Ceylon became an 
independent state on Feb 4, 1948. Sri Lanka is a lower middle income country. The life 
expectancy is 75 years which is the highest in SAARC region. In spite of a cruel civil war 
in 1983, economic growth has remained consistent at 5 percent in the last decade. There 
is a temporary fall in GDP due to global recession. Business confidence bounces back 
rapidly and an International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreement has been signed in 2009 
(CIA Fact Book). 
Sri Lankan state is an island on the Indian Ocean. Sri Lanka remains under 
colonial power approximately four and a half centuries. The first rulers are Portugueses 
(1505- 1658), the second rulers are Dutch (1658-1796) and third ruler are the British 
(1796-1948). In this long era, this country becomes the exchange economy. Sri Lanka 
became an independent state in 1948. Since the very beginning of independence, Sri 
Lanka becomes the dualistic export country. Export of modern plants and conventional 
agricultural are the main characteristics of the economy (Abeyratne and Rodrigo, 2000). 
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In the initial years after independence, the government did not focus on development 
issues due to immediate problems. The foundation of National Planning Council is laid in 
1956. Economic growth during the decade of 1970s remains at low level due to import 
substitution policy. In the same way, in the decade of 1980s, economic growth again at 
low level due to political instability and trade liberalization in the country. In the era of 
1980s, the government expenditures are 8.6 percent which is possible due to increase in 
foreign aid. After 1994, there is decline in the public expenditure, and it fell 3 to 4 
percent of GDP to gain the fiscal stability. In spite of growth in fiscal consolidation 
involving 2002-03 and the 2002 enactment of the Fiscal Management Responsibility Act 
(FMRA), the fiscal condition remains under significant strain. The fiscal deficit surpasses 
8 percent of GDP, in 2003. Besides fiscal policy, monetary policy is helping tool to 
enhance the economic growth. Central Bank has key role.  
The major target of Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) is price stability and 
financial market stability. The CBSL has steadily changed the policy from direct controls 
to market oriented policy since 1977. The policy about credit controls is eliminated and 
the bank rate is also abolished gradually. Therefore, the CBSL has frequently used the 
open market operations for monetary policy. The floating exchange rate is started to use 
by CBSL in 2001. At present, the CBSL carries out monetary policy based on a monetary 
targeting and interest rates, for attaining economic growth and price stability 
(Amarasekara, 2008). But financial crisis disturbs the monetary policy. Former to the 
international financial crisis, monetary policy is steadily tightened due to a quick rise in 
inflation. The monetary policy is again changed by the end of 2008. Therefore, the 
benchmark repurchases and reverse-repurchase rates are minimized consecutively, by 
9.75 percent to 7.5 percent (World Bank, 2010). Therefore these modern tools assist to 
achieve the set targets of economic growth.  
 
3.2.1.6  Pakistan 
Islam is introduced to the local people, with the arrival of Arab traders, in 8
th
 
century. Muslims ruled all over India almost 1000 years. Then British gained control and 
remained ruler for almost two centuries. This ideological state is emerged on the map of 
the world on 14
th
 August 1947. At that time, this state consists of two wings, East and 
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West Pakistan. In 1971, Eastern part separated. Therefore, the present total area of 
Pakistan is 796096 sq k.m.  The climate of this region is mostly hot in plain areas, dry in 
desert, moderate in northwest, chilly in the north. Topography of the country is smooth 
Indus plain in the east; mountains in the north and northwest, Baluchistan plateau is 
located in the west of Pakistan.  The main rivers of Pakistan are the Indus, the Jhelum, the 
Chenab, the Kabul and the Swaan rivers. Urdu is the national language and Rupee is 
national currency. Afghanistan is to the North West of Pakistan, China is to the northeast 
of Pakistan, India is to the east of Pakistan and Iran to the southwest and Arabian Sea is 
to the south.  
3.2.1.6.1  Pakistan’s Economy 
Soon after independence, Pakistan has to face a number of hurdles and hardships. 
But in 66 years, there are ups and down in economic growth. Pakistan’s economic growth 
occurrence over the last sixty years is equally remarkable and unsatisfactory. Our growth 
is significant as per capita income is increased and poverty level fell. Structural changes 
are occurred in our economy. At the time of independence our country is agrarian based 
but with the passage of time manufacturing sector becomes part and parcel of economic 
growth. The share of manufacturing sector is increased upto 80 percent of our exports. 
But at the same time there is increase in poverty level and Pakistan ranks 134th in the list 
of 177 countries of the world in Human Development Index (Hussain, 2010). Pakistan’s 
economic growth rate remains different in different decades. Decade wise economic 
growth of Pakistan is given below. 
3.2.1.6.2  Pakistan’s Growth Rates from 1948-2010 
This new independent state has to struggle hard for survival. Million of refugees 
had to adjust. During the first decade, the whole concern of the establishment is to keep 
the state on its own feet. Pakistan is a primarily agrarian economy, exporting main 
primary commodities (mainly jute and cotton) and importing manufactured commodities 
(primarily consumer goods). The country is therefore, underdeveloped according to the 
classical definition of the term (Wizarat, 2004). Despite political distortion, Pakistan’s 
economy continues efforts towards the higher economic growth. Korean war proves a 
blessing for Pakistan. Exports increased and terms of trade become favorable. However, 
this phase of blessing is short and Pakistan’s exports and import fell. In the early years of 
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1950s, International trade minimizes. From 1950-1955, our exports fell from 10.4 to 3.4 
percent of GDP and in the same way our imports fell from 9.0 to 5.4 percentage of GDP 
(Hussain, 1999).  
The decade of 1960s is known as the best era of economic growth of Pakistan. 
Pakistan makes significant progress in every sector of the economy. In the first five years 
of 1960s, Industrial and agricultural sector makes higher growth. From 1960-1965, 
investors can gain foreign exchange from Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan 
(IDBP) easily. Such loans are granted at a low interest rate. IDBP provide 40 percent 
finance for a new investment project (Amjad, 1982). In the agricultural sector, Green 
Revolution increases the agricultural output. Employment increases. Foreign trade also 
helps to increase the pace of growth. There is an enhancement in Pakistan’s foreign trade 
in early 1960s (Lewis, 1970). Pakistan’s accelerating growth attracts the foreign direct 
investment (FDI). According to State Bank of Pakistan, FDI inflow is Rs. 80 million per 
annum in the decade of 1960s (Chaudhry, 1970). However, Functional inequality is 
preferred. The main focus is on how to increase production.   Many arguments are there 
to support the preliminary inequality of incomes. The government’s focuses the rich, who 
are supposed to generate more savings and in this way investment would increase. The 
government adopts first make the cake and then divide policy. In this era, a few areas are 
focused like Karachi and Central Punjab, whereas Eastern part is ignored. This creates 
political chaos and Eastern Pakistan becomes a new state, Bangladesh. Due to political 
chaos and no significant economic change occurred in the years of 1969-70. Thus these 
years are not added in the study. 
In the decade of 1970s, a new economic structure is introduced, nationalization is 
the main feature. Nationalization is done at large scale from rice units to banks and from 
cotton factories to educational institutions and all these come are under the control of the 
government. These new policies make huge cut on private investment. The GDP fell to 5 
percent but poverty reduced in the decade of 1970s. Gazdar (2000) found that the large 
scale sector is taken over by the state implied huge increase in the number of workers 
with secure employment and access to union membership. The government also 
emphasizes the importance of allotment of residential plots to landless families during the 
1970s. Huge amount is spent in the public sector. Investment is made in long run projects 
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of development. In the decade of 1970s, the foundations for future growth are laid down. 
Basic industries are set up and a base of capital goods industry is established which 
resulted in subsequent growth. The economic policies of the 1970s are responsible for 
growth not only during his own tenure, but also in the period after 1977 (Zaidi, 2005). In 
this decade trade balance is oscillating due to oil shock and nationalization policy. Money 
is devalued and the trade balance is favorable for the year of 1972. In the later half of this 
decade, a new government is established. The economy again put into a new track. 
Nationalization is discarded in growth policies.  
In 1980s, the focus is again on denationalization. It is the main feature of new 
government. Remittances and foreign aid are major sources of finance. In the first half of 
1980s, the economy faces high inflation and a cut in development budget. The major 
reason is a huge cut in foreign aid. The budget deficit increased from Rs. 25650 million 
in 1982-83 to Rs. 52890 million in 1987-88. The deficit is double in this period. 
Therefore, the external debt is also doubled; it is 39.7 percent of GNP in 1987-88. The 
government fails to increase the revenue and it fell from 13.9 percent in 1979-80 to 10.8 
percent in 1986-87. The priority is given to agricultural sector. The share of 
manufacturing sector declines to 43.8 percent in 1987-88 which is 48.3 percent in 1976-
77(Bhatia, 1990). The role of International Monetary Fund (IMF) is increased in the last 
years of this decade. Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) is introduced in the last years 
of the decade. 
This decade is known as political and economic destabilization era. Economic 
growth fell down due to political disturbance and poor governance. The decline in foreign 
aid and sanctions after nuclear explosion has mounted hurdles for Pakistan’s economy. 
Investment ratio fell down by 14 percent in 1998 (Hussain, 2010). Especially, investment 
in manufactured goods declines. Pakistan’s manufactured exports are greater in 1965 than 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Turkey. But in 1990s there is a reversal and Pakistan becomes a 
low GDP growth country of the South Asia (World Bank, 2002). The economy has to 
adopt strict conditionalities of IMF. The main aim of SAP is to control the fiscal deficit. 
The government of Pakistan is forced to cut the deficit up to 4 percent of the GDP. For 
this purpose new taxes are levied and the government expenditure is minimized. From 
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1994-1997, the government collected Rs 140 billion. But tax base is not broadened. Main 
source is indirect taxes. Development expenditure is cut down to less than 3 percent in 
2000 which are above 9 percent in 1980s (Zaidi, 2005). Moreover, macroeconomic 
modification is performed and the focal point is not to reduce expenditure but on 
transferring expenditures in other sectors (Sarmad, 1992). 
 Growth in this decade is influenced by external and internal factors. In the last 
years of the 1990s, debt servicing has crowded out all other public expenditures. More 
than 50 percent of revenue is consumed on only debt servicing. Pakistan has to spend 6 to 
7 billion dollars every year in this head which is approximately two third of our exports 
income. As Pakistan decides to favor USA in the Afghan War, a relief is given in debt 
servicing payment. Low interest rate and time period is extended by US government. In 
this way Pakistan gets benefit of 1.2 to 1.5 billion dollars in the head of debt servicing 
every year (Ali, 2008). Remittances from US and the Middle East countries are increased. 
High oil prices hit the economy hard. So far as the internal factors are concerned, the 
government struggle hard and the trade gap declined. The overall growth performance 
can be explained as the occurrence of growth in data reveals different growth pattern. It is 
shown in the data that there are three growths and two declines occurred. Three growth 
periods are 1952 to 1959, 1961 to 1970, and 2004 to 2009.The two periods of decline are 
1971 to 1992 and 1993 to 2003 (Mc Cartney, 2011).  
3.2.1.6.3 Pakistan’s Fiscal and Monetary Policy 
 Fiscal policy is a significant mechanism of growth stability. It has 
significant affects on income distribution and minimizing poverty. Tax structure and 
expenditure pattern assist to gain such targets. Pakistan’s tax structure is imbalanced; a 
few sectors are heavily taxed while some are ignored. Agriculture and services sectors are 
given free hand. Therefore, there is gap between revenue and expenditure. Even in our 
history, the revenue generation is not focal point of our policy. In the decade of 1980s, 
denationalization is focused. Fiscal deficit remains 6.8 percent of GDP in 1980s. This 
decade is characterized as high public spending and high deficit financing (Mahmood et 
al. 2008). In this decade, revenue is far less than expenditure. The tax revenue declines 
from 13.9 percent in 1979-80 to 10.8 percent of the GDP in 1986-87. In the same way, 
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the share of development expenditures fell from 39.9 percent of the GDP in 1979-80 to 
19.5 percent in 1986-87 (Bhatia, 1990). As the decade of 1990s is politically destabilize 
era, the major focus is to reform the fiscal policy. The main target is to minimize the 
fiscal deficit. The main aim of fiscal policy is to decrease the tax to GDP ratio. However, 
this target is not achieved. In order to raise revenue, certain changes are brought in the tax 
structure. The internal formation of taxation is changed in 2000s. The ratio of income tax 
has increased significantly from 31 percent in 1999-2000 to 39 percent in 2010-11. The 
main problem is the declining ratio of customs and excise duties due to tax reforms. 
Tariff and other trade taxes are minimized from 24 percent at the start of the 2000s to 20 
percent at the end of the decade. Sales tax has become major part of tax revenue. Despite 
several reforms the revenue collection is not increased substantially. Tax to GDP ratio is 
9.2 percent in 2009-10; however it is 15 percent in Sri Lanka and 16 percent in India 
(Economic Survey, 2010-11). Like fiscal policy, monetary policy of a country has 
significant role to improve the economic conditions of the country. 
According to the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) Act (1956), the SBP is a sovereign 
body which is managed by the Board of Directors. This body has the power to control the 
monetary, exchange rate and credit policy in Pakistan. The system of monetary policy 
during the period of 1970-1990, is to control the amount, cost and allotment of credit. It 
can be achieved through credit budgeting and credit ceiling. Due to credit ceiling, banks 
are forced to invest in low yielding projects and political factor minimized the profits 
(Zaidi, 2005). In another act, issued in 1997, SBP has given authority to stop banks to 
issue credit. The SBP can cancel the license of any bank. Hence, the main task of SBP is 
to control the supply of money in the country. SBP makes necessary arrangements about 
the supply of money, according to the requirement of the government. Money supply is 
set to meet with estimated demand, the excess or lower supply of money may generate 
inflation or difficulties to achieve the GDP targets. SBP also introduces the 3 day 
discount rate, in the era of 1990s, which tells the tightening or loosening of monetary 
policy. SBP has fortified the market-oriented policy. According to the new policy reserve 
requirements are minimized, open market actions are supported enlarged the liquidity 
administration and special attention is given to interest rates (Akhtar, 2007). Likewise, in 
the early years of 2000s, the SBP has increased the money supply. But by the end of 
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2007, SBP tighten the monetary policy, M2 is 19.1 percent of GDP in 2005, it fell to 9.6 
percent in 2009 (Economic Survey, 2009-10).  
The decade wise growth in GDP, Expenditures and M2 of all selected countries is 
given below. The values are in US million dollars. 
 
Table3.1: Cumulative Values of GDP, Expenditures and M2 (Million $)  
Bangladesh Years GDP EXP M2 
1981-1990 250550.2 12584.63 1296892.3 
1991-2000 379937 18399.9 4847123 
2001-2010 645598.5 36462.5 24700000 
Bhutan 1981-1990 1746.61 10.46 5666.7 
1991-2000 3335.49 16.24 44547 
2001-2010 6892.19 50.24 245660.5 
India 1981-1990 2168928 260818.8 13300000 
1991-2000 3695943 444694 64300000 
2001-2010 7027949 777781.4 308000000 
Nepal 1981-1990 27647.92 44.89 165843.5 
1991-2000 44770.92 67.41 1014548.2 
2001-2010 67051.46 152.79 4431458 
Pakistan 1981-1990 394369.57 42798.29 2156611 
1991-2000 636624.55 61002.08 9252439 
2001-2010 958014.09 92439.43 35870395 
Sri Lanka 1981-1990 83308.15 97.49 542385.5 
1991-2000 131221.7 222.11 2762123 
2001-2010 209410.2 727.08 11750023 
 Growth Policies of SAARC countries reveal the nature of their functioning 
process. It is evident through the data that expenditures and money base is increased 
sharply as compared to the GDP increase, especially in the decade of 2000s. The 
governments of SAARC region increased expenditures with the increase of GDP which 
show that fiscal policy is pro cyclical. Likewise, money base is increased throughout the 
study period. It also shows that monetary policy is pro cyclical. It is required that the 
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SAARC countries should adopt counter cyclical growth policies (fiscal and monetary). 
Whereas the developed countries adopt counter cyclical policies, such economies cut 
expenditures during boom and increase during recession. Furthermore, institutions are not 
performing well and governance in this region is poor. Economic and political 
institutions and governance has no significant role in attaining the targets of the growth 
policies (Talvi and Vegh, 2005). The countries of SAARC region have to adopt counter 
cyclical growth policies to gain stability. In order to analyze the growth policies of 
SAARC countries, a few econometric techniques are used. In the next Chapter, data 
sources and methodology is elaborated. 
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Chapter 4 
Data Sources and Methodology 
 Data sources and Methodology has key role in empirical findings of the study. For 
the collection of data, certain authentic sources are used. In the same way, modern 
techniques as panel GMM and 2SLS are used to find the results of the study. Principal 
Component Analysis is also applied to develop indices. The methodology of certain 
diagnostic tests is also elucidated.  
4.1 Data Sources  
 The data for the study is panel data and covering the time period of 1981-2010. 
The data is collected from World Development Indicators (2012) KOF Globalization 
Index, Polity iv, Human Right Data Set (Cingranelli and Richards, 2010), Freedom 
House and Quality of Government Institute.  
4.2 Methodology 
 The main purpose of this study is to observe the growth policies; fiscal and 
monetary policy is procyclical, countercyclical or acyclical. The role of institutions is 
focused; strong institutions assist the government in implementing growth policies. 
However, institutions and other growth variables may cause the endogeniety (Falcetti, 
2002). In the same way the data on institutions may cause multicollineraity. So Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) is used to reduce the multicollineraity and dimensionality.    
4.2.1 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
The main purpose of PCA is to decrease the dimensionality of a data set. 
Preisendorfer and Mobley (1988) elucidated that Beltrami (1873) autonomously 
developed the singular value decomposition (SVD) in such a way that formed present 
PCA. Though, it is usually customary that the initial descriptions of present PCA are 
given by Pearson (1901) and Hotelling (1933). PCA is linear combination or grouping of 
the random variables X1, X2…..Xn and rely on the covariance matrix.  
PCA is a statistical procedure which is utilized to observe relationships between 
various quantitative variables. Simply, in the language of mathematics, if, when there are 
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“n” correlated variables, this technique develops uncorrelated elements. Every factor is a 
linear weighted mixture of the “n” variables. As, a set of variables X1……..Xn 
 
  1 11 1 22 2 1........... n nPC a X a X a X       (4.1) 
   
  1 1 2 2...........m m m mn nPC a X a X a X       (4.2) 
Where, mn presents the weight for the mth principal component and the nth 
variable. Indeed such weights are the eigenvectors. The eigenvalue of the related 
eigenvector is the variance for every principal component. The first principal component, 
makes clear the largest feasible variation in the data. In the same way, all following 
principal components (PC2 to PCn) are uncorrelated with the preceding principal 
components however explains slighter proportions of the deviation of the original 
variables (Johnson and Wichtern, 2007). 
4.2.2 Panel Data Model 
Panel data is a commonly used technique. Panel data has time and cross section 
elements. Time series gives information about the changes within subject whereas cross 
section element shows changes between the subjects. 
4.2.2.1 Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) 
GMM is introduced by Hansen (1982). The conservative Instrumental Variable (IV) 
technique is no doubt consistent but ineffective in the occurrence of heteroskedasticity. 
The general technique to overcome this issue is GMM. It uses the orthogonality clause or 
condition for competent estimation in the presence of heteroskedasticity. In other words, 
this approach gives consistent result in the presence of non identical and independent 
(i.i.d) errors (Baum, 2003). 
GMM approach is appropriate for heteroskedasticity error, which is based on a 
weighting matrix. Though, 2SLS makes available consistent coefficient estimates, but 
there is a loss of efficiency and the inconsistency of standard errors estimates in the 
existence of heteroskedasticity, which might probably influence the testing methods and 
results. 
 
 69 
 
 4.2.2.2 Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) 
Much of theory was built on sets or systems of relationships. If the interest was 
only in a particular part of the system or in the system as a whole, the interaction of the 
variables in the model would have important implications for both interpretation and 
estimation of the parameters of model. The implications of simultaneity for econometric 
estimation were recognized long before the method was developed (Working 1926 and 
Haavelmo 1943).  
The zero mean hypothesis ought to hold in order to use linear regression. But 
there are three general examples where this statement may be debased in economic 
research: endogeneity, omitted variable bias, and error or inaccuracy in variables. There 
are different reasons for these problems but the solution is same i.e. instrumental variable 
technique (Baum, 2006). 
The common problem is endogeneity. Endogeneity is a source of irregularity of 
the least square. It needs instrumental variable technique as 2SLS. As a number of the 
right-hand-side variables are endogenous, so 2SLS generality of straightforward panel-
data estimators is required, for exogenous variables (Baltagi, 1981).  
2SLS estimation technique is an efficient estimator in the presence of independent 
and homocedastic errors. This estimator needs to determine variables that congregate two 
conditions prior to be considered as good instruments: 1) relevance constraint: to be 
relevantly related to the endogenous variable  2) exclusion constraint: no effect on 
growth, except its effect through the endogenous variable. 
4.3 Diagnostic Tests 
4.3.1 Model Specification Test 
The Ramsey RESET test is a common test for omitted variables and inaccurate 
functional form. The RESET test put forward that the model specification is appropriate 
and the parameters of the model are stable. 
4.3.2 Identification of the parameters: Order Condition 
In order to calculate the 2SLS estimates, our specification must satisfy the order 
condition for identification. Haavelmo (1944) presented a very general concept of 
identification. Pindyk and Rubinfield (1991) explained the order condition that if an 
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equation is to be identified, the number of predetermined variables excluded from the 
equation must be greater than or equal to the number of included endogenous variables. 
They further state that a necessary condition for an equation to be identified is that 
the number of all variables excluded from the equation be greater than or equal to the 
number of endogenous variables in the model.  There must be minimum as many 
excluded exogenous variables as there are included endogenous explanatory variables in 
equation (Greene, 2003). 
4.3.3 Autocorrelation 
There are a number of diagnostic tests for the existence of serial error correlation 
in a panel data model. Bhargava et al. (1982) simplified the Durbin-Watson test statistic 
to the fixed effects panel data model. Baltagi and Lee (1995) originated an LM statistic to 
diagnose the first order serial correlation. Drukker (2003) presented a simple test to detect 
the serial correlation based on OLS, it is originally developed by Wooldridge (2002). In 
order to detect autocorrelation Durbin and Watson (1950 and 1971) developed a test 
statistics. 
 4.3.4.  Heteroskedasticity 
 
 As panel data naturally shows serial correlation and GroupWise 
heteroskedasticity (Greene 2000). Baum (2001) examined that the error procedure may 
well be homoskedastic within cross-sectional units, however its variance might differ 
across units: a clause known as groupwise heteroskedasticity. The null hypothesis 
specifies that σi
2
 = σ2 for i = 1, . . . , Ng, where Ng is the number of cross-sectional units.  
4.3.5  Over identification Test   
The Sargan test is a performed to evaluate for over identification of a model. The 
Sargan test states that the residuals should not be correlated with exogenous variables. If 
the null hypothesis is proved then the instruments are valid. In other words, Sargan test of 
over identification is that the instruments are valid instruments, if uncorrelated with the 
error term. According to the null hypothesis, the test statistic is disseminated as chi-
squared in the number of (L-K) over identifying restrictions. In order to evaluate in 2SLS, 
the test statistic is designed as N*R-squared from a regression of the instrumental 
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variable residuals. The combined null hypothesis is that the expelled instruments are 
correctly excluded from the growth equation, and that the equation is properly specified. 
In the same way, Hansen J statistic is common technique for the over identification of model. 
J statistic is reliable in the occurrence of heteroskedasticity.  
 
4.3.6. Weak Identification 
There are a number of test developed to check the weak identification among the 
regressor and excluded instruments. Stock and Yogo (2005) developed a test to check the 
existence of weak instruments. The critical values for a weak-instruments test are not 
similar for different estimators because the estimators are not influenced to the similar 
degree by weak instruments. When applying the rk (Wald statistic, as the forceful analog 
of the Cragg and Donald), statistic to analyze for weak identification, it is essential to 
apply carefully the critical values accumulated by Stock and Yogo (2005). In case of i.i.d. 
pass on to the older rule of thumb of Staiger and Stock (1997), accordingly, the F statistic 
should be at least 10 for weak identification. In the same way, the Anderson and Rubin 
(1949) developed a test of the significance of the endogenous regressors. When 
estimating a reduced-form equation for y with completes instruments as regressors. 
The Anderson and Rubin (1982) statistic is vigorous to the occurrence of weak 
instruments. As instruments become weak, the null H0 : γ1 = 0 is less likely to be rejected 
(Baum et al. 2007). 
4.3.7. Endogeniety Test 
 
Durbin (1954), Wu (1973) and Hausman (1978) developed endogeneity test. 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) tests, estimates the model through both OLS and IV 
techniques. This test can simply be performed by adding the residuals of every 
endogenous right-hand side variable, as a function of the entire exogenous variables, in a 
regression of the unique and original model. By applying these techniques, empirical 
results are found and are given in the following chapter. 
 
 
 
 72 
 
Chapter 5 
Model Selection And Empirical Results 
Model selection has vital role in findings of study. The dynamic equations with 
lagged values are selected to capture the cyclicality of fiscal and monetary policy. In this 
study 14 models are evaluated for both fiscal and monetary policy.  
Fiscal Policy, Institutions And Governance 
5.1  Selection of Empirical Model 
In order to evaluate the fiscal policy cyclicality, fiscal response is assessed 
through the government expenditure. As cyclicality is a significant idea which tells and 
assists to understand the direction of fiscal policy. The data for the study is panel data, 
covering the time period of 1981-2010 and the economies of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, 
Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are studied in this study. The data is collected from World 
Development Indicators (2012) KOF Globalization Index, Polity iv, Human Right Data 
set (Cingranelli and Richards, 2010), Freedom House and Quality of Government 
Institute. 
This study uses the following model to evaluate the cyclicality of fiscal policy.  In 
this study, the dynamic equation with lagged values is used.  
1 1 2 3it it it it it itLGE LGE LY X                (5.1) 
Where  is the difference, L is the log, GE is the government consumption expenditure, 
Y is the Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP), X is a vector of control variable, 
it , 
disturbance term, 
it is the intercept and all  s are coefficients and i is for countries and 
t is for time. Where Xit is 
 , ,, , , , , , , , ,it it it it it it it it it it it it it itX ECO K OP GV PI IMP REV POPM DCP FA EXP EGV PGV  
 
itECO = Economic Institutions  ,itK = Investment   
 
,itOP = Trade Openness   itGV = Governance Variable  
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itPI = Political Institutions   REVit= Total Revenue  
 POPMit= Population    FAit = Foreign Assets 
 DCPit= Domestic Credit to Private Sector EXPit = Exports 
 IMPit= Imports    EGVit= Economic Governance 
 PGVit= Political Governance 
This type of model is also used by a number of economists in their empirical 
studies, as Thorton (2008), Lane (2003b) and Woo (2003). Since in this study, 2SLS and 
Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) techniques are used. Pooled OLS results are 
given in appendix but due to upward biasedness, the results are not consistent.   It is 
evaluated either the fiscal policy is counter cyclical, pro cyclical or acyclical. The 
following are the models used to evaluate the fiscal policy in the perspective of 
institutions and governance. 
5.1.1 Fiscal Policy Models 
5.1.1.1) Fiscal Policy and Economic Institutions Model 
 
  
         
           (5.2) 
 5.1.1.2) Fiscal Policy and Political Institutions Model                 
    
             (5.3) 
5.1.1.3) Fiscal Policy and Governance Model    
     
                      (5.4)    
5.1.1.4) Fiscal Policy, Economic Institutions and Interaction Variable 
                             
              (5.5) 
1 2 1 3 4it it it it it itLGE LY LGE LECO LEXP          
( , , )LPOPM LREV LDCP LIMP 
1 2 1 3 4it it it it it itLGE LY LGE LPI LEXP          
( , )LK LREV LPOPM 
1 2 1 3 4it it it it it itLGE LY LGE LGV LOP          
( , , )LK LREV LPOPM LFA 
1 2 1 3 4 5it it it it it it itLGE LY LGE LECO LEGV LEXP            
( , , )LPOPM LREV LDCP LIMP 
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5.1.1.5) Fiscal Policy, Political Institutions and Interaction Variable
 
  
              (5.6) 
 
5.1.1.6) Fiscal Policy, Economic Institutions and Governance 
           
 
                                      (5.7)
 
       
5.1.1.7) Fiscal Policy, Political Institutions and Governance
 
 
          (5.8) 
The first two models explain fiscal policy in the viewpoint of institutions 
(economic and political), in the third model governance variable is evaluated with fiscal 
policy, model four and five elucidate fiscal policy with institutions and interaction 
variables and model six and seven presents joint study of fiscal policy with institutions 
and governance variable. In above mentioned equations all 
, , , , , and       are 
coefficients and   indicates the difference in the models. In the parenthesis, the variables 
on the left hand side are endogenous variables and on the right hand side are the 
instruments.  
5.1.2 Empirical Results: Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics assist to examine the nature of data and make clear which 
variable is not so significant in the data. It tells whether a variable is well identified. So, if 
a variable within standard deviation is zero, such variable is dropped (Baum, 2006). The 
following table shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the models. 
 
 
1 2 1 3 4 5it it it it it it itLGE LY LGE LECO LGV LEXP            
( , , )it it it itLPOPM LREV LDPC LIMP 
1 2 1 3 4 5it it it it it it itLGE LY LGE LPI LGV LEXP            
( , )it it itLK LREV LPOPM 
1 2 1 3 4 5it it it it it it itLGE LY LGE LPI LPGV LEXP            
( , )it it itLK LREV LPOPM 
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Table 5.1 Description of Variables 
Variables 
 
Mean Std. Dev Min Max Observations 
  LGE 
 
Overall 
Between 
Within 
2.966456 3.647374 
3.806416 
1.17705 
4.807286 
-1.62219 
-.475422 
9.454243 
7.818394 
5.515377 
N =     145 
n = 6 
T-bar = 24.16 
 LY Overall 
Between 
Within 
6.645832 2.291482 
2.374098 
.6978638 
1.063676 
3.028929 
3.417738 
11.34891 
9.916821 
3.417738 
N= 178 
n= 6 
T-bar = 9.6667 
  LGEt-1 Overall 
Between 
Within 
2.893201 3.645502 
3.797013 
1.169842 
-4.80728 
-1.62219 
-.512157 
9.454243 
7.773411 
5.478641 
N= 140 
n= 6 
T-bar =23.33 
LREV Overall 
Between 
Within 
7.599719 2.546009 
2.228505 
1.523322 
2.618855 
4.203332 
4.136473 
13.00583 
10.14127 
10.14127 
N=161 
n=6 
T-bar = 6.8333 
LECO Overall 
Between 
Within 
3.384823 0.4260604 
0.3695629 
0.2589936 
1.544641 
2.937379 
1.992086 
4.054453 
3.82827 
4.092411 
N= 180 
n= 6 
T=30 
LOP Overall 
Between 
Within 
1.791946 1.583821 
1.695626 
0.3148782 
-.6440332 
-.2075501 
1.244376 
3.942203 
3.493413 
2.639699 
N= 180 
n= 6 
T=30 
LK Overall 
Between 
Within 
7.009507 3.66493 
3.951789 
0.587492 
0.278385 
1.467566 
5.820325 
12.6487 
11.41316 
8.327535 
N= 180 
n= 6 
T=30 
LPOPM Overall 
Between 
Within 
3.640921 2.312542 
2.519325 
0.170678 
-.8149804 
-.5752874 
3.226693 
7.110382 
6.866508 
3.961190 
N= 180 
n= 6 
T=30 
LPI Overall 
Between 
Within 
3.176517 0.7366936 
0.7410242 
0.2873389 
1.386294 
1.707474 
2.400627 
3.871201 
3.791696 
4.177093 
N= 180 
n= 6 
T=30 
LGV 
 
Overall 
Between 
Within 
1.728376 0.282873 
0.2443592 
0.1713463 
1.266948 
1.348534 
1.285555 
2.296567 
2.076916 
2.116793 
N= 180 
n= 6 
T=30 
LDCP Overall 
Between 
Within 
2.954571    .6440632    
.4486355 
.4961373    
.9867231 
2.083391 
1.857903 
4.080558 
3.33884 
4.640014 
N= 180 
n= 6 
T=30 
LEXP Overall 
Between 
Within 
5.964903    3.646468  
3.881886    
.817949     
.5984972 
1.103349 
4.263057 
12.34831 
10.58197 
7.976775 
N= 180 
n= 6 
T=30 
LFA Overall 
Between 
Within 
 
6.899273 2.528616  
1.628066    
2.034679   
3.069809   
4.797795    
2.677203    
12.54383  
9.001871 
10.44124 
N= 148 
n= 6 
      T=24.66 
LIMP Overall 
Between 
Within 
 
6.33249 3.493998 
3.739649 
.6991224 
.6604742 
1.618658 
5.020789 
12.45752 
10.68452 
8.105496 
N= 180 
n= 6 
T=30 
LEGV Overall 
Between 
Within 
 
5.113199 .4552617 
.3461399 
.3268966 
3.504736 
4.710467 
3.60364 
5.881856 
5.575682 
5.776292 
N= 180 
n= 6 
T=30 
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LPGV Overall 
Between 
Within 
 
4.904893 .5972868 
.5659246 
.297268 
3.346389 
3.78439 
4.072055 
5.880086 
5.37315 
5.683288 
N= 180 
n= 6 
T=30 
 
 Descriptive statistics are used to explain the fundamental features of the 
data. It presents simple summaries. Descriptive statistics presents data in convenient 
form. The descriptive statistics show that ∆LY is in average positive at $ 6.645832 
million with minimum and maximum at $1.063676 million and $ 11.34891 respectively. 
The between and within minimum and maximum values are in average at $-1.62219, $-
0.475422, $7.818394 and $5.515377 respectively. The values of other variables are given 
in the above table.   LGE is the difference of log government expenditure. 
5.1.3 Correlation 
Correlation is another source to evaluate the data. It also explains that the concerned 
variable is suitable or not. 
Table 5.2 
|    logge   logget-1    logy     logk   logrev   logeco    loggv  logpopm logop  logpi logprc logexp logfa logimp logegv logpgv      
 logge |   1.0000 
  logget-1 |   0.9506   1.0000 
   logy |   0.9256   0.9267   1.0000 
         logk |   0.8654   0.8732   0.9361   1.0000 
      logrev |   0.7770   0.7787   0.8328   0.7932   1.0000 
      logeco |   0.4306   0.4391   0.5674   0.6316   0.5348   1.0000 
       loggv |  -0.5855  -0.6059  -0.6708  -0.6143  -0.4820  -0.2807   1.0000 
     logpopm |   0.8748   0.8812   0.9449   0.8748   0.7582   0.3990  -0.6892   1.0000 
         logop |   0.8398   0.8254   0.7135   0.7000   0.6796   0.1900  -0.3411   0.6656   1.0000 
       logpv |   0.6125   0.6366   0.7911   0.7452   0.7296   0.6104  -0.6438   0.8167   0.3188   1.0000 
      logprc |   0.5120   0.5352   0.6007   0.4985   0.6961   0.6577  -0.3740   0.5250   0.3262   0.7028   1.0000 
        logexp |   0.9540   0.9517   0.9501   0.9181   0.8355   0.4638  -0.5892   0.9115    0.8850   0.6738   0.5333   1.0000 
       logfa |   0.4488   0.4411   0.5009   0.3998   0.4092   0.2663  -0.4280   0.4002   0.3440   0.2755   0.3537   0.4550   1.0000 
        logimp |   0.9535   0.9515   0.9420   0.9090   0.8206   0.4195  -0.5815   0.9160   0.8941   0.6602   0.5161   0.9969   0.4503   1.0000 
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      logegv |   0.0377   0.0328   0.1148   0.2133   0.2052   0.7846   0.3748  -0.0598   -0.0368   0.1738   0.3937   0.0674  -0.0192   0.0296       
1.0000 
      lpgv |   0.4631   0.4827   0.6424   0.6143   0.6634   0.6185  -0.2873   0.6650   0.2222   0.9179   0.6858   0.5379   0.1229   0.5249   
0.4118  1.000 
 
Correlation table explains the relation of a variable with other variables. The 
significance of variables is made clear in this way. The relation of   logy with   log GE 
is 0.9256.  The relation of other variables is shown in the above table.  
5.1.4 Combined Results  
i) Principal Component Analysis (PCA)  
Before presenting the final result, the method and composition of institutions 
(economic and political) and governance indices are explicated. In order to measure the 
institutions there are a number of problems as subjective and objective issues, (Glaser et 
al. 2004). So as to handle these issues, Principal Component Analysis (PCA) approach is 
applied by a number of economists. De melo et al. (1997) and Havrylyshyn and Rooden 
(2000) developed institutions indicators by utilizing PCA. In this study, the three indices- 
economic, political, and governance are developed. For economic institutions, a number 
of indicators and indices are developed by economists such as the economic globalization 
index is developed by KOF, the index range is 0 to 100, where 0 is for low and 100 for 
good institution. The indicators Size of the government expenditure (GS) as percentage 
of GDP and money growth (M2) are used to develop index. It is also used by Economic 
Freedom of the World data set prepared by Fraser Institute. The standard deviation of 
inflation indicator is also developed as it is developed in Free the Economic World 
indicators (FEW).  By following the lines of International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), 
the economic risk rating index is prepared. There are five indicators as GDP score shows 
percentage change in GDP, per capita GDP, Inflation, budget balance and current account 
balance. The index is developed by taking data from WDI (2010). The ICRG risk rating 
criteria is as from 0 to 24.5 percent shows very high risk, 25 to 29.5 is high risk, 30 to 
34.5 is moderate risk and 35 to 40 is low risk. The Score (SC) of SAARC countries has 
been generated. By applying Principal Component Analysis, an index of economic 
indicators has been generated. In the same way, for political institution index is prepared. 
The indicators as Legislative Competitiveness for Electoral Environment (LIEC) and 
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Executive Competitiveness for Electoral Environment (EIEC) indicator with the value 
ranging from 1 to 7 where 1 is for low and 7 is taken for higher quality. Political 
globalization (PG) indicator is developed by KOF with the value of 1 to 100 where 1 is 
for low and 100 is for high. Polity2 (PL), executive constraints (EC) and total summed 
magnitudes of all (societal and interstate) major episodes of political violence (ACTOT) 
indicators are developed by Polityiv project. These indicators are used by a large number 
of economists in their studies, as Gleaser et al. (2004), Alesina et al. (1996) and Barro 
and Lee (1994). For governance indicators, civil liberties and political rights indicators 
are used in the study. These indicators are developed by Freedom House and the values 
ranging from 1 to 7.  The higher value depicts the poor governance. These indices have 
also been used widely by researchers, as Isham et al. (1997), Sachs and Warner (1995a) 
and Levine and Renelt (1992). It is essential to check the adequacy of the data before 
using PCA. Therefore, Kaiser-Mayer-Oklin (KMO) Index is used in the study. It is found 
that the data fulfills the required conditions. The values lies from 0.5 to 1.0 show that 
factor analysis is suitable (Leech et al. 2005).  
 The following are the values of indices of economic, political, and governance 
respectively. 
1 20.62 0.49 0.25 0.55it it it it itPC GS INFS SC M        (5.9) 
2 0.40 0.44 0.36 0.46 0.45 0.31it it it it it it itPC LIEC EIEC PG PL EC ACTOT          
          (5.10)  
3 0.70 0.70it it itPC PR CL       (5.11) 
The results of fiscal policy models are given below and their detailed results are given 
in appendix. 
5.1.4.1 Fiscal Policy and Economic Institutions 
So as to analyze the fiscal policy 2SLS and GMM techniques are used in this 
study. Economic institutions are also used to examine their role in fiscal policy. The 
results are given in the Table 5.3. 
 
 79 
 
       Table 5.3 Fiscal Policy and Economic Institutions (Expenditure is dependent variable) 
Variables 2SLS GMM 
1
st
 Stage 2
nd
 Stage 
 LY 1.0401 
(0.000)* 
0.6719 
(0.011)* 
0.6598 
(0.007)** 
 LGEt-1 -0.0931 
(0.092)*** 
0.3643 
(0.000)* 
0.3947 
(0.000)* 
LECO -0.1354 
(0.009)** 
-0.2430 
(0.001)* 
-0.2465 
(0.001)* 
LEXP -1.1613 
(0.000)* 
0.5155 
(0.000)* 
0.4828 
(0.000)* 
CONS -7.2239 
(0.000)* 
-2.9079 
    (0.004)** 
-2.7533 
   (0.004)** 
Anderson 
(0.000) 
Wu. Hausman 
(0.3867) 
Sargan 
(0.3345) 
 
CraggDon 
(19.21) 
Hetro 
(0.2959) 
Hansen. J 
(0.3242) 
 
Redundant 
(0.000) 
Auto 
(0.0144) 
Orthog 
(0.1432) 
 
           Note: The values are coefficient and in parenthesis are P values. *, ** and *** show the significance level at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. 
The 2SLS and GMM results show that the Fiscal policy in this region is 
procyclical as  LGEt-1 is significant in both models and have positive coefficient sign. 
The results are also similar as the study of Reinhart et al. (2004). The variable  LY is 
significant which also explains the cyclicality of fiscal policy. The economic institution is 
significant and negative coefficient sign which explains as the performance of institutions 
increase, the government expenditure will decline. The variable LEXP is significant in 
both 2SLS and GMM models. Population is an endogenous variable which is also used 
by Kormendi and Meguire (1985). There are three instrumental variables revenue, 
domestic credit to private sector and foreign assets are used. For stability, revenue has 
significant role. Developing countries are not in position to save it due to poor control on 
expenditure in boom. Therefore, pro cyclical policies are adopted by these countries 
(Eichengreen, et al. 1999). Weak control on expenditures is due to increasing population.  
In the same way domestic credit to private sector is increased in boom and in trough it 
reduces in developing economies. This variable is also used by Levine and Renelt (1992) 
in institutional studies. For cyclicality of fiscal policy, foreign assets variable is also used 
as Calderon (2004). As domestic credit to private sector and foreign assets increase, the 
standard of living of people will increase. Hence fiscal policy is procyclical in developing 
countries. 
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For model specification, Ramsey Reset test is carried out. It is found that the 
model is correctly specified. For weak identification, Cragg and Donald (1993) test is 
performed. The F statistic of Cragg and Donald explains that the model is not weakly 
identified. For over-identification, the Sargan statistic and Hansen J is carried out. The P. 
values give explanation that the models fulfill the required standard. The redundant 
choice allows a test; whether a subset of expelled or excluded instruments is redundant. 
The given value of this study accomplishes this condition. For endogeniety, Wu Hausman 
test is performed which elucidate that endogeniety exists. Orthogonality test is performed 
to test the excludability of instruments. Autocorrelation, heteroskadsity and orthognality 
tests are also done which show that there is no issue of auto, hetero and excludability. 
The detailed results are given in the appendix.  
5.1.4.2 Fiscal Policy and Political Institutions 
In order to analyze the fiscal policy, 2SLS and GMM techniques are used in this 
study. Political institutions are also used to examine their role in fiscal policy. The results 
are given in the Table 5.4. 
       Table 5.4 Fiscal Policy and Political Institutions (Expenditure is dependent variable) 
Variables 2SLS GMM 
1
st
 Stage 2
nd
 Stage 
 LY 1.4800 
(0.000)* 
0.6661 
(0.000)* 
0.6628 
(0.000)* 
 LGEt-1 -0.08504 
(0.361) 
0.3652 
(0.000)* 
0.3654 
(0.000)* 
LPI 1.6754 
(0.000)* 
-0.7704 
(0.002)* 
-0.7661 
(0.002)* 
LEXP 0.5040 
(0.000)* 
0.3841 
(0.000)* 
0.3857 
(0.000)* 
CONS -10.2274 
(0.000)* 
-2.1749 
    (0.009)* 
-2.1751 
(0.001)* 
Anderson 
(0.000) 
Wu. Hausman 
(0.4665) 
Sargan 
(0.9294) 
 
CraggDon 
(30.84) 
Hetro 
(0.1745) 
Hansen. J 
(0.9250) 
 
Redundant 
(0.0011) 
Auto 
(0.0166) 
Orthog 
(0.3146) 
 
           Note: The values are coefficient and in parenthesis are P values. *, ** and *** show the significance level at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. 
The 2SLS and GMM results show that the Fiscal policy in this region is 
procyclical as  LGEt-1 is significant in both models and has positive coefficient sign. 
The results are also similar as the study of Reinhart et al. (2004). The variable  LY is 
significant which also clarifies the cyclicality of fiscal policy.  The political institutions 
 81 
 
variable is significant and negative coefficient sign which gives explanation that with the 
increase in the performance of political institutions, government expenditures will 
decline.  
The variable LEXP is significant in both 2SLS and GMM models. The variable 
capital is endogenous variable. In institutional studies, Barro (1991) used this variable. 
Revenue, population and foreign assets are used as instruments. These instrumental 
variables are correlate with capital. As revenue increases living standard of people and 
foreign assets are increased. 
5.1.4.3 Fiscal Policy and Governance 
So as to evaluate the fiscal policy, 2SLS and GMM techniques are applied in this 
study. Governance index is also used to examine its role in fiscal policy. The results are 
given in the Table 5.5. 
       Table 5.5 Fiscal Policy and Governance   (Expenditure is dependent variable) 
Variables 2SLS GMM 
1
st
 Stage 2
nd
 Stage 
 LY 1.9568 
(0.000)* 
0.8532 
(0.000)* 
0.7540 
(0.000)* 
 LGEt-1 -0.0004 
(0.997) 
0.3721 
(0.000)* 
0.3893 
(0.000)* 
LGV 0.8114 
(0.190) 
0.3138 
(0.498) 
0.1791 
(0.872) 
LOP -0.0909 
(0.510) 
0.5099 
(0.000)* 
0.4956 
(0.000)* 
CONS -10.4229 
(0.000)* 
-5.2061 
    (0.000)* 
-4.3594 
(0.000)* 
Anderson 
(0.000) 
Wu. Hausman 
(0.5971) 
Sargan 
(0.3102) 
 
CraggDon 
(13.28) 
Hetro 
(0.1812) 
Hansen. J 
(0.1563) 
 
Redundant 
(0.000) 
Auto 
(0.0176) 
Orthog 
(0.1028) 
 
           Note: The values are coefficient and in parenthesis are P values. *, ** and *** show the significance level at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. 
The 2SLS and GMM results explain that the Fiscal policy in this region is 
procyclical as  LGEt-1 is significant in both models and has positive coefficient sign. 
The variable  LY is significant which also clarifies the cyclicality of fiscal policy. The 
governance index is insignificant which explains that governance is not up to required 
standard. The governance variable has no significant role in the model. The variable LOP 
is significant in both 2SLS and GMM models.  
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5.1.4.4 Fiscal Policy, Economic Institutions and Interaction 
Variable  
For the analysis of fiscal policy, 2SLS and GMM techniques are used. So as to 
capture the complementary relationship among institutions and governance, interaction 
variable of both is used. This approach is commonly used in institutional studies as Prabir 
De (2010). Besides this, interaction term also account for intervening variables (Sobel, 
1987 and Lee, 2011). The variables of Economic institutions and interaction variable 
(Economic institution*governance) are also evaluated. The results are given in the table 
5.6.  
        Table 5.6 Fiscal Policy, Economic Institution and Interaction       (Expenditure is dependent variable) 
Variables 2SLS GMM 
1
st
 Stage 2
nd
 Stage 
 LY 0.9995 
(0.000)* 
0.7883 
(0.004)** 
0.7953 
(0.005)** 
 LGEt-1 -0.0954 
(0.086)*** 
0.3692 
(0.000)* 
0.3896 
(0.000)* 
LECO 0.0883 
(0.789) 
-0.8915 
(0.059)*** 
-0.8893 
  (0.084)*** 
LEGV -0.2147 
(0.493) 
0.6304 
(0.165) 
0.6235 
(0.202) 
LEXP -1.1685 
(0.000)* 
0.4819 
(0.000)* 
0.4649 
(0.000)* 
CONS -6.6477 
(0.000)* 
-4.4876 
    (0.002)** 
-4.4274 
 (0.012)** 
Anderson 
(0.000) 
Wu. Hausman 
(0.3915) 
Sargan 
(0.4566) 
 
CraggDon 
(19.00) 
Hetro 
(0.2045) 
Hansen. J 
(0.4362) 
 
Redundant 
(0.001) 
Auto 
(0.0137) 
Orthog 
(0.4433) 
 
           Note: The values are coefficient and in parenthesis are P values. *, ** and *** show the significance level at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. 
The results of 2SLS and GMM techniques show that the Fiscal policy in this 
region is procyclical as  LGEt-1 is significant in both models and has positive coefficient 
sign. The result is in accordance with the study of Reinhart et al. (2004). The 
variable  LY is significant which also clarifies the cyclicality of fiscal policy. The 
economic institutions variable is significant and possesses negative coefficient sign. It 
explains that as the performance of economic institutions increase the government 
expenditure will fall. The interaction variable is insignificant which elucidates that it has 
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no significant role in the model. This interaction variable economic institutions and 
governance has no significant role in the SAARC countries. When institutions shows low 
performance and governance is also poor, higher growth targets cannot be achieved.  The 
variable LEXP is significant in both 2SLS and GMM models.  
 
5.1.4.5 Fiscal Policy, Political Institutions and Interaction 
Variables  
For the evaluation of fiscal policy, 2SLS and GMM approaches are applied. The 
index of Economic institutions and interaction variable (Political institution*governance) 
is also evaluated. The results are given in the table 5.7.  
        Table 5.7 Fiscal Policy, Political Institution and Interaction (Expenditure is dependent variable) 
Variables 2SLS GMM 
1
st
 Stage 2
nd
 Stage 
 LY 1.5667 
(0.000)* 
0.6795 
(0.001)* 
0.6781 
(0.001)* 
 LGEt-1 -0.0679 
(0.468) 
0.3677 
(0.000)* 
0.3682 
(0.000)* 
LPI 1.3606 
(0.002)* 
-0.8173 
 (0.012)** 
-0.8187 
(0.021)** 
LPGV 0.1848 
(0.208) 
0.0272 
(0.833) 
0.0303 
(0.862) 
LEXP 0.4650 
(0.001)* 
0.3782 
(0.000)* 
0.3790 
(0.000)* 
CONS -10.6394 
(0.000)* 
-2.2406 
    (0.014)** 
-2.4886 
(0.004)** 
Anderson 
(0.000) 
Wu. Hausman 
(0.4546) 
Sargan 
(0.9354) 
 
CraggDon 
(30.87) 
Hetro 
(0.1914) 
Hansen. J 
(0.9322) 
 
Redundant 
(0.001) 
Auto 
(0.0163) 
Orthog 
(0.4056) 
 
           Note: The values are coefficient and in parenthesis are P values. *, ** and *** show the significance level at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. 
The results of 2SLS and GMM techniques show that the Fiscal policy in this 
region is procyclical as  LGEt-1 is significant in both models and has positive coefficient 
sign. The variable  LY is significant which also clarifies the cyclicality of fiscal policy. 
The political institution variable is significant and possesses negative coefficient sign. It 
explains that as the performance of political institution increases the government 
expenditure will go down. The interaction variable is insignificant which explicates that it 
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has no significant role in the model. The variable LEXP is significant in both 2SLS and 
GMM models.  
5.1.4.6 Combined Result: Fiscal Policy, Economic Institutions and 
Governance 
In order to analyze the fiscal policy 2SLS and GMM approaches are applied in the 
study. Economic institutions and Governance indices are also used to observe their role in 
fiscal policy. The results are given in the Table 5.8. 
Table 5.8.Fiscal Policy, Economic Institution and Governance (Expenditure is dependent variable) 
Variables 2SLS GMM 
1
st
 Stage 2
nd
 Stage 
 LY 0.9976 
(0.000)* 
0.8032 
(0.003)** 
0.8104 
(0.004)** 
 LGEt-1 -0.0955 
(0.086)*** 
0.3695 
(0.000)* 
0.3895 
(0.000)* 
LECO -0.1261 
(0.018)*** 
-0.2629 
(0.000)* 
-0.2674 
 (0.000)* 
LGV -0.2224 
(0.479) 
0.6842 
(0.133) 
0.6756 
(0.172) 
LEXP -1.1693 
(0.000)* 
0.4788 
(0.000)* 
0.4624 
(0.000)* 
CONS -6.6314 
(0.006)* 
-4.6354 
(0.002)** 
-4.5754 
(0.010)* 
Anderson 
(0.000) 
Wu. Hausman 
(0.7383) 
Sargan 
(0.4644) 
 
CraggDon 
(19.05) 
Hetro 
(0.1551) 
Hansen. J 
(0.4435) 
 
Redundant 
(0.0001) 
Auto 
(0.0139) 
Orthog 
(0.4626) 
 
 Note: The values are coefficient and in parenthesis are P values. *,** and *** show the significance level at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively 
 
The results explain that the Fiscal policy in the SAARC region is procyclical as 
 LGEt-1 is significant in 2SLS and GMM models and have positive coefficient sign. The 
major result is also the same as the studies of Thorton (2008) and Reinhart et al. (2004). 
It also makes clear that the government consumption expenditure is procyclical in 
developing countries. The variable  LY is significant that with the increase of GDP, the 
government expenditures also increase. The P. value of LEXP is significant in both 2SLS 
and GMM models. The variable LECO is significant in both models but has negative 
coefficient sign which elucidates that economic institutions have negative relation with 
expenditure (dependent variable) and LGI is insignificant in both models. This result is in 
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line with the study of Mpatswe et al. (2011). The pro cyclicality of the government 
expenditure is due to weak institutional and poor governance.  
5.1.4.7  Combined Result: Fiscal Policy, Political Institutions and 
Governance 
2SLS and GMM approaches are applied in the study for the analysis of fiscal 
policy. Political institutions and Governance indices are also used to examine their role in 
fiscal policy. The results are given in the Table 5.9. 
Table 5.9 Fiscal Policy, Political Institution and Governance (Expenditure is dependent variable) 
Variables 2SLS GMM 
1
st
 Stage 2
nd
 Stage 
 LY 1.5796 
(0.000)* 
0.6861 
(0.001)* 
0.6844 
(0.000)* 
 LGEt-1 0.06521 
(0.482) 
0.3692 
(0.000)* 
0.3696 
(0.000)* 
LPI 1.7732 
(0.000)* 
-0.7528 
(0.003)* 
-0.7480 
(0.000)* 
LGV 0.8765 
(0.093)** 
0.1750 
(0.706) 
0.1852 
(0.703) 
LEXP 0.4595 
(0.001)* 
0.3745 
(0.000)* 
0.3754 
(0.000)* 
CONS -12.5434 
(0.000)* 
-2.6385 
(0.090)*** 
-2.6662 
(0.082)*** 
Anderson 
(0.000) 
Wu. Hausman 
(0.4327) 
Sargan 
(0.9394) 
 
CraggDon 
(31.53) 
Hetro 
(0.1842) 
Hansen. J 
(0.9364) 
 
Redundant 
(0.0011) 
Auto 
(0.0145) 
Orthog 
(0.9684) 
 
           Note: The values are coefficient and in parenthesis are P values. *, ** and *** show the significance level at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. 
The results make clear that the Fiscal policy in the SAARC region is procyclical 
as  LGEt-1 is significant in models, 2SLS and GMM and have positive coefficient sign. 
The variable  LY is significant in both models which show that with the increase in 
GDP, the government expenditure is also increased. The role of political institutions is 
significant but has negative coefficient sign which show that political institutions have 
negative relation with government expenditure (as the performance of political institution 
increases the government expenditure will decreases). The governance variable is not 
significant in both models. The variable LEXP is significant in both 2SLS and GMM 
models.  
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Model Selection And Empirical Results; Monetary Policy, 
Institutions And Governance 
 
5.2 Selection of Empirical Model 
In order to assess the monetary cyclicality, monetary reaction is evaluated through 
the money balance, output gap and other control variables. Output gap is evaluated by 
using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter and it is also used by Kaminsky et al. (2004) in his 
study. It is examined by Hodrick and Prescott (1981). In order to smooth annual data, the 
parameter set at 6.25 as suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002). Since cyclicality is a major 
idea that guides and assists to comprehend the path of monetary policy. This study uses 
the following model to evaluate the cyclicality.  
0 1 22it it it itLM LY LX             (5.12) 
Where L is log, M2 is real money balance, Y is the output gap X is a vector of 
control variables, 
it  disturbance term, 0 is intercept and all  s are coefficients and i is 
for countries and t is for time.  
, 1, , ,, 2 , , , , , , , ,it it it it it it it it it it it it it it itX ECO K M GV PI OP FA TT EXP EGV PGV POPM DCP REV  
itECO = Economic Institutions ,itK = Gross Investment 
 
12itM  = Lagged value of Money itGV = Governance variable  
itPI = Political Institutions  OPit= Trade Openness 
 FAit= Foreign Assests   itTT = Terms of Trade    
           EXPit= Exports              EGVit=Economic Governance   
          PGVit= Political Governance  POPMit= Population    
         DCPit= Domestic Credit to Private Sector REVit= Revenue 
 
The above mentioned model is also used in number of empirical studies, as 
Calderon et al. (2012) and Clarida et al. (1999).  In order to evaluate the monetary policy, 
it is cyclical, procyclical or acyclical, the study applies M2 as dependent variable as 
Reinhart et al. (2004) explained it as a cyclical component. In this study, GMM and 2SLS 
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approaches are used to assess the cyclicality of monetary policy. The following are the 
models for the study of monetary policy, institutions and governance. 
5.2.1  Monetary Policy Models 
5.2.1.1  Monetary Policy and Economic Institutions  
1 2 1 3 42 2it it it it it itLM LY LM LECO LDCP          
                       ( , )it it itLPOPM LINF LREV                                (5.13)   
           
 5.2.1.2        Monetary Policy and Political Institutions         
         1 2 1 3 4 5
2 2it it it it it it itLM LY LM LPI LPOPM LOP                                            
                                ( , )it it itLDCP LK LREV                                   (5.14) 
 
 
5.2.1.3         Monetary Policy and Governance  
              
         1 2 1 3 4 52 2it it it it it it itLM LY LM LGV LPOPM LOP            
                     ( , )it it itLDCP LFA LREV                                          (5.15)  
 5.2.1.4       Monetary Policy, Economic Institutions and Interaction Variable  
                   
          1 2 1 3 4 52 2it it it it it it itLM LY LM LECO LEGV LDCP            
                       ( , )it it itLPOPM LINF LREV                                    (5.16)  
 5.2.1.5     Monetary Policy, Political Institutions and Interaction Variable           
             1 2 1 3 4 52 2it it it it it it itLM LY LM LPI LPGV LDCP            
                                        ( , )it it itLK LFA LREV                                              (5.17)  
 
 
5.2.1.6       Monetary Policy, Economic Institutions and Governance  
            1 2 1 3 4 52 2it it it it it it itLM LY LM LECO LGV LDCP            
                             ( , )it it itLPOPM LINF LREV                              (5.18)  
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5.2.1.7      Monetary Policy, Political Institutions and Governance  
             1 2 1 3 4 52 2it it it it it it itLM LY LM LPI LGV LIMP            
                                        ( , )it it itLDCP LEXP LFA                                     (5.19) 
The first two models explain monetary policy in the perception of institutions 
(economic and political), in the third model governance variable is evaluated with 
monetary policy, model four and five evaluate monetary policy with institution and 
interaction variables and model six and seven presents combined study of monetary 
policy with institutions and governance variable. In above mentioned equatios all 
, , , , , and       are coefficients. In the parenthesis, the variables on the left hand side 
are endogenous variables and on the right hand side are the instruments.  
5.2.2 Empirical Results 
  Descriptive Statistics 
 Descriptive statistics explain the characteristics of data and explicate in detail 
which variable is not so robust in the given data. It also informs whether a variable is well 
identified.  
Table 5.10 Description of Variables 
Variables 
 
Mean Std. Dev Min Max Observations 
LM2 
 
Overall 
Between 
Within 
12.35176 2.678981  
2.507043 
1.382013 
5.78259 
8.138349 
9.841883 
17.8982 
15.57056 
15.07212 
N =     180 
n = 6 
T-bar = 30 
LY Overall 
Between 
Within 
9.683253 2.263876   
2.421667    
.459099 
4.757479    
5.81037 
8.630361 
13.7845 
12.83955 
10.73983 
N= 180 
n= 6 
T-bar = 30 
LM2t-1 Overall 
Between 
Within 
12.27122 2.659694    
2.512475 
1.335337 
5.782594    
8.044546 
9.843675 
17.72753 
15.48802 
14.93099 
N= 174 
n= 6 
T-bar =29 
LECO Overall 
Between 
Within 
3.384823 .4260604   
.3695629 
.2589936 
1.544641   
2.937379 
1.992086 
4.054453 
3.82827 
4.092411 
N= 180 
n= 6 
T=30 
LPI Overall 
Between 
Within 
3.176517 .7366936   
.7410242 
.2873389 
1.386294   
1.707474 
2.400627 
3.871201 
3.791696 
4.177093 
N= 180 
n= 6 
T=30 
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LGV Overall 
Between 
Within 
1.728376 .282873   
.2443592 
.1731463 
1.266948   
1.348534 
1.285555 
2.296567 
2.076916 
2.116793 
N= 180 
n= 6 
T=30 
LK Overall 
Between 
Within 
7.009506 3.66493   
3.951788 
.5874939 
.2783814 
1.467566   
5.820321 
12.64869 
11.41315 
8.327539 
N= 180 
n= 6 
T=30 
LTT Overall 
Between 
Within 
4.237584 .3118699 
.1946614 
.2559471 
3.270477 
4.003376 
3.419047 
4.89273 
4.502619 
4.742404 
N= 180 
n= 6 
T=30 
LOP Overall 
Between 
Within 
1.791946    1. 1.695626  
583821 
.3148782    
-.6440332 
-.2075501    
1.244376       
3.942203 
3.493413 
2.639699 
N= 180 
n= 6 
T=30 
LFA Overall 
Between 
Within 
6.899273    2.528617  
1.628066    
2.034679   
-3.069818    
4.797795    
-2.677211    
12.54383 
9.001871 
10.44123 
N= 148 
n= 6 
T=24.66 
LEXP Overall 
Between 
Within 
5.964903    3.646468   
3.881886    
.817949    
-.5984972  
1.103349    
4.263057    
12.34831 
10.58197 
7.976775 
N= 180 
n= 6 
T=30 
LEGV Overall 
Between 
Within 
5.965592    1.040369    
.76776     
.7670792    
4.75875   
3.722906    
3.219643    
8.048819 
6.925556 
7.545556 
N= 180 
n= 6 
T=30 
LPGV Overall 
Between 
Within 
5.366064    1.133905 
.9890786    
.6826095    
2.767693   
3.601704    
3.258505      
8.002333 
6.576306 
6.91987 
N= 180 
n= 6 
T=30 
LPOPM Overall 
Between 
Within 
3.640921    2.312541     
2.519325   
.1706876    
-.81498     
-.5752783    
3.226693    
7.11038 
6.866507 
3.961193 
N= 180 
n= 6 
T=30 
LDCP Overall 
Between 
Within 
2.954571    .6440632    
.4486355    
.4961373    
.9867231    
2.083391     
1.857903    
4.080558 
3.33884 
4.640014 
N= 180 
n= 6 
T=30 
LREV Overall 
Between 
Within 
7.599719    2.546009    
2.228505    
1.523322    
2.618855    
4.203332    
4.136473    
13.00583 
10.14127 
11.29876 
N= 180 
n= 6 
T=30 
LIMP Overall 
Between 
Within 
6.33249 3.493998 
3.739649 
.6991224 
.6604742 
1.618658 
5.020789 
12.45752 
10.68452 
8.105496 
N= 180 
n= 6 
T=30 
 
Descriptive statistics explain the primary characteristic of the data. It presents 
plain summaries. Descriptive Statistics presents data in a suitable form. The descriptive 
summary show that LM2 is in average positive at $ 12.35176 million with minimum and 
maximum at $ 5.78259 million and $ 17.8982 million respectively. The between and 
within minimum and maximum values are in average at $8.138349, $ 9.841883, 
$15.57056 and $15.07212respectively.  The values of other variables are given in the 
above table.  
 
 
 90 
 
5.2.3   Correlation 
Correlation is an important resource to appraise the data. It explains that the 
concerned variable is appropriate or not. 
Table 5.11 
             |    logm2  logy   logm2t-1     logk   logeco      logpi    logop    logfa  logtt     logimp  logegv  logpgv  logpopm   logdcp   logrev 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       logm2 |   1.0000 
     logy      |   0.9516   1.0000 
      logm2t-1 |   0.9997   0.9518   1.0000 
        logk |   0.8990   0.9537   0.8998   1.0000 
      logeco |   0.7362   0.6301   0.7333   0.6920   1.0000 
         logpi |   0.8915   0.8762   0.8918   0.7863   0.6259   1.0000 
       logop |   0.6441   0.7082   0.6439   0.7565   0.3422   0.4014   1.0000 
       logfa |   0.8280   0.6897   0.8267   0.6218   0.6067   0.6184   0.5532   1.0000 
       logtt |   0.5706   0.5478   0.5674   0.5760   0.7429   0.4315   0.4601   0.5352   1.0000 
        logimp |   0.8995   0.9555   0.8994   0.9469   0.5807   0.7458   0.8828   0.6931    0.5891   1.0000 
     logegv |  -0.1650  -0.3274  -0.1694  -0.2507   0.2853  -0.2932  -0.1295  -0.0212   0.1403  -0.2550   1.0000 
     logpgv |   0.6643   0.5655   0.6634   0.5084   0.5791   0.7499   0.2599   0.4792    0.3256   0.4838   0.3274   1.0000 
     logpopm |   0.8918   0.9744   0.8923   0.8835   0.4796   0.8770   0.6551   0.6033   0.4344   0.9117  -0.4287   0.5447   1.0000 
      logdcp |   0.8470   0.7030   0.8451   0.6381   0.7466   0.8053   0.3734   0.7145    0.4755   0.6260   0.0358   0.6943   0.6339   1.0000 
      logrev |   0.9256   0.8829   0.9251   0.8785   0.6618   0.7843   0.7437   0.7701   0.5640   0.8958  -0.1261   0.6057   0.8183   0.7661   
1.0000 
        logexp |   0.8995   0.9555   0.8994   0.9469   0.5807   0.7458   0.8828   0.6931   0.5891   1.0000  -0.2550   0.4838   0.9117   0.6260   
0.8958   1.0000 
Correlation table explains the relation of a variable with other variables. The 
significance of variables is made clear in this way. The relation of   logy with  logM2 is 
0.9516.  The relation of other variables is shown in the above table. 
5.2.4  Combined Results  
The combined results of monetary policy with two institutions (Economic and 
Political) and governance are given below and their detailed results are given in appendix 
B.  
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5.2.4.1 Monetary Policy and Economic Institutions 
In order to analyze the monetary policy 2SLS and GMM techniques are used in 
the study. Economic institutions are also used to examine their role in monetary policy. 
The results are given in the Table 5.12. 
       Table 5.12 Monetary Policy and Economic Institutions (LM2 is dependent variable) 
Variables 2SLS GMM 
1
st
 Stage 2
nd
 Stage 
LY 0.7869  
(0.000)* 
0.1004 
     (0.027)*** 
0.1061    
(0.025)*** 
LM2t-1 0.6672 
(0.000)* 
0.9095    
(0.000)* 
0.9068    
(0.000)* 
LECO -0.3483    
(0.000)* 
-0.0072    
(0.516) 
-0.0078    
 (0.493) 
LDCP -0.1835 
(0.011)** 
0.0550    
(0.000)* 
0.0582    
(0.002)* 
CONS -10.3616    
(0.000)* 
0.3279 
            (0.305) 
0.3124    
(0.359) 
Anderson 
(0.000) 
Wu. Hausman 
(0.7298) 
Sargan 
(0.6075) 
 
CraggDon 
(26.19) 
Hetro 
(0.1348) 
Hansen. J 
(0.5812) 
 
Redundant 
(0.000) 
Auto 
(0.0554) 
Orthog 
(0.1219) 
 
           Note: The values are coefficient and in parenthesis are P values. *, ** and *** show the significance level at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. 
The 2SLS and GMM results show that the monetary policy in this region is 
procyclical as LM2t-1 is significant in both models and have positive coefficient sign. The 
variable LY is significant which also explains the cyclicality of monetary policy. The 
economic institution is insignificant and negative coefficient sign. The results are same as 
in study of Reinhart et al. (2004) and Calderon et al. (2012). It elucidates that the 
developing countries adopt procyclical monetary policies. This is due to poor institutions 
(Duncan, 2012). The variable LDCP is significant in both 2SLS and GMM models.  
For model specification, Ramsey Reset test is used. It is found that the model is 
correctly specified. For weak identification, Cragg and Donald (1993) test is performed. 
The F statistic explains that the model is weakly identified or not. Stock and Yogo made 
clear that this usual significance analysis is strictly distorted, if the Cragg and Donald 
values is less than seven (Carstensen and Gundlach, 2006). For over-identification, the 
Sargan statistic and Hansen J tests are carried out. The P-values makes clear that the 
model is over-identified or not. The redundant choice allows a test of whether a subset of 
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expelled or excluded instruments is redundant. The given value of this study 
accomplishes this condition. For endogeniety, Wu Hausman test is performed which 
explicates that endogeniety exists. Autocorrelation, heteroskadsity and orthognality tests 
are also done which show that there is no issue of auto, hetero and orthog. The detailed 
results are given in the appendix.  
5.2.4.2  Monetary Policy and Political Institutions 
In order to analyze the monetary policy 2SLS and GMM techniques are used in 
the study. Political institutions are also used to examine their role in monetary policy. The 
results are given in the Table 5.13. 
       Table 5.13 Monetary Policy and Political Institutions   (LM2 is dependent variable) 
Variables 2SLS GMM 
1
st
 Stage 2
nd
 Stage 
LY -0.4486 
(0.008)* 
0.2619 
(0.000)* 
0.2556 
(0.000)* 
LM2t-1 1.1560 
(0.000)* 
0.7341 
(0.000)* 
0.7405 
(0.000)* 
LPI 0.5131 
(0.000)* 
-0.0531 
(0.057)*** 
-0.0531 
 (0.076)*** 
LPOPM -0.5832 
(0.000)* 
0.0256 
(0.036)** 
0.0535 
(0.013)** 
LOP 0.1989 
(0.000)* 
-0.0438 
(0.0438) 
-0.0429 
(0.000)* 
CONS -7.7216 
(0.000)* 
1.0193 
    (0.000)* 
1.0021 
(0.000)* 
Anderson 
(0.000) 
Wu. Hausman 
(0.6828) 
Sargan 
(0.5295) 
 
CraggDon 
(9.83) 
Hetro 
(0.1157) 
Hansen. J 
(0.5315) 
 
Redundant 
(0.0024) 
Auto 
(0.0023) 
Orthog 
(0.5461) 
 
           Note: The values are coefficient and in parenthesis are P values. *, ** and *** show the significance level at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. 
The results of 2SLS and GMM tests show that the monetary policy in this region 
is procyclical as LM2t-1 is significant in both models and have positive coefficient sign. 
The variable LY is significant which also explains the cyclicality of monetary policy. The 
variable of political institutions is significant and negative coefficient sign which gives 
explanation that with the increase in the performance of political institution, the role of 
M2 will be according to requirement (as less M2 will be needed). The result is similar to 
the study of Reinhart et al. (2004) and Calderon et al. (2012). It makes clear that the 
developing countries adopt procyclical monetary policies. This is due to poor institutions 
(Duncan, 2012). The variable LPOPM and LOP is significant in both 2SLS and GMM 
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models. Cragg and Donald value is 9.83. Stock and Yogo explained that this usual 
significance analysis is strictly distorted, if the Cragg and Donald values is less than 
seven (Carstensen and Gundlach, 2006). 
 
5.2.4.3  Monetary Policy and Governance 
In order to analyze the monetary policy 2SLS and GMM approches are used in 
the study. Governance variable is also used to analyze the role in monetary policy. The 
results are given in the Table 5.14. 
       Table 5.14 Monetary Policy and Governance    (LM2 is dependent variable) 
Variables 2SLS GMM 
1
st
 Stage 2
nd
 Stage 
LY -0.8069 
(0.000)* 
0.1573 
(0.019)** 
0.1618 
     (0.051)*** 
LM2t-1 0.8901 
(0.000)* 
0.8528 
(0.000)* 
0.8495 
(0.000)* 
LGV -0.2776 
(0.030)** 
0.0515 
      (0.071)*** 
0.0572 
 (0.077)*** 
LPOPM 0.0564 
(0.313) 
0.0131 
(0.255) 
0.0123 
(0.271) 
LOP 0.0623 
(0.126) 
-0.0324 
(0.001)* 
-0.0333 
(0.001)* 
CONS 0.3815 
(0.681) 
0.6078 
    (0.001)* 
0.5876 
(0.003)* 
Anderson 
(0.000) 
Wu. Hausman 
(0.1363) 
Sargan 
(0.2639) 
 
CraggDon 
(8.947) 
Hetro 
(0.9403) 
Hansen. J 
(0.3117) 
 
Redundant 
(0.0000) 
Auto 
(0.0017) 
Orthog 
(0.1964) 
 
           Note: The values are coefficient and in parenthesis are P values. *, ** and *** show the significance level at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. 
The results of 2SLS and GMM tests show that the monetary policy in this region 
is procyclical as LM2t-1 is significant in both models and have positive coefficient sign. 
The variable LY is significant which also explains the cyclicality of monetary policy. The 
governance variable is not significant at 5 % conventional level which explains that 
governance has no major role in monetary policy. It is elucidated that the developing 
countries adopt procyclical monetary policies. The variable LOP is significant in both 
2SLS and GMM models but the variable LPOPM is insignificant in both models. 
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5.2.4.4 Monetary Policy, Economic institutions and Interaction 
Variables 
For the analysis of monetary policy, 2SLS and GMM techniques are used. The 
index of Economic institutions and interaction variable (economic 
institution*governance) is also evaluated. The results are given in table 5.15.  
      Table 5.15 Monetary Policy, Economic Institution and Interaction  (LM2 is dependent variable) 
Variables 2SLS GMM 
1
st
 Stage 2
nd
 Stage 
LY 0.7633 
(0.000)* 
0.0975 
    (0.028)** 
0.1025 
     (0.024)*** 
LM2t-1 0.7166 
(0.000)* 
0.9177 
(0.000)* 
0.9095 
(0.000)* 
LECO -0.3578 
(0.000)* 
-0.0195 
(0.485) 
-0.0223 
(0.462) 
LEGV 0.1793 
(0.065)*** 
0.0121 
   (0.598) 
0.0144 
 (0.547) 
LDCP -0.1853 
(0.010)* 
0.0552 
(0.001)* 
0.0584 
(0.002)* 
CONS -11.03 
(0.000)* 
0.2992 
    (0.374) 
0.2791 
(0.444) 
Anderson 
(0.000) 
Wu. Hausman 
(0.7818) 
Sargan 
(0.6094) 
 
CraggDon 
(27.73) 
Hetro 
(0.2193) 
Hansen. J 
(0.5808) 
 
Redundant 
(0.000) 
Auto 
(0.0485) 
Orthog 
(0.1156) 
 
           Note: The values are coefficient and in parenthesis are P values. *, ** and *** show the significance level at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. 
The results of 2SLS and GMM tests show that the monetary policy in the SAARC 
region is procyclical as LM2t-1 is significant in both models and have positive coefficient 
sign. The variable LY is significant which also explains the cyclicality of monetary 
policy. Both the economic institution and the interaction term are insignificant in both 
models. The result is similar to the study of Reinhart, et al. (2004) and Calderon et al. 
(2012). It explains that the developing countries adopt procyclical monetary policies. The 
variable LDCP is significant in both 2SLS and GMM models.  
 
5.2.4.5 Monetary Policy, Political institutions and Interaction Variables 
So as to analyse the monetary policy, 2SLS and GMM techniques are used. The 
index of Political institutions and interaction variable (political institution*governance) is 
also evaluated. The results are given in table 5.16.  
 95 
 
      Table 5.16 Monetary Policy, Political Institution and Interaction  (LM2 is dependent variable) 
Variables 2SLS GMM 
1
st
 Stage 2
nd
 Stage 
LY 2.3448 
(0.000)* 
0.1612 
    (0.026)* 
0.1623 
     (0.000)* 
LM2t-1 -0.2034 
(0.722) 
0.8648 
(0.000)* 
0.8644 
(0.000)* 
LPI -0.9279 
(0.029)** 
-0.0251 
(0.302) 
-0.0284 
(0.282) 
LPGV -0.1413 
(0.329) 
0.0108 
   (0.157) 
0.0116 
 (0.078) 
LDCP -0.6816 
(0.072)*** 
0.0789 
(0.000)* 
0.0810 
(0.001)* 
CONS -2.5446 
(0.212) 
0.3217 
    (0.002)* 
0.3171 
(0.006)* 
Anderson 
(0.000) 
Wu. Hausman 
(0.1094) 
Sargan 
(0.4661) 
 
CraggDon 
(24.21) 
Hetro 
(0.3366) 
Hansen. J 
(0.4774) 
 
Redundant 
(0.0314) 
Auto 
(0.0149) 
Orthog 
(0.4233) 
 
           Note: The values are coefficient and in parenthesis are P values. *, ** and *** show the significance level at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. 
The results of 2SLS and GMM techniques show that the monetary policy in the 
SAARC countries is procyclical. The variable LM2t-1 is significant in both models and 
has positive coefficient sign. The variable LY is significant which also explains the 
cyclicality of monetary policy. The variable of political institutions is insignificant and 
the interaction term is significant at 10 percent. It explains that governance has no major 
role in monetary policy. The result is as in the study of Reinhart et al. (2004) and 
Calderon et al. (2012). It is explained that the developing countries adopt procyclical 
monetary policies. The variable LDCP is significant in both 2SLS and GMM models.  
5.2.4.6 Combined Result: Monetary Policy, Economic institutions 
and Governance  
Monetary policy, economic institutions and governance are evaluated collectively. 
For this purpose, 2SLS and GMM techniques are used. The results are given in table 
5.17.  
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      Table 5.17 Monetary Policy, Economic Institution and Governance  (LM2 is dependent variable) 
Variables 2SLS GMM 
1
st
 Stage 2
nd
 Stage 
LY 0.7626 
(0.000)* 
0.0976 
    (0.028)** 
   0.1026 
     (0.024)** 
LM2t-1 0.7179 
(0.001)* 
0.9117 
(0.000)* 
0.9095 
(0.000)* 
LECO -0.3586 
(0.000)* 
-0.0074 
(0.511) 
-0.0079 
(0.489) 
LGV 0.1827 
(0.060)*** 
0.0117 
   (0.610) 
0.0140 
 (0.599) 
LDCP -0.1857 
(0.010) 
0.0552 
(0.001)* 
0.0584 
(0.002)* 
CONS -11.0519 
(0.000)* 
0.2992 
    (0.374) 
0.2792 
(0.445) 
Anderson 
(0.000) 
Wu. Hausman 
(0.7791) 
Sargan 
(0.6100) 
 
CraggDon 
(27.76) 
Hetro 
(0.2164) 
Hansen. J 
(0.5817) 
 
Redundant 
(0.000) 
Auto 
(0.0489) 
Orthog 
(0.1140) 
 
           Note: The values are coefficient and in parenthesis are P values. *, ** and *** show the significance level at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. 
The results of 2SLS and GMM approaches show that the monetary policy in the 
SAARC countries is procyclical. The variable LM2t-1 is significant in both models and 
has positive coefficient sign. The variable LY is significant which also explains the 
cyclicality of monetary policy. Both the economic institutions and the governance 
variables are insignificant in both 2SLS and GMM. The variable LECO has negative 
coefficient sign. The result is as in the study of Reinhart et al. (2004) and Calderon et al. 
(2012). It is explained that the developing countries adopt procyclical monetary policies. 
The variable LDCP is significant in both 2SLS and GMM models.  
5.2.4.7 Combined Result: Monetary Policy, Political institutions 
and Governance  
Monetary policy, political institutions and governance are evaluated collectively. 
For this purpose, 2SLS and GMM techniques are used. The results are given in table 
5.18.  
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      Table 5.18 Monetary Policy, Political Institution and Governance  (LM2 is dependent variable) 
Variables 2SLS GMM 
1
st
 Stage 2
nd
 Stage 
LY -1.3711 
(0.000)* 
0.1764 
    (0.003)* 
  0.1821 
     (0.006)* 
LM2t-1 1.1753 
(0.000)* 
0.8627 
(0.000)* 
0.8580 
(0.000)* 
LPI 0.2693 
(0.003)* 
0.0351 
(0.171) 
0.0397 
(0.143) 
LGV -0.2260 
(0.063)*** 
0.0547 
   (0.053)*** 
0.0581 
   (0.051)*** 
LIMP -0.3051 
(0.001)* 
-0.0264 
(0.004)* 
-0.0270 
(0.003)* 
CONS -0.0928 
(0.870) 
0.3639 
    (0.005)** 
0.3700 
(0.009)* 
Anderson 
(0.000) 
Wu. Hausman 
(0.1094) 
Sargan 
(0.4171) 
 
CraggDon 
(15.67) 
Hetro 
(0.8462) 
Hansen. J 
(0.4737) 
 
Redundant 
(0.0059) 
Auto 
(0.0139) 
Orthog 
(0.4687) 
 
           Note: The values are coefficient and in parenthesis are P values. *, ** and *** show the significance level at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. 
The results of 2SLS and GMM tests explain that the monetary policy in the 
SAARC countries is procyclical. The variable LM2t-1 is significant in both models and 
has positive coefficient sign. The variable LY is significant which also explains the 
cyclicality of monetary policy. The political institutions variable is insignificant in both 
models and the governance variables are significant in both 2SLS and GMM at 10 
percent level which explain that governance has no major role in monetary policy. The 
result is as in the study of Reinhart et al. (2004) and Calderon et al. (2012). It is 
explained that the developing countries adopt procyclical monetary policies. The variable 
LIMP is significant in both 2SLS and GMM models.  
In this part of the study, both fiscal and monetary policies, institutions and 
governance are evaluated through GMM and 2SLS techniques.  The data is taken from 
authentic sources as WDI and Freedom House, KOF Globalization Index, Polity iv, 
Human Right Data set (Cingranelli and Richards, 2010). Growth policies are procyclical 
and the role of institutions and governance is not robust in SAARC region. All the 
diagnostic tests fulfill the required criteria.  
The comprehensive results enable us to make policy implications of study which 
is given in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This chapter sums up the whole study. Conclusion is explained in this part of the 
study. On the basis of conclusion, policy implications are elucidated. 
6.1   Conclusion 
 This study has explained the cyclical relationship among economic growth 
policies (fiscal and monetary), institutions (Economic and Political) and governance in 
major SAARC countries. The panel data for six SAARC countries Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka for the period of 1981-2010 give robust evidence of 
procyclical fiscal policy in this region. In spite of the fact that in developed countries 
countercyclical fiscal policy is adopted in peak time of the economy. However in the 
developing countries fiscal policy is procyclical in peak time. There are number of ways 
to evaluate the fiscal policy but in this study total government expenditure is used to 
measure the cyclicality of fiscal policy. In order to evaluate the cyclicality among 
SAARC region, the role of institutions and governance is also analyzed.  
For the evaluation of fiscal policy, 2SLS and GMM techniques are applied. It is 
found that fiscal policy is procyclical in this region. The P.value is significant for 
 LGEt-1 and  LY variables and has positive coefficient sign. This clearly demonstrates 
that the fiscal policy is procylical. The result is also the same as the study of Thorton 
(2008) and Reinhart et al. (2004). It explains that the government consumption 
expenditures are procyclical in developing countries. The economic institutions indicator 
is significant but has negative coefficient sign. In the same way governance variable does 
not play significant role in the region. This result is also the same as the study of 
Mpatswe et al. (2011). So, weak institutions and poor governance is one of the major 
reasons for procyclical fiscal policy in the region. The diagnostic tests are as model 
specification, autocorrelation, heteroskadacity, Anderson, Cragg and Donald, Sargan 
tests, Auto, Hetro and orthog are performed and the results show that the required 
conditions are fulfilled.  
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In the same way, fiscal policy is procyclical in the process of evaluation among 
political institutions. The variables  LGEt-1 and  LY are significant and have positive 
coefficient sign. This makes clear that fiscal policy is procyclical. The variable of 
political institution is significant and negative coefficient sign. The governance variable 
is insignificant. The results of all the diagnostic tests are significant, which are performed 
for political model. The results show that fiscal policy is procyclical. However, the role 
of institutions and governance is not so robust.  
Monetary policy is procyclical in developing countries whereas in advanced 
countries it is countercyclical (Lane, 2003b). In this study, monetary policy is evaluated 
in the perspective of institutions and governance. In order to evaluate the cyclicality of 
monetary policy, LM2 variable is used. In economic institutions, the variable LM2t-1 and 
LY is significant and robust and have positive coefficient signs which show that the 
monetary policy in SAARC region is procyclical. The variables LECO and LGI are 
insignificant which show that in monetary policy economic institution and governance 
has no role. The different diagnostic tests are performed, as model specification, 
autocorrelation, heteroskadacity, Anderson, Cragg and Donald, orhog and Sargan which 
show that the results fulfilled the required conditions. 
In the same way, monetary policy is procyclical among political institutions. The 
variable LM2t-1 and LY is significant in both 2SLS and GMM. Both the variables have 
correct coefficient sign. However, the variables LPI and LGI are insignificant. So, the 
political institution and governance indicators have no robust role. The models have 
significant result for all diagnostic tests.  
Procyclical policies hinder the economic growth. It has deep effects on the 
economy. Procyclical policy will cause reduction in the revenues (Eichengreen and 
Hausmann, 2004), the level of poverty rises (World Bank, 2000 and Laursen and 
Mahajan, 2005) the level of new investment fall (Bernanke, 1983), and by depressing 
human capital via unemployment (Martin and Rogers, 1997). 
6.2  Policy Implications 
 From a policy viewpoint, the implications of the study seem to be of grand 
practical magnitude. The following policies should be taken for conducting the 
appropriate growth policies in SAARC countries. 
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As it is evident from the study that the developing countries of SAARC region 
adopt procyclical fiscal policy, so it is the need of the hour to adopt counter cyclical 
growth policies. The governments of developing countries smoothen the expenditure, 
decline expenditure in peak and increase in trough (Thorton, 2008).  
There is a need to adopt counter cyclical monetary policy in SAARC region. 
Money balances must fall in good times and increase in bad times (Kaminsky et al. 
2004). Central banks must perform significant role in adopting counter cyclical monetary 
policy such as open market operation. 
Domestic credit to private sector and trade openness play significant role in the 
economies of SAARC countries. There is need to enhance the credit to private sector, 
economic activities increase and people get more jobs and the governments’ earn more 
revenue. It is required to increase exports and decrease imports.  
The role of institutions is important to adopt appropriate growth policies. In 
SAARC region institutions are not functioning well. These countries must get rid of 
colonial based extractive institutions. So, it is required to modernize institutions and 
enhance their performance. 
One of the main reasons of weak performance of institution is poor governance. 
Governance must be improved to gain growth stability. The governments of SAARC 
region should enhance the performance of civil service employees. Corruption must be 
minimized.   
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Appendix A 
Fiscal Policy and Economic Institutions  
Result: GMM  
    D.lexpe|      Coef   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  lpopm |  -.0862571   .1933031    -0.45   0.655    -.4651243    .2926101 
   lgdpD1 |   .6598321   .2444344     2.70   0.007     .1807495    1.138915 
    lgeLD |   .3947127   .0861955     4.58   0.000     .2257727    .5636527 
     leco |  -.2465599   .0717211    -3.44   0.001    -.3871307    -.105989 
      lexp |   .4828486   .1046626     4.61   0.000     .2777136    .6879837 
     _iyr_83 |   .3293972   .4834549     0.68   0.496     -.618157    1.276951 
     _iyr_84 |   .5031684   .3841199     1.31   0.190    -.2496927     1.25603 
     _iyr_85 |   .0941636    .469583     0.20   0.841    -.8262021    1.014529 
     _iyr_86 |   .3143725    .460453     0.68   0.495    -.5880988    1.216844 
     _iyr_87 |  -.1780293   .6166652    -0.29   0.773    -1.386671    1.030612 
     _iyr_88 |  -.1317542   .3929091    -0.34   0.737    -.9018418    .6383334 
     _iyr_89 |   .5948802   .5305109     1.12   0.262    -.4449021    1.634663 
     _iyr_90 |  -.8002008   .4914323    -1.63   0.103     -1.76339    .1629889 
     _iyr_91 |   .4855558   .3423157     1.42   0.156    -.1853706    1.156482 
     _iyr_92 |   .3080142   .6969769     0.44   0.659    -1.058035    1.674064 
     _iyr_93 |  -.3183447   .7908612    -0.40   0.687    -1.868404    1.231715 
     _iyr_94 |  -.5848478   .6194093    -0.94   0.345    -1.798868    .6291722 
     _iyr_95 |   .4258032   .4425248     0.96   0.336    -.4415294    1.293136 
     _iyr_96 |  -.5764986   .6605924    -0.87   0.383    -1.871236    .7182387 
     _iyr_97 |   .2665165   .5644423     0.47   0.637    -.8397701    1.372803 
     _iyr_98 |   .3399252   .5657899     0.60   0.548    -.7690027    1.448853 
     _iyr_99 |  -1.110765   1.082099    -1.03   0.305     -3.23164    1.010111 
     _iyr_00 |  -.5075315   .6769988    -0.75   0.453    -1.834425    .8193617 
     _iyr_01 |   .1748655   .3336489     0.52   0.600    -.4790743    .8288052 
     _iyr_02 |   .6761237   .5785834     1.17   0.243    -.4578789    1.810126 
     _iyr_03 |   .0755454   .3778745     0.20   0.842     -.665075    .8161658 
     _iyr_04 |  -.0088665   .4196456    -0.02   0.983    -.8313568    .8136237 
     _iyr_05 |   .2355244   .3723724     0.63   0.527    -.4943121    .9653609 
     _iyr_06 |   .1488712    .579516     0.26   0.797    -.9869593    1.284702 
     _iyr_07 |    .259208   .3407879     0.76   0.447    -.4087239      .92714 
     _iyr_08 |   .2610647   .4908643     0.53   0.595    -.7010116    1.223141 
     _iyr_09 |   .3771617   .3093048     1.22   0.223    -.2290646     .983388 
       _cons |  -2.753364   .9512853    -2.89   0.004    -4.617849   -.8888793 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):             26.985 
                                                      Chi-sq(3) P-val =    0.0000 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):               19.213 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):         2.253 
                                                      Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.3242 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Result: 2SLS 
First-stage regressions 
   lpopm |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LgdpD1 |   1.040157   .1093742     9.51   0.000     .8224954    1.257819 
 lexpe LD |  -.0931235   .0546301    -1.70   0.092    -.2018409    .0155939 
      leco |  -.1354263   .0502819    -2.69   0.009    -.2354905   -.0353621 
       lexp |  -1.161363   .2306111    -5.04     0.000    -1.620293   -.7024319 
     _iyr_83 |   1.544492   .4182536     3.69   0.000     .7121411    2.376844 
     _iyr_84 |    1.77264   .4119288     4.30   0.000     .9528754    2.592404 
     _iyr_85 |   1.695295   .4072172     4.16   0.000     .8849067    2.505683 
     _iyr_86 |   1.877963   .3983964     4.71   0.000     1.085129    2.670797 
     _iyr_87 |   2.358998   .3978734     5.93   0.000     1.567205    3.150791 
     _iyr_88 |   1.720872   .3974208     4.33   0.000     .9299792    2.511764 
     _iyr_89 |   1.950674   .3918841     4.98   0.000       1.1708    2.730548 
     _iyr_90 |   1.523834   .4439692     3.43   0.001     .6403071    2.407361 
     _iyr_91 |   1.924928   .5165439     3.73   0.000     .8969733    2.952883 
     _iyr_92 |    2.01245   .5140112     3.92   0.000     .9895347    3.035364 
     _iyr_93 |    1.78122   .4501883     3.96   0.000      .885317    2.677123 
     _iyr_94 |   1.618459   .4141435     3.91   0.000     .7942867    2.442631 
     _iyr_95 |   1.504046   .4029349     3.73   0.000     .7021795    2.305912 
     _iyr_96 |   1.511284   .4315275     3.50   0.001     .6525172    2.370052 
     _iyr_97 |   1.675387   .4389712     3.82   0.000     .8018065    2.548968 
     _iyr_98 |   1.671513   .4281053     3.90   0.000      .819556     2.52347 
     _iyr_99 |   1.176288   .4800047     2.45   0.016     .2210478    2.131527 
     _iyr_00 |   .9191431   .4334222     2.12   0.037     .0566053    1.781681 
     _iyr_01 |   .8374136   .4305577     1.94   0.055    -.0194236    1.694251 
     _iyr_02 |   .5696346   .4816804     1.18   0.240    -.3889399    1.528209 
     _iyr_03 |   1.049219   .3755275     2.79   0.007      .301896    1.796543 
     _iyr_04 |   .8005039   .3600742     2.22   0.029     .0839334    1.517074 
     _iyr_05 |   .6069353   .3562466     1.70   0.092     -.102018    1.315889 
     _iyr_06 |   .5894235   .3557682     1.66   0.101    -.1185778    1.297425 
     _iyr_07 |   .1732597   .3652559     0.47   0.637    -.5536228    .9001422 
     _iyr_08 |   .3872602   .3641688     1.06   0.291    -.3374588    1.111979 
     _iyr_09 |   .3606456   .3642602     0.99   0.325    -.3642552    1.085546 
       logdcp |    .523998   .1659911     3.16   0.002     .1936652    .8543308 
       logimp |   1.247334   .2223489     5.61   0.000     .8048455    1.689822 
       logrev |   .2176517   .0583457     3.73   0.000     .1015401    .3337634 
       _cons |  -7.223398    .705094   -10.24   0.000     -8.62658   -5.820217 
IV (2SLS) estimation 
    D.logexpe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     lpopm |  -.1052658   .1973423    -0.53   0.594    -.4920497     .281518 
   lgdpD1 |   .6719734   .2642421     2.54     0.011     .1540684    1.189878 
lexpeLD |   .3643563   .0827212     4.40   0.000     .2022258    .5264867 
      leco |  -.2430623   .0728546    -3.34   0.001    -.3858547   -.1002699 
      lexp |   .5155079   .0984544     5.24   0.000     .3225409    .7084749 
     _iyr_83 |   .2678266   .5666457     0.47   0.636    -.8427785    1.378432 
     _iyr_84 |   .5233988   .5701064     0.92   0.359    -.5939893    1.640787 
     _iyr_85 |   .1179488    .574813     0.21   0.837    -1.008664    1.244562 
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     _iyr_86 |   .3472971   .5763025     0.60   0.547     -.782235    1.476829 
     _iyr_87 |  -.2758114   .6133105    -0.45   0.653    -1.477878    .9262552 
     _iyr_88 |  -.1347592   .5698194    -0.24   0.813    -1.251585    .9820664 
     _iyr_89 |   .7031443   .5622241     1.25   0.211    -.3987946    1.805083 
     _iyr_90 |   -.766864   .6255542    -1.23   0.220    -1.992928    .4591998 
     _iyr_91 |   .4304691   .7260451     0.59   0.553    -.9925532    1.853491 
     _iyr_92 |   .2787744   .7097951     0.39   0.695    -1.112398    1.669947 
     _iyr_93 |  -.2399857   .6235083    -0.38   0.700     -1.46204    .9820681 
     _iyr_94 |  -.5252898   .5830304    -0.90   0.368    -1.668008    .6174288 
     _iyr_95 |   .4458153   .5888069     0.76   0.449    -.7082252    1.599856 
     _iyr_96 |  -.6632789   .6309856    -1.05   0.293    -1.899988    .5734302 
     _iyr_97 |   .2842219   .6378735     0.45   0.656    -.9659872    1.534431 
     _iyr_98 |   .2229218   .6439884     0.35   0.729    -1.039272    1.485116 
     _iyr_99 |  -1.107222   .7045902    -1.57   0.116    -2.488193    .2737496 
     _iyr_00 |  -.4960342   .6273439    -0.79   0.429    -1.725606    .7335373 
     _iyr_01 |   .1311595   .6263536     0.21   0.834    -1.096471     1.35879 
     _iyr_02 |    .652943   .7071013     0.92   0.356    -.7329501    2.038836 
     _iyr_03 |   .0782713   .5468525     0.14   0.886      -.99354    1.150083 
     _iyr_04 |  -.0598786   .5204451    -0.12   0.908    -1.079932    .9601751 
     _iyr_05 |   .2158345   .5207015     0.41   0.679    -.8047217    1.236391 
     _iyr_06 |   .2230242   .5201915     0.43   0.668    -.7965324    1.242581 
     _iyr_07 |   .2346793   .5421707     0.43   0.665    -.8279557    1.297314 
     _iyr_08 |   .2473177    .541682     0.46   0.648    -.8143596    1.308995 
     _iyr_09 |   .3699803    .539901     0.69   0.493    -.6882063    1.428167 
       _cons |  -2.907917   1.001411    -2.90   0.004    -4.870646   -.9451874 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):          48.159 
                                                      Chi-sq(3) P-val =    0.0000 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):               19.213 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           2.190 
                                                      Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.3345 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Pooled OLS 
     logexpe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lgdp |   .6599512   .1902315     3.47   0.001      .284508    1.035394 
     leco |  -.3265017   .0468462    -6.97   0.000     -.418958   -.2340454 
        lexp |   1.073651   .0277732    38.66   0.000     1.018837    1.128464 
     lpopm |  -.1768587   .1084368    -1.63   0.105     -.390871    .0371535 
       _cons |  -3.246693   .9735375    -3.33   0.001    -5.168079   -1.325307 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Autocorrelatio 
H0: no first order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,       5) =     13.481 
    Prob > F =      0.0144 
Heteroskedasticity  
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Ho: Disturbance is homoskedastic 
Pagan-Hall general test statistic   :  37.901  Chi-sq(34) P-value = 0.2959 
 
Redundant: 
IV redundancy test (LM test of redundancy of specified instruments):    17.040 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.0000 
Ramsey Test 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of logexpe 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 172) =     88.58 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000 
 
2. Fiscal Policy and Political Institutions 
Result: GMM 
  D.lexpe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lk |  -.0745508   .0997611    -0.75   0.455     -.270079    .1209773 
 lgdpD1 |   .6628035    .174762     3.79   0.000     .3202763    1.005331 
  lexpeLD |   .3654971      .0826     4.42   0.000     .2036042    .5273901 
        lpi |  -.7661371   .2505653    -3.06   0.002    -1.257236   -.2750382 
        lexp |   .3857164   .1031797     3.74   0.000     .1834879    .5879449 
     _iyr_83 |   .3435796   .4797105     0.72   0.474    -.5966357    1.283795 
     _iyr_84 |   .5264852   .4363802     1.21   0.228    -.3288042    1.381775 
     _iyr_85 |   .1197322   .5367578     0.22   0.823    -.9322939    1.171758 
     _iyr_86 |   .4809821   .4305176     1.12   0.264    -.3628169    1.324781 
     _iyr_87 |  -.1279419   .5888928    -0.22   0.828    -1.282151    1.026267 
     _iyr_88 |   .0940696   .4220646     0.22   0.824    -.7331619     .921301 
     _iyr_89 |   .8718042   .5370823     1.62   0.105    -.1808577    1.924466 
     _iyr_90 |  -.6918671   .5585121    -1.24   0.215    -1.786531    .4027965 
     _iyr_91 |    .515331   .4082397     1.26   0.207     -.284804    1.315466 
     _iyr_92 |   .4047151   .8325805     0.49   0.627    -1.227113    2.036543 
     _iyr_93 |  -.1247229   .8673003    -0.14   0.886      -1.8246    1.575154 
     _iyr_94 |  -.2634722   .5949002    -0.44   0.658    -1.429455    .9025108 
     _iyr_95 |   .6849584   .4697875     1.46   0.145    -.2358081    1.605725 
     _iyr_96 |  -.2826252   .6503263    -0.43   0.664    -1.557241    .9919908 
     _iyr_97 |   .4254152   .5192121     0.82   0.413    -.5922217    1.443052 
     _iyr_98 |   .5203085    .533066     0.98   0.329    -.5244817    1.565099 
     _iyr_99 |  -.9320018   1.027242    -0.91   0.364    -2.945359    1.081356 
     _iyr_00 |  -.5048802   .5966756    -0.85   0.397    -1.674343    .6645826 
     _iyr_01 |   .1019479    .407851     0.25   0.803    -.6974254    .9013213 
     _iyr_02 |   .5537375   .7886693     0.70   0.483     -.992026    2.099501 
     _iyr_03 |   .0420009   .4323598     0.10   0.923    -.8054087    .8894105 
     _iyr_04 |   -.057035    .463289    -0.12   0.902    -.9650648    .8509948 
     _iyr_05 |    .269688   .4261298     0.63   0.527     -.565511    1.104887 
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     _iyr_06 |   .3215093   .5960606     0.54   0.590    -.8467479    1.489767 
     _iyr_07 |   .2636557   .4303618     0.61   0.540    -.5798379    1.107149 
     _iyr_08 |   .3021088   .5206051     0.58   0.562    -.7182584    1.322476 
     _iyr_09 |   .4671432   .3862987     1.21   0.227    -.2899883    1.224275 
       _cons |  -2.175148   .6756213    -3.22   0.001    -3.499342   -.8509546 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):             37.915 
                                                      Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.0000 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):               30.844 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):         0.009 
                                                      Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.9250 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Result:2SLS 
First-stage regressions 
        lk |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     lgdpD1 |   1.480034   .2027688     7.30   0.000     1.076588    1.883481 
   lexpeLD |  -.0850496   .0926005    -0.92   0.361    -.2692956    .0991965 
       lpi |   1.675457   .3573734     4.69   0.000     .9643956    2.386518 
        lexp |   .5040209   .1275256     3.95   0.000     .2502849    .7577568 
     _iyr_83 |    3.36209   .7120816     4.72   0.000     1.945271    4.778909 
     _iyr_84 |   3.501925   .7086931     4.94   0.000     2.091848    4.912002 
     _iyr_85 |   3.540898   .7023941     5.04   0.000     2.143354    4.938442 
     _iyr_86 |   3.027128   .7047208     4.30   0.000     1.624955    4.429301 
     _iyr_87 |   3.499408   .7184265     4.87   0.000     2.069964    4.928851 
     _iyr_88 |   2.465748   .6959468     3.54   0.001     1.081032    3.850463 
     _iyr_89 |   2.622831   .6787808     3.86   0.000      1.27227    3.973392 
     _iyr_90 |   2.541063   .7561301     3.36   0.001     1.036601    4.045525 
     _iyr_91 |   2.961522   .8605894     3.44   0.001     1.249219    4.673825 
     _iyr_92 |   2.564096   .8410945     3.05   0.003     .8905813     4.23761 
     _iyr_93 |   2.256745   .7415222     3.04   0.003     .7813484    3.732142 
     _iyr_94 |   1.390212   .6943567     2.00   0.049     .0086595    2.771764 
     _iyr_95 |   1.469587   .6982921     2.10   0.038     .0802047    2.858969 
     _iyr_96 |   .6567366   .7389246     0.89   0.377    -.8134915    2.126965 
     _iyr_97 |   1.161021   .7426212     1.56   0.122     -.316562    2.638605 
     _iyr_98 |   1.208866   .7513513     1.61   0.112    -.2860874    2.703819 
     _iyr_99 |   1.151633   .8094517     1.42   0.159    -.4589221    2.762188 
     _iyr_00 |   1.037588   .7229668     1.44   0.155    -.4008895    2.476065 
     _iyr_01 |   .9963789   .7220139     1.38   0.171    -.4402023     2.43296 
     _iyr_02 |   .9102404   .8152927     1.12   0.268    -.7119362    2.532417 
     _iyr_03 |   .9520563   .6266881     1.52   0.133    -.2948563    2.198969 
     _iyr_04 |   .5805513   .6001033     0.97   0.336     -.613466    1.774569 
     _iyr_05 |   .3387283   .5990811     0.57   0.573    -.8532552    1.530712 
     _iyr_06 |   .2183971   .5983456     0.37   0.716     -.972123    1.408917 
     _iyr_07 |  -.0103609    .617399    -0.02   0.987    -1.238791    1.218069 
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     _iyr_08 |   .3331369   .6195411     0.54   0.592    -.8995556    1.565829 
     _iyr_09 |    .028762   .6199501     0.05   0.963    -1.204744    1.262268 
     lpopm |  -1.291449   .1752211    -7.37   0.000    -1.640084   -.9428142 
      lrev |   .3031171   .1052776     2.88   0.005     .0936478    .5125865 
       _cons |  -10.22744   1.188199    -8.61   0.000    -12.59159   -7.863299 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
IV (2SLS) estimation 
  D.logexpe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lk |  -.0745876   .1108343    -0.67   0.501    -.2918188    .1426437 
     lgdpD1 |   .6661556   .1911983     3.48   0.000     .2914139    1.040897 
    lexpeLD |   .3652536   .0816468     4.47   0.000     .2052289    .5252783 
        lpi |    -.77046   .2484898    -3.10   0.002    -1.257491    -.283429 
        lexp |   .3841467   .1048683     3.66   0.000     .1786086    .5896848 
     _iyr_83 |    .343389   .5622556     0.61   0.541    -.7586117     1.44539 
     _iyr_84 |   .5263722   .5661979     0.93   0.353    -.5833553      1.6361 
     _iyr_85 |   .1215459    .569694     0.21   0.831    -.9950338    1.238126 
     _iyr_86 |   .4822678   .5441175     0.89   0.375    -.5841828    1.548718 
     _iyr_87 |  -.1245277   .5603059    -0.22   0.824    -1.222707    .9736517 
     _iyr_88 |    .095105   .5399076     0.18   0.860    -.9630943    1.153304 
     _iyr_89 |   .8702199   .5306626     1.64   0.101    -.1698597      1.9103 
     _iyr_90 |  -.6932549    .619734    -1.12   0.263    -1.907911    .5214014 
     _iyr_91 |   .5173801   .7210564     0.72   0.473    -.8958645    1.930625 
     _iyr_92 |   .4068543   .7083043     0.57   0.566    -.9813967    1.795105 
     _iyr_93 |  -.1193336   .6153756    -0.19   0.846    -1.325448     1.08678 
     _iyr_94 |  -.2605696   .5641559    -0.46   0.644    -1.366295    .8451557 
     _iyr_95 |   .6840189    .568443     1.20   0.229    -.4301089    1.798147 
     _iyr_96 |   -.283032   .6143698    -0.46   0.645    -1.487175    .9211107 
     _iyr_97 |    .426072   .6176209     0.69   0.490    -.7844427    1.636587 
     _iyr_98 |   .5220313   .6151931     0.85   0.396    -.6837251    1.727788 
     _iyr_99 |  -.9290479    .693778    -1.34   0.181    -2.288828     .430732 
     _iyr_00 |  -.5070192     .62333    -0.81   0.416    -1.728724    .7146852 
     _iyr_01 |   .1038612   .6234501     0.17   0.868    -1.118079    1.325801 
     _iyr_02 |   .5543615   .7087438     0.78   0.434    -.8347508    1.943474 
     _iyr_03 |   .0425978   .5412743     0.08   0.937     -1.01828    1.103476 
     _iyr_04 |  -.0612779   .5172044    -0.12   0.906     -1.07498    .9524241 
     _iyr_05 |   .2664605   .5169992     0.52   0.606    -.7468393     1.27976 
     _iyr_06 |   .3093494   .5167937     0.60   0.549    -.7035475    1.322246 
     _iyr_07 |   .2659603   .5369997     0.50   0.620    -.7865399     1.31846 
     _iyr_08 |   .3095011    .538827     0.57   0.566    -.7465803    1.365583 
     _iyr_09 |   .4688301   .5381118     0.87   0.384    -.5858497     1.52351 
       _cons |  -2.174916   .8384728    -2.59   0.009    -3.818292   -.5315395 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):          49.718 
                                                            Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.0000 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):               30.844 
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Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           0.008 
                                                            Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.9294 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Pooled OLS 
     logexpe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lgdp |    .727583   .0861569     8.44   0.000     .5575428    .8976233 
       lpi |  -.9652294   .1073245    -8.99   0.000    -1.177046   -.7534125 
        lexp |   .8841799   .0354165    24.97   0.000     .8142814    .9540784 
        lk |  -.1589916   .0283306    -5.61   0.000    -.2149051   -.1030781 
       _cons |  -2.665828   .3537093    -7.54   0.000    -3.363913   -1.967743 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Autocorrelation 
H0: no first order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,       5) =     12.534 
           Prob > F =      0.0166 
Heteroskedasticity  
Ho: Disturbance is homoskedastic 
Pagan-Hall general test statistic   :  40.450  Chi-sq(33) P-value = 0.1745 
 
Redundant 
IV redundancy test (LM test of redundancy of specified instruments):    10.677 
Ramsey Test 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of logexpe 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 172) =     51.08 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000 
                                                       Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.0011 
3. Fiscal Policy and Governance 
 
Result: GMM 
 
    D.lexpe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lk |  -.0543327    .102186    -0.53   0.595    -.2546135    .1459481 
    lgdpD1 |    .754073   .1908835     3.95   0.000     .3799481    1.128198 
   lexpeLD |   .3893347   .0832568     4.68   0.000     .2261545    .5525149 
      lge |   .0791519    .490123     0.16   0.872    -.8814714    1.039775 
       lop |   .4956613   .0985367     5.03   0.000     .3025329    .6887896 
     _iyr_83 |   .6825099   .4133097     1.65   0.099    -.1275621    1.492582 
     _iyr_84 |   .8752029   .3958891     2.21   0.027     .0992745    1.651131 
     _iyr_85 |   .4443075   .4821216     0.92   0.357    -.5006335    1.389249 
     _iyr_86 |   .8038169   .3872869     2.08   0.038     .0447485    1.562885 
     _iyr_87 |   .2253107   .5694444     0.40   0.692    -.8907799    1.341401 
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     _iyr_88 |   .3312901   .3735151     0.89   0.375     -.400786    1.063366 
     _iyr_89 |   1.147245    .526812     2.18   0.029     .1147123    2.179778 
     _iyr_90 |  -.4912199   .5861152    -0.84   0.402    -1.639985    .6575447 
     _iyr_91 |   .6695446   .3998099     1.67   0.094    -.1140685    1.453158 
     _iyr_92 |   .5170653   .7661132     0.67   0.500    -.9844891     2.01862 
     _iyr_93 |   .0195434   .8087152     0.02   0.981    -1.565509    1.604596 
     _iyr_94 |  -.2360528    .546745    -0.43   0.666    -1.307653    .8355477 
     _iyr_95 |    .773446   .4515234     1.71   0.087    -.1115236    1.658416 
     _iyr_96 |  -.1415965   .5720712    -0.25   0.805    -1.262836    .9796425 
     _iyr_97 |   .6822413   .5265066     1.30   0.195    -.3496926    1.714175 
     _iyr_98 |   .6965713   .4743349     1.47   0.142    -.2331081    1.626251 
     _iyr_99 |  -.8145523   1.121956    -0.73   0.468    -3.013545    1.384441 
     _iyr_00 |  -.2398099   .6264346    -0.38   0.702    -1.467599    .9879794 
     _iyr_01 |   .4320597   .2946674     1.47   0.143    -.1454778    1.009597 
     _iyr_02 |   .8441948    .545682     1.55   0.122    -.2253222    1.913712 
     _iyr_03 |   .1850731   .3656412     0.51   0.613    -.5315706    .9017167 
     _iyr_04 |   .0704013    .412305     0.17   0.864    -.7377018    .8785043 
     _iyr_05 |   .3076536   .3695268     0.83   0.405    -.4166057    1.031913 
     _iyr_06 |    .244401   .5244306     0.47   0.641    -.7834641    1.272266 
     _iyr_07 |    .482139   .3262841     1.48   0.139    -.1573661    1.121644 
     _iyr_08 |   .3269545   .4284545     0.76   0.445    -.5128008     1.16671 
     _iyr_09 |   .5057838   .3059717     1.65   0.098    -.0939097    1.105477 
       _cons |  -4.359431   1.533724    -2.84   0.004    -7.365474   -1.353388 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):             41.671 
                                                   Chi-sq(3) P-val =    0.0000 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):               13.287 
                         (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic):         16.589 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):         3.712 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.1563 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Result 2SLS 
First-stage regression  
    lk |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lgdpD1 |   1.956843   .2324472     8.42   0.000     1.494258    2.419427 
    lexpeLD |  -.0004507   .1085407    -0.00   0.997    -.2164536    .2155521 
       lgv |   .8114135   .6138462     1.32   0.190    -.4101794    2.033006 
       lop |  -.0909957   .1375781    -0.66   0.510    -.3647848    .1827934 
     _iyr_83 |   3.320722   .8491337     3.91   0.000     1.630892    5.010552 
     _iyr_84 |   3.464789   .8424884     4.11   0.000     1.788184    5.141395 
     _iyr_85 |   3.504572   .8349801     4.20   0.000     1.842908    5.166235 
     _iyr_86 |   3.225478   .8513165     3.79   0.000     1.531304    4.919652 
     _iyr_87 |   3.981117    .859734     4.63   0.000     2.270192    5.692042 
     _iyr_88 |   2.897728   .8399145     3.45   0.001     1.226245    4.569211 
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     _iyr_89 |   3.044535   .8019165     3.80   0.000      1.44867    4.640399 
     _iyr_90 |   2.626231   .9018621     2.91   0.005     .8314683    4.420994 
     _iyr_91 |   3.884998   1.021643     3.80   0.000     1.851863    5.918133 
     _iyr_92 |   3.438521   .9956438     3.45   0.001     1.457126    5.419915 
     _iyr_93 |   2.649709   .8792833     3.01   0.003     .8998799    4.399539 
     _iyr_94 |   1.845157   .8257978     2.23   0.028     .2017673    3.488547 
     _iyr_95 |   2.128597   .8401489     2.53   0.013     .4566476    3.800547 
     _iyr_96 |   1.182951   .8719896     1.36   0.179    -.5523638    2.918266 
     _iyr_97 |   1.376363   .8641409     1.59   0.115    -.3433322    3.096058 
     _iyr_98 |    1.93648   .8969785     2.16   0.034     .1514354    3.721524 
     _iyr_99 |   1.452044   .9580784     1.52   0.134    -.4545924    3.358681 
     _iyr_00 |   1.021027   .8311412     1.23   0.223    -.6329964    2.675051 
     _iyr_01 |   .9823898   .8293205     1.18   0.240    -.6680105     2.63279 
     _iyr_02 |   .6015208   .9253885     0.65   0.518    -1.240061    2.443103 
     _iyr_03 |    .894503   .7248526     1.23   0.221    -.5479997    2.337006 
     _iyr_04 |   .6030083   .6932012     0.87   0.387    -.7765061    1.982523 
     _iyr_05 |   .4535221   .6912201     0.66   0.514    -.9220497    1.829094 
     _iyr_06 |   .4563253   .6861032     0.67   0.508    -.9090637    1.821714 
     _iyr_07 |   .0417217   .7077119     0.06   0.953     -1.36667    1.450113 
     _iyr_08 |   .6572195   .7077889     0.93   0.356    -.7513253    2.065764 
     _iyr_09 |   .4695516   .7039848     0.67   0.507    -.9314229    1.870526 
       logfa |  -6.26e-07   2.63e-06    -0.24   0.812    -5.85e-06    4.60e-06 
     lpopm |  -.8551933   .1724279    -4.96   0.000    -1.198336   -.5120508 
      lrev |   .5663501   .1171508     4.83   0.000     .3332126    .7994875 
       _cons |  -10.42298   1.876077    -5.56   0.000     -14.1565   -6.689471 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
IV (2SLS) estimation 
    D.lexpe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lk |  -.0841672    .121261    -0.69   0.488    -.3218345       .1535 
  lgdpD1|   .8532085    .228732     3.73   0.000      .404902    1.301515 
 lexpeLD |   .3721034   .0813003     4.58   0.000     .2127576    .5314491 
     lge |    .313821   .4632618     0.68   0.498    -.5941554    1.221797 
     lop |   .5099257   .0984905     5.18   0.000     .3168878    .7029636 
     _iyr_83 |   .6521071   .5576254     1.17   0.242    -.4408186    1.745033 
     _iyr_84 |   .9324452   .5691011     1.64   0.101    -.1829725    2.047863 
     _iyr_85 |   .5050433   .5778697     0.87   0.382    -.6275606    1.637647 
     _iyr_86 |   .8269425   .5555959     1.49   0.137    -.2620054     1.91589 
     _iyr_87 |   .2806782   .5949394     0.47   0.637    -.8853815    1.446738 
     _iyr_88 |    .293706   .5474138     0.54   0.592    -.7792054    1.366617 
     _iyr_89 |   1.181795   .5396236     2.19   0.029     .1241522    2.239438 
     _iyr_90 |  -.4991547   .6209148    -0.80   0.421    -1.716125     .717816 
     _iyr_91 |   .7405268   .7540262     0.98   0.326    -.7373373    2.218391 
     _iyr_92 |   .5868089   .7358061     0.80   0.425    -.8553445    2.028962 
     _iyr_93 |   .0362093   .6225468     0.06   0.954     -1.18396    1.256379 
     _iyr_94 |  -.2241505   .5660491    -0.40   0.692    -1.333586    .8852854 
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     _iyr_95 |   .8096672   .5771409     1.40   0.161    -.3215082    1.940843 
     _iyr_96 |  -.2687917   .6126879    -0.44   0.661    -1.469638    .9320545 
     _iyr_97 |    .757147   .6200488     1.22   0.222    -.4581263     1.97242 
     _iyr_98 |   .6351062    .620608     1.02   0.306    -.5812632    1.851475 
     _iyr_99 |  -.8172216    .703117    -1.16   0.245    -2.195306    .5608623 
     _iyr_00 |  -.1900647   .6229773    -0.31   0.760    -1.411078    1.030948 
     _iyr_01 |   .4232951   .6233111     0.68   0.497    -.7983722    1.644962 
     _iyr_02 |   .8513862   .7079958     1.20   0.229      -.53626    2.239032 
     _iyr_03 |   .2613596   .5435703     0.48   0.631    -.8040185    1.326738 
     _iyr_04 |   .1339476   .5168583     0.26   0.796    -.8790759    1.146971 
     _iyr_05 |    .364819    .517974     0.70   0.481    -.6503913    1.380029 
     _iyr_06 |   .3755603   .5178059     0.73   0.468    -.6393206    1.390441 
     _iyr_07 |   .4033665   .5380506     0.75   0.453    -.6511934    1.457926 
     _iyr_08 |   .4355982    .544344     0.80   0.424    -.6312965    1.502493 
     _iyr_09 |   .5197762   .5405594     0.96   0.336    -.5397008    1.579253 
       _cons |  -5.206144   1.489746    -3.49   0.000    -8.125993   -2.286295 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):          38.244 
                                                   Chi-sq(3) P-val =    0.0000 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):               13.287 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           2.341 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.3102 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Pooled OLS 
     lexpe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lgdp |   1.190147   .0524983    22.67   0.000     1.086535    1.293758 
       lge |  -.1459909   .1647221    -0.89   0.377    -.4710884    .1791066 
       lop |   1.102691   .0334856    32.93   0.000     1.036603    1.168779 
        lk |  -.1118059   .0304328    -3.67   0.000    -.1718684   -.0517435 
       _cons |  -6.991337   .5387681   -12.98   0.000    -8.054656   -5.928018 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Autocorrelation 
H0: no first order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,       5) =     12.134 
           Prob > F =      0.0176 
 
Heteroskedasticity 
Ho: Disturbance is homoskedastic 
 Pagan-Hall general test statistic   :  41.324  Chi-sq(34) P-value = 0.1812 
Redundant 
IV redundancy test (LM test of redundancy of specified instruments):    18.597 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.0000 
Ramsey Test 
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Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of logexpe 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 172) =     46.10 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000 
 
4. Fiscal Policy, Economic Institutions and Interaction Variable 
 
Result: GMM 
 
Dlogexpe |          Coef.           Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     lpopm |  -.0976274   .1908095    -0.51   0.609     -.471607    .2763523 
   lgdpD1 |   .7953032   .2803021     2.84   0.005     .2459211    1.344685 
  lexpeLD |   .3896459   .0849998     4.58   0.000     .2230494    .5562424 
     leco |  -.8893669   .5150286    -1.73   0.084    -1.898804    .1200706 
      legv |      .6235   .4882314     1.28   0.202     -.333416    1.580416 
        lexp |   .4649718   .1007268     4.62   0.000     .2675508    .6623927 
     _iyr_83 |   .2699172   .4500652     0.60   0.549    -.6121943    1.152029 
     _iyr_84 |   .5703492   .4081325     1.40   0.162    -.2295759    1.370274 
     _iyr_85 |   .2021143   .4975539     0.41   0.685    -.7730734    1.177302 
     _iyr_86 |   .4275198   .4590276     0.93   0.352    -.4721577    1.327197 
     _iyr_87 |  -.0191353   .6345711    -0.03   0.976    -1.262872    1.224601 
     _iyr_88 |  -.0621079   .3908005    -0.16   0.874    -.8280628     .703847 
     _iyr_89 |   .6858187   .5318339     1.29   0.197    -.3565567    1.728194 
     _iyr_90 |  -.8613861   .5026945    -1.71   0.087    -1.846649     .123877 
     _iyr_91 |   .6756122   .4079163     1.66   0.098     -.123889    1.475113 
     _iyr_92 |   .4798395   .8212609     0.58   0.559    -1.129802    2.089481 
     _iyr_93 |  -.3159063   .8246813    -0.38   0.702    -1.932252    1.300439 
     _iyr_94 |  -.5639324   .6296347    -0.90   0.370    -1.797994     .670129 
     _iyr_95 |   .5570699   .4285505     1.30   0.194    -.2828736    1.397014 
     _iyr_96 |  -.5761618    .624348    -0.92   0.356    -1.799861    .6475378 
     _iyr_97 |   .3331773   .5697443     0.58   0.559     -.783501    1.449856 
     _iyr_98 |   .4715735   .5664856     0.83   0.405    -.6387178    1.581865 
     _iyr_99 |  -1.007331   1.074706    -0.94   0.349    -3.113716    1.099054 
     _iyr_00 |  -.4064706   .6338318    -0.64   0.521    -1.648758    .8358169 
     _iyr_01 |   .2406373   .3276383     0.73   0.463    -.4015219    .8827965 
     _iyr_02 |   .7020205   .5962705     1.18   0.239    -.4666482    1.870689 
     _iyr_03 |   .0712626   .3641755     0.20   0.845    -.6425083    .7850335 
     _iyr_04 |   .0122186   .4557051     0.03   0.979     -.880947    .9053841 
     _iyr_05 |   .2029401   .3923488     0.52   0.605    -.5660494    .9719295 
     _iyr_06 |   .1737675    .555445     0.31   0.754    -.9148847     1.26242 
     _iyr_07 |   .2855812   .3390277     0.84   0.400    -.3789008    .9500632 
     _iyr_08 |   .3273722    .476488     0.69   0.492    -.6065272    1.261272 
     _iyr_09 |   .4423773   .3182439     1.39   0.165    -.1813693    1.066124 
       _cons |  -4.427483   1.755048    -2.52   0.012    -7.867314   -.9876514 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):             24.652 
                                                   Chi-sq(3) P-val =    0.0000 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):               19.000 
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 Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):         1.659 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.4362 
Result: 2SLS 
First-stage regressions 
     lpopm |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lgdpD1|   .9995373   .1245986     8.02   0.000       .75153    1.247545 
   lexpeLD |  -.0954468   .0549145    -1.74   0.086    -.2047515    .0138578 
     leco |   .0883759   .3290492     0.27   0.789    -.5665801    .7433319 
      legv |  -.2147541   .3120132    -0.69   0.493    -.8358009    .4062927 
      lexp |  -1.168583    .231611    -5.05   0.000    -1.629593   -.7075725 
     _iyr_83 |   1.517755   .4214304     3.60   0.001     .6789186    2.356591 
     _iyr_84 |   1.727404   .4184835     4.13   0.000     .8944331    2.560374 
     _iyr_85 |   1.644469   .4151831     3.96   0.000     .8180674     2.47087 
     _iyr_86 |   1.827288   .4064374     4.50   0.000     1.018295    2.636281 
     _iyr_87 |   2.280818   .4150342     5.50   0.000     1.454713    3.106923 
     _iyr_88 |   1.681951   .4027243     4.18   0.000     .8803479    2.483553 
     _iyr_89 |   1.906702    .398336     4.79   0.000     1.113834     2.69957 
     _iyr_90 |   1.530011   .4455271     3.43   0.001     .6432117    2.416811 
     _iyr_91 |   1.833421   .5350327     3.43   0.001     .7684654    2.898377 
     _iyr_92 |   1.932747   .5285512     3.66   0.000     .8806921    2.984802 
     _iyr_93 |   1.754357   .4533595     3.87   0.000      .851967    2.656746 
     _iyr_94 |        1.6   .4163771     3.84   0.000     .7712218    2.428777 
     _iyr_95 |   1.453513   .4108794     3.54   0.001     .6356779    2.271348 
     _iyr_96 |   1.495516   .4335596     3.45   0.001     .6325368    2.358495 
     _iyr_97 |   1.640711   .4432945     3.70   0.000     .7583551    2.523066 
     _iyr_98 |   1.610153   .4386745     3.67   0.000     .7369932    2.483313 
     _iyr_99 |   1.130161   .4862318     2.32   0.023     .1623411    2.097982 
     _iyr_00 |   .8883146   .4371555     2.03   0.046     .0181784    1.758451 
     _iyr_01 |   .8066213   .4342913     1.86   0.067     -.057814    1.671057 
     _iyr_02 |   .5619491   .4834015     1.16   0.249    -.4002376    1.524136 
     _iyr_03 |   1.051351   .3767815     2.79   0.007     .3013865    1.801316 
     _iyr_04 |   .8007351   .3612646     2.22   0.030      .081656    1.519814 
     _iyr_05 |   .6195272   .3578921     1.73   0.087    -.0928392    1.331894 
     _iyr_06 |   .5985566   .3571908     1.68   0.098    -.1124139    1.309527 
     _iyr_07 |   .1643465    .366692     0.45   0.655    -.5655357    .8942287 
     _iyr_08 |   .3633108   .3670257     0.99   0.325    -.3672355    1.093857 
     _iyr_09 |   .3427962   .3663832     0.94   0.352    -.3864713    1.072064 
      ldcp |   .5115223   .1675232     3.05   0.003     .1780756     .844969 
        limp |   1.267051   .2249156     5.63   0.000     .8193675    1.714734 
      lrev |   .2125532   .0590054     3.60   0.001     .0951059    .3300005 
       _cons |   -6.64776   1.095404    -6.07   0.000    -8.828107   -4.467413 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
IV (2SLS) estimation 
   D.lexpe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     lpopm |  -.0945357    .196318    -0.48   0.630     -.479312    .2902406 
     lgdpD1 |   .7883398   .2704115     2.92   0.004     .2583429    1.318337 
   lexpeLD |   .3692153   .0822286     4.49   0.000     .2080501    .5303804 
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     leco |  -.8915708   .4717916    -1.89   0.059    -1.816265    .0331238 
      legv |    .630464   .4546021     1.39   0.165    -.2605398    1.521468 
       lexp |   .4819607   .1011303     4.77   0.000     .2837488    .6801725 
     _iyr_83 |   .2684352   .5623802     0.48   0.633    -.8338097     1.37068 
     _iyr_84 |   .5867354   .5667956     1.04   0.301    -.5241635    1.697634 
     _iyr_85 |    .195659   .5720605     0.34   0.732    -.9255591    1.316877 
     _iyr_86 |   .4363931    .574027     0.76   0.447    -.6886792    1.561465 
     _iyr_87 |  -.1037576   .6171066    -0.17   0.866    -1.313264    1.105749 
     _iyr_88 |  -.0771886   .5661933    -0.14   0.892    -1.186907     1.03253 
     _iyr_89 |   .7805527   .5594777     1.40   0.163    -.3160034    1.877109 
     _iyr_90 |  -.8373063   .6235145    -1.34   0.179    -2.059372    .3847597 
     _iyr_91 |   .6233563   .7317542     0.85   0.394    -.8108555    2.057568 
     _iyr_92 |   .4487032   .7134452     0.63   0.529    -.9496237     1.84703 
     _iyr_93 |  -.2183119   .6188072    -0.35   0.724    -1.431152    .9945279 
     _iyr_94 |  -.5193721   .5786044    -0.90   0.369    -1.653416    .6146716 
     _iyr_95 |   .5608806   .5889239     0.95   0.341     -.593389     1.71515 
     _iyr_96 |  -.6438539   .6262086    -1.03   0.304      -1.8712    .5834924 
     _iyr_97 |   .3670987   .6350232     0.58   0.563    -.8775239    1.611721 
     _iyr_98 |     .36896   .6456294     0.57   0.568    -.8964505     1.63437 
     _iyr_99 |  -1.000803   .7027982    -1.42   0.154    -2.378262    .3766565 
     _iyr_00 |  -.4194383   .6248621    -0.67   0.502    -1.644146    .8052689 
     _iyr_01 |     .21061   .6241108     0.34   0.736    -1.012625    1.433845 
     _iyr_02 |   .6835214     .70216     0.97   0.330    -.6926868     2.05973 
     _iyr_03 |   .0705253   .5428403     0.13   0.897    -.9934221    1.134473 
     _iyr_04 |  -.0611141   .5165654    -0.12   0.906    -1.073564    .9513354 
     _iyr_05 |   .1771306   .5175815     0.34   0.732    -.8373106    1.191572 
     _iyr_06 |   .2001364   .5165837     0.39   0.698    -.8123491    1.212622 
     _iyr_07 |   .2707403   .5389099     0.50   0.615    -.7855036    1.326984 
     _iyr_08 |   .3273753    .540506     0.61   0.545    -.7319971    1.386748 
     _iyr_09 |   .4341833   .5377788     0.81   0.419    -.6198437     1.48821 
       _cons |  -4.487634   1.472164    -3.05   0.002    -7.373022   -1.602245 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):          48.198 
                                                   Chi-sq(3) P-val =    0.0000 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):               19.000 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           1.568 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.4566 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Pooled OLS 
     lexpe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lgdp |   .7460714   .1965418     3.80   0.000     .3581585    1.133984 
     lecoi |  -.5997807   .1737422    -3.45   0.001    -.9426943   -.2568671 
      legv |   .2576091   .1577723     1.63   0.104    -.0537847    .5690029 
        lx |   1.053086    .030376    34.67   0.000     .9931337    1.113039 
     lpopm |  -.1854958   .1080539    -1.72   0.088    -.3987608    .0277692 
       _cons |  -4.207175   1.133521    -3.71   0.000    -6.444397   -1.969954 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Autocorrelation 
H0: no first order autocorrelation 
  F(  1,       5) =     13.861 
           Prob > F =      0.0137 
Heteroskedasticity  
Ho: Disturbance is homoskedastic 
 Pagan-Hall general test statistic   :  41.628  Chi-sq(35) P-value = 0.2045 
Redundant 
IV redundancy test (LM test of redundancy of specified instruments):    16.225 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.0001 
Ramsey Test 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of logexpe 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 171) =     90.84 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000 
 
 
5. Fiscal Policy, Political Institutions and Interaction Variable 
 
Result: GMM 
    D.lexpe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lk |  -.0751549   .0998576    -0.75   0.452    -.2708722    .1205624 
   lgdpD1 |    .678125   .1949544     3.48   0.001     .2960213    1.060229 
  lexpLD |   .3682297    .080493     4.57   0.000     .2104663     .525993 
      lpi |  -.8187433   .3534298    -2.32   0.021    -1.511453   -.1260336 
     lpgv |   .0303549   .1379333     0.22   0.826    -.2399894    .3006992 
       lexp |   .3790224   .1006613     3.77   0.000     .1817297     .576315 
     _iyr_83 |   .3526713    .476724     0.74   0.459    -.5816906    1.287033 
     _iyr_84 |   .5431711   .4486789     1.21   0.226    -.3362234    1.422566 
     _iyr_85 |   .1372085   .5457995     0.25   0.802    -.9325388    1.206956 
     _iyr_86 |    .499379   .4364402     1.14   0.253     -.356028    1.354786 
     _iyr_87 |  -.0993322   .5980015    -0.17   0.868    -1.271394    1.072729 
     _iyr_88 |   .1082142    .425961     0.25   0.799    -.7266541    .9430824 
     _iyr_89 |   .8903519   .5376345     1.66   0.098    -.1633925    1.944096 
     _iyr_90 |  -.6995872   .5620431    -1.24   0.213    -1.801171     .401997 
     _iyr_91 |   .5489107   .4343903     1.26   0.206    -.3024787      1.4003 
     _iyr_92 |   .4340984   .8599091     0.50   0.614    -1.251293    2.119489 
     _iyr_93 |  -.1196998   .8724148    -0.14   0.891    -1.829601    1.590202 
     _iyr_94 |  -.2596389   .5967344    -0.44   0.663    -1.429217    .9099389 
     _iyr_95 |   .7076955   .4659246     1.52   0.129       -.2055    1.620891 
     _iyr_96 |  -.2766315   .6435481    -0.43   0.667    -1.537962    .9846995 
     _iyr_97 |   .4517752   .5270696     0.86   0.391    -.5812621    1.484813 
     _iyr_98 |   .5490303   .5389922     1.02   0.308    -.5073751    1.605436 
     _iyr_99 |  -.9105607   1.031764    -0.88   0.377    -2.932781    1.111659 
     _iyr_00 |  -.4819206   .5984516    -0.81   0.421    -1.654864    .6910229 
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     _iyr_01 |   .1224814   .4094895     0.30   0.765    -.6801034    .9250661 
     _iyr_02 |   .5626177   .7888329     0.71   0.476    -.9834663    2.108702 
     _iyr_03 |   .0410334   .4302947     0.10   0.924    -.8023288    .8843956 
     _iyr_04 |  -.0528597   .4686565    -0.11   0.910    -.9714096    .8656903 
     _iyr_05 |      .2662   .4285113     0.62   0.534    -.5736667    1.106067 
     _iyr_06 |   .3167576   .5907919     0.54   0.592    -.8411732    1.474688 
     _iyr_07 |   .2703713   .4304803     0.63   0.530    -.5733545    1.114097 
     _iyr_08 |   .3149489   .5231555     0.60   0.547    -.7104169    1.340315 
     _iyr_09 |   .4756022   .3858329     1.23   0.218    -.2806164    1.231821 
       _cons |  -2.248647   .7906264    -2.84   0.004    -3.798247   -.6990479 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):             37.387 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.0000 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):               30.873 
 Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):         0.007 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.9322 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Result: 2SLS 
First-stage regressions 
        lk |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  lgdpD1 |   1.566748   .2132452     7.35   0.000     1.142376    1.991119 
  lexpeLD |  -.0679344   .0932331    -0.73   0.468    -.2534742    .1176054 
       lpi |   1.360638   .4338958     3.14   0.002     .4971579    2.224118 
     lpgv|   .1848697   .1456352     1.27   0.208    -.1049536    .4746931 
       lexp |    .465095   .1306953     3.56   0.001      .205003     .725187 
     _iyr_83 |   3.400812   .7100649     4.79   0.000     1.987738    4.813887 
     _iyr_84 |   3.585077   .7090658     5.06   0.000     2.173991    4.996163 
     _iyr_85 |   3.627815   .7031002     5.16   0.000     2.228601    5.027029 
     _iyr_86 |    3.12121   .7059773     4.42   0.000      1.71627    4.526149 
     _iyr_87 |   3.653576   .7259615     5.03   0.000     2.208867    5.098286 
     _iyr_88 |   2.534641    .695456     3.64   0.000      1.15064    3.918643 
     _iyr_89 |   2.722929   .6808155     4.00   0.000     1.368063    4.077795 
     _iyr_90 |    2.47929   .7548627     3.28   0.002     .9770654    3.981515 
     _iyr_91 |    3.14683    .869699     3.62   0.001     1.416074    4.877586 
     _iyr_92 |   2.724651     .84743     3.22   0.002     1.038211     4.41109 
     _iyr_93 |   2.267764   .7387904     3.07   0.003      .797524    3.738004 
     _iyr_94 |   1.399733   .6917916     2.02   0.046      .023024    2.776442 
     _iyr_95 |   1.598484   .7030431     2.27   0.026     .1993837    2.997584 
     _iyr_96 |   .6852943   .7364953     0.93   0.355     -.780378    2.150967 
     _iyr_97 |   1.313542   .7495274     1.75   0.084    -.1780648    2.805149 
     _iyr_98 |   1.372863   .7595988     1.81   0.074    -.1387868    2.884513 
     _iyr_99 |    1.27351   .8121094     1.57   0.121    -.3426397    2.889659 
     _iyr_00 |   1.176414   .7285093     1.61   0.110    -.2733653    2.626194 
     _iyr_01 |   1.117925   .7256494     1.54   0.127    -.3261631    2.562013 
     _iyr_02 |   .9643146   .8133494     1.19   0.239    -.6543022    2.582931 
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     _iyr_03 |   .9433968   .6243735     1.51   0.135    -.2991461     2.18594 
     _iyr_04 |   .6012898   .5980744     1.01   0.318    -.5889163    1.791496 
     _iyr_05 |   .3143838    .597141     0.53   0.600    -.8739646    1.502732 
     _iyr_06 |   .1945204   .5963969     0.33   0.745    -.9923473    1.381388 
     _iyr_07 |   .0282792   .6158348     0.05   0.963    -1.197271     1.25383 
     _iyr_08 |   .4045382   .6197738     0.65   0.516     -.828851    1.637927 
     _iyr_09 |   .0770111   .6187921     0.12   0.901    -1.154424    1.308447 
     lpopm |  -1.290142   .1745666    -7.39   0.000    -1.637541   -.9427437 
      lrev |   .2977698   .1049671     2.84   0.006     .0888787    .5066609 
       _cons |  -10.63942   1.227425    -8.67   0.000    -13.08208    -8.19677 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
IV (2SLS) estimation 
    D.lexpe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lk |  -.0750987   .1111707    -0.68   0.499    -.2929893    .1427919 
   lgdpD1 |   .6795941   .2063029     3.29   0.001     .2752478     1.08394 
   lexpeLD |   .3677817   .0821315     4.48   0.000     .2068069    .5287564 
       lpi |  -.8173242   .3254852    -2.51   0.012    -1.455264   -.1793849 
     lpgv |   .0272446   .1291792     0.21   0.833     -.225942    .2804313 
       lexp |   .3782013   .1065344     3.55   0.000     .1693977     .587005 
     _iyr_83 |    .351834   .5649108     0.62   0.533    -.7553708    1.459039 
     _iyr_84 |   .5413104   .5731576     0.94   0.345    -.5820578    1.664679 
     _iyr_85 |   .1369671   .5772251     0.24   0.812    -.9943732    1.268307 
     _iyr_86 |    .498717   .5513636     0.90   0.366    -.5819358     1.57937 
     _iyr_87 |  -.0990317   .5770605    -0.17   0.864    -1.230049    1.031986 
     _iyr_88 |   .1077077   .5439458     0.20   0.843    -.9584063    1.173822 
     _iyr_89 |   .8873078   .5382112     1.65   0.099    -.1675667    1.942182 
     _iyr_90 |  -.7000245   .6196513    -1.13   0.259    -1.914519    .5144698 
     _iyr_91 |   .5474297   .7392372     0.74   0.459    -.9014486    1.996308 
     _iyr_92 |   .4330859   .7226062     0.60   0.549    -.9831962    1.849368 
     _iyr_93 |  -.1155061   .6159062    -0.19   0.851     -1.32266    1.091648 
     _iyr_94 |  -.2573716   .5642097    -0.46   0.648    -1.363202    .8484591 
     _iyr_95 |   .7047924   .5768563     1.22   0.222    -.4258252     1.83541 
     _iyr_96 |  -.2774533   .6143094    -0.45   0.652    -1.481478    .9265711 
     _iyr_97 |   .4497853   .6264244     0.72   0.473     -.777984    1.677555 
     _iyr_98 |   .5477839   .6256298     0.88   0.381    -.6784279    1.773996 
     _iyr_99 |  -.9100147    .699918    -1.30   0.194    -2.281829    .4617994 
     _iyr_00 |  -.4860971   .6316234    -0.77   0.442    -1.724056    .7518621 
     _iyr_01 |   .1222038   .6299015     0.19   0.846    -1.112381    1.356788 
     _iyr_02 |   .5623071   .7100784     0.79   0.428     -.829421    1.954035 
     _iyr_03 |   .0419432    .541112     0.08   0.938    -1.018617    1.102503 
     _iyr_04 |  -.0576526    .517368    -0.11   0.911    -1.071675    .9563702 
     _iyr_05 |   .2634198   .5170995     0.51   0.610    -.7500765    1.276916 
     _iyr_06 |   .3063686   .5168783     0.59   0.553    -.7066941    1.319431 
     _iyr_07 |   .2718166   .5374582     0.51   0.613    -.7815821    1.325215 
     _iyr_08 |   .3203798   .5414501     0.59   0.554    -.7408428    1.381602 
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     _iyr_09 |   .4762705   .5391804     0.88   0.377    -.5805036    1.533045 
       _cons |  -2.240619   .9160397    -2.45   0.014    -4.036024   -.4452145 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):          50.095 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.0000 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):               30.873 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           0.007 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.9354 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Pooled OLS 
     lexpe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lgdp |   .7001252   .0931168     7.52   0.000     .5163414     .883909 
       lpi |  -.8943971    .140491    -6.37   0.000    -1.171683   -.6171113 
     lpgi1 |  -.0344259   .0439938    -0.78   0.435     -.121256    .0524042 
        lx |   .8936635   .0374699    23.85   0.000     .8197095    .9676176 
        lk |  -.1571432   .0284602    -5.52   0.000    -.2133148   -.1009716 
       _cons |  -2.509742   .4064174    -6.18   0.000    -3.311884   -1.707599 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Autocorrelation 
H0: no first order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,       5) =     12.628 
           Prob > F =      0.0163 
 
Heteroskedasticity  
Ho: Disturbance is homoskedastic 
Pagan-Hall general test statistic   :  40.966  Chi-sq(34) P-value = 0.1914 
 
Redundant 
IV redundancy test (LM test of redundancy of specified instruments):    10.511 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.0012 
Ramsey Test 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of logexpe 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 171) =     52.75 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000 
6.  Fiscal Policy, Economic Institutions and Governance 
 
Result: GMM 
 
    D.lexpe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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     lpopm |  -.1011259   .1912331    -0.53   0.597    -.4759359     .273684 
    lgdpD1 |   .8104079   .2833199     2.86   0.004     .2551111    1.365705 
  lexpeLD |   .3895433   .0847452     4.60   0.000     .2234457     .555641 
     leco |  -.2674872    .072373    -3.70   0.000    -.4093358   -.1256386 
      lgv |   .6756949   .4943359     1.37   0.172    -.2931856    1.644575 
       lexp |   .4624214   .1004124     4.61   0.000     .2656167    .6592261 
     _iyr_83 |   .2644376   .4478708     0.59   0.555    -.6133731    1.142248 
     _iyr_84 |   .5742401   .4102799     1.40   0.162    -.2298937    1.378374 
     _iyr_85 |   .2101296   .4992117     0.42   0.674    -.7683074    1.188567 
     _iyr_86 |   .4351783    .458546     0.95   0.343    -.4635554    1.333912 
     _iyr_87 |  -.0047567   .6354613    -0.01   0.994    -1.250238    1.240725 
     _iyr_88 |  -.0578941   .3904092    -0.15   0.882     -.823082    .7072939 
     _iyr_89 |   .6980669   .5318487     1.31   0.189    -.3443374    1.740471 
     _iyr_90 |  -.8730932   .5022606    -1.74   0.082    -1.857506    .1113195 
     _iyr_91 |   .6903083   .4143088     1.67   0.096     -.121722    1.502339 
     _iyr_92 |   .4920397   .8316967     0.59   0.554    -1.138056    2.122135 
     _iyr_93 |   -.326359   .8271485    -0.39   0.693     -1.94754    1.294822 
     _iyr_94 |  -.5642803   .6301421    -0.90   0.371    -1.799336    .6707755 
     _iyr_95 |   .5686377   .4280633     1.33   0.184    -.2703509    1.407626 
     _iyr_96 |  -.5789627   .6208164    -0.93   0.351    -1.795741    .6378151 
     _iyr_97 |   .3376179   .5698489     0.59   0.554    -.7792655    1.454501 
     _iyr_98 |     .48213   .5655895     0.85   0.394    -.6264051    1.590665 
     _iyr_99 |  -1.001824   1.072219    -0.93   0.350    -3.103335    1.099687 
     _iyr_00 |  -.4030756   .6290333    -0.64   0.522    -1.635958    .8298069 
     _iyr_01 |   .2451496   .3272637     0.75   0.454    -.3962755    .8865747 
     _iyr_02 |   .7010999   .5992145     1.17   0.242     -.473339    1.875539 
     _iyr_03 |   .0721992   .3629713     0.20   0.842    -.6392115    .7836098 
     _iyr_04 |   .0143612   .4581712     0.03   0.975    -.8836379    .9123603 
     _iyr_05 |   .1948082   .3933539     0.50   0.620    -.5761512    .9657676 
     _iyr_06 |   .1664716   .5518459     0.30   0.763    -.9151265     1.24807 
     _iyr_07 |   .2771742   .3407808     0.81   0.416     -.390744    .9450923 
     _iyr_08 |   .3355231    .474268     0.71   0.479    -.5940252    1.265071 
     _iyr_09 |   .4433589   .3185148     1.39   0.164    -.1809187    1.067636 
       _cons |  -4.575497    1.78105    -2.57   0.010    -8.066291   -1.084704 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):             24.844 
                                                   Chi-sq(3) P-val =    0.0000 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):               19.051 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):         1.626 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.4435 
Result: 2SLS 
 
     lpopm |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lgdpD1 |   .9976305   .1249766     7.98   0.000     .7488709     1.24639 
   lexpeLD |   -.095566   .0549077    -1.74   0.086     -.204857     .013725 
    leco |  -.1261875   .0520871    -2.42   0.018    -.2298643   -.0225107 
     lge |  -.2224052   .3129994    -0.71   0.479     -.845415    .4006045 
      lexp |   -1.16939   .2316037    -5.05   0.000    -1.630386   -.7083947 
     _iyr_83 |    1.51972   .4209998     3.61   0.001      .681741    2.357699 
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     _iyr_84 |   1.728693   .4178124     4.14   0.000     .8970581    2.560328 
     _iyr_85 |   1.645423   .4144691     3.97   0.000      .820443    2.470403 
     _iyr_86 |    1.82832   .4056959     4.51   0.000     1.020803    2.635838 
     _iyr_87 |     2.2807   .4140428     5.51   0.000     1.456568    3.104831 
     _iyr_88 |   1.683351   .4021383     4.19   0.000     .8829142    2.483787 
     _iyr_89 |   1.906362   .3980183     4.79   0.000     1.114126    2.698597 
     _iyr_90 |   1.534357   .4455956     3.44   0.001     .6474211    2.421293 
     _iyr_91 |   1.833123    .534015     3.43   0.001     .7701928    2.896053 
     _iyr_92 |   1.933087   .5275675     3.66   0.000     .8829902    2.983184 
     _iyr_93 |   1.758101   .4527584     3.88   0.000     .8569079    2.659294 
     _iyr_94 |   1.601929   .4160819     3.85   0.000     .7737387    2.430119 
     _iyr_95 |   1.453451   .4104115     3.54   0.001     .6365472    2.270354 
     _iyr_96 |   1.497776   .4332863     3.46   0.001     .6353413    2.360211 
     _iyr_97 |   1.642115   .4428185     3.71   0.000     .7607071    2.523524 
     _iyr_98 |    1.61013   .4380388     3.68   0.000     .7382361    2.482025 
     _iyr_99 |   1.131027    .485692     2.33   0.022     .1642809    2.097772 
     _iyr_00 |   .8891929   .4368081     2.04   0.045     .0197482    1.758638 
     _iyr_01 |   .8069354    .434021     1.86   0.067    -.0569617    1.670833 
     _iyr_02 |   .5631407   .4832643     1.17   0.247    -.3987727    1.525054 
     _iyr_03 |   1.052212   .3767185     2.79   0.007     .3023726    1.802051 
     _iyr_04 |   .8010691   .3611945     2.22   0.029     .0821294    1.520009 
     _iyr_05 |   .6217208   .3579594     1.74   0.086    -.0907797    1.334221 
     _iyr_06 |    .601911   .3573067     1.68   0.096    -.1092902    1.313112 
     _iyr_07 |   .1675762   .3664788     0.46   0.649    -.5618816    .8970339 
     _iyr_08 |   .3623273   .3669823     0.99   0.327    -.3681328    1.092787 
     _iyr_09 |   .3438872    .366153     0.94   0.350    -.3849221    1.072696 
      ldcp |   .5118458   .1673831     3.06   0.003     .1786781    .8450136 
        limp |   1.268427   .2250068     5.64   0.000     .8205616    1.716291 
      lrev |   .2127762   .0589279     3.61   0.001     .0954831    .3300694 
       _cons |   -6.63149    1.09278    -6.07   0.000    -8.806614   -4.456366 
IV (2SLS) estimation 
    D.lexpe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     lpopm |  -.0972838   .1957665    -0.50   0.619    -.4809791    .2864115 
 lgdpD1 |   .8032878   .2706435     2.97   0.003     .2728363    1.333739 
 lexpeLD |   .3695075   .0820915     4.50   0.000      .208611     .530404 
    leco |  -.2629593   .0731246    -3.60   0.000    -.4062809   -.1196377 
      lge |   .6842265   .4555719     1.50   0.133     -.208678    1.577131 
       lexp |   .4788607   .1010548     4.74   0.000     .2807969    .6769245 
     _iyr_83 |   .2667726   .5614668     0.48   0.635     -.833682    1.367227 
     _iyr_84 |   .5909669   .5657733     1.04   0.296    -.5179283    1.699862 
     _iyr_85 |    .201367   .5710193     0.35   0.724    -.9178102    1.320544 
     _iyr_86 |   .4431675   .5729675     0.77   0.439    -.6798281    1.566163 
     _iyr_87 |  -.0878591   .6160812    -0.14   0.887    -1.295356    1.119638 
     _iyr_88 |  -.0735616   .5651737    -0.13   0.896    -1.181282    1.034158 
     _iyr_89 |   .7911984   .5587093     1.42   0.157    -.3038517    1.886249 
     _iyr_90 |  -.8495691   .6229354    -1.36   0.173      -2.0705     .371362 
     _iyr_91 |   .6390331    .730425     0.87   0.382    -.7925736     2.07064 
     _iyr_92 |   .4615881   .7120782     0.65   0.517    -.9340594    1.857236 
     _iyr_93 |  -.2236579    .617738    -0.36   0.717    -1.434402    .9870863 
     _iyr_94 |  -.5203001   .5776508    -0.90   0.368    -1.652475    .6118746 
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     _iyr_95 |   .5712148   .5879575     0.97   0.331    -.5811606     1.72359 
     _iyr_96 |  -.6452568   .6251484    -1.03   0.302    -1.870525    .5800116 
     _iyr_97 |   .3719477   .6338253     0.59   0.557    -.8703271    1.614222 
     _iyr_98 |   .3812203   .6444813     0.59   0.554    -.8819399     1.64438 
     _iyr_99 |  -.9949414   .7014119    -1.42   0.156    -2.369684    .3798006 
     _iyr_00 |  -.4158518   .6236683    -0.67   0.505    -1.638219    .8065156 
     _iyr_01 |   .2158512   .6229943     0.35   0.729    -1.005195    1.436898 
     _iyr_02 |   .6829731   .7009358     0.97   0.330    -.6908359    2.056782 
     _iyr_03 |   .0707652   .5419323     0.13   0.896    -.9914027    1.132933 
     _iyr_04 |   -.059735   .5157058    -0.12   0.908      -1.0705    .9510298 
     _iyr_05 |   .1703891   .5168597     0.33   0.742    -.8426374    1.183416 
     _iyr_06 |   .1905904   .5159193     0.37   0.712     -.820593    1.201774 
     _iyr_07 |   .2630931   .5376859     0.49   0.625    -.7907518    1.316938 
     _iyr_08 |   .3355942   .5397162     0.62   0.534    -.7222302    1.393419 
     _iyr_09 |   .4351744   .5366533     0.81   0.417    -.6166467    1.486995 
       _cons |    -4.6354    1.47714    -3.14   0.002    -7.530541   -1.740258 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):          48.274 
                                                   Chi-sq(3) P-val =    0.0000 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):               19.051 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           1.533 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.4646 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Pooled OLS 
lexpe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lgdp |   .7449781   .1968721     3.78   0.000     .3564133    1.133543 
     lecoi |  -.3419581   .0476547    -7.18   0.000    -.4360138   -.2479024 
       lge |   .2499238    .157748     1.58   0.115     -.061422    .5612696 
        lexp |   1.053532   .0304304    34.62   0.000     .9934716    1.113592 
     lpopm |  -.1859718   .1081251    -1.72   0.087    -.3993773    .0274338 
       _cons |  -4.186378   1.136421    -3.68   0.000    -6.429322   -1.943435 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Autocorrelation 
H0: no first order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,       5) =     13.748 
           Prob > F =      0.0139 
 
Heteroskedasticity test 
Ho: Disturbance is homoskedastic 
 Pagan-Hall general test statistic   :  43.432  Chi-sq(35) P-value = 0.1551 
Redundant 
IV redundancy test (LM test of redundancy of specified instruments):    16.291 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.0001 
Ramsey Test 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of logexpe 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 171) =     90.81 
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                  Prob > F =      0.0000 
 
 
7.  Fiscal Policy, Political Institutions and Governance 
 
Result: GMM 
 
    D.lexpe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lk |  -.0747517   .0993452    -0.75   0.452    -.2694647    .1199613 
    lgdpD1 |   .6844349   .1894482     3.61   0.000     .3131233    1.055747 
    lexpeLD |   .3696704   .0805211     4.59   0.000     .2118519    .5274888 
       lpi |  -.7480853   .2531671    -2.95   0.003    -1.244284   -.2518869 
         lgv |   .1852362   .4865108     0.38   0.703    -.7683074     1.13878 
        lexp |   .3754315   .1003586     3.74   0.000     .1787323    .5721307 
     _iyr_83 |   .3602082   .4745984     0.76   0.448    -.5699876    1.290404 
     _iyr_84 |   .5589925   .4551777     1.23   0.219    -.3331393    1.451124 
     _iyr_85 |    .154436   .5507191     0.28   0.779    -.9249535    1.233826 
     _iyr_86 |   .5182422   .4382388     1.18   0.237    -.3406901    1.377174 
     _iyr_87 |  -.0735523   .6034953    -0.12   0.903    -1.256381    1.109277 
     _iyr_88 |   .1202808   .4261578     0.28   0.778    -.7149731    .9555347 
     _iyr_89 |   .9037244   .5373676     1.68   0.093    -.1494968    1.956946 
     _iyr_90 |  -.7040735   .5628031    -1.25   0.211    -1.807147    .3990003 
     _iyr_91 |   .5725579    .439725     1.30   0.193    -.2892873    1.434403 
     _iyr_92 |   .4531755   .8734243     0.52   0.604    -1.258705    2.165056 
     _iyr_93 |  -.1159349   .8757765    -0.13   0.895    -1.832425    1.600556 
     _iyr_94 |  -.2563237    .596775    -0.43   0.668    -1.425981    .9133338 
     _iyr_95 |   .7231584   .4650319     1.56   0.120    -.1882874    1.634604 
     _iyr_96 |  -.2728879   .6375321    -0.43   0.669    -1.522428     .976652 
     _iyr_97 |   .4580731   .5218391     0.88   0.380    -.5647127    1.480859 
     _iyr_98 |   .5671083   .5352264     1.06   0.289    -.4819162    1.616133 
     _iyr_99 |  -.8971862   1.031967    -0.87   0.385    -2.919805    1.125433 
     _iyr_00 |  -.4734797   .5917654    -0.80   0.424    -1.633319    .6863592 
     _iyr_01 |   .1350486   .4070224     0.33   0.740    -.6627007    .9327979 
     _iyr_02 |   .5697945   .7863649     0.72   0.469    -.9714523    2.111041 
     _iyr_03 |   .0418601   .4282855     0.10   0.922    -.7975641    .8812844 
     _iyr_04 |  -.0513071     .47047    -0.11   0.913    -.9734114    .8707972 
     _iyr_05 |   .2616552    .430007     0.61   0.543     -.581143    1.104453 
     _iyr_06 |   .3123127   .5878811     0.53   0.595     -.839913    1.464538 
     _iyr_07 |   .2783244   .4304384     0.65   0.518    -.5653193    1.121968 
     _iyr_08 |   .3254741   .5191537     0.63   0.531    -.6920483    1.342997 
     _iyr_09 |   .4816702   .3853977     1.25   0.211    -.2736954    1.237036 
       _cons |  -2.666222   1.534706    -1.74   0.082     -5.67419    .3417456 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):             37.489 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.0000 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):               31.538 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):         0.006 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.9364 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Result: 2SLS 
        lk |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     lgdpD1 |    1.57967   .2088661     7.56   0.000     1.164014    1.995327 
   lexpeLD |  -.0652127   .0922853    -0.71   0.482    -.2488664     .118441 
       lpi |   1.773264    .357957     4.95   0.000     1.060907    2.485622 
        lgv |   .8765214   .5162539     1.70   0.093    -.1508565    1.903899 
        lexp |   .4595438   .1287618     3.57   0.001     .2032997    .7157879 
     _iyr_83 |   3.431796   .7051438     4.87   0.000     2.028515    4.835077 
     _iyr_84 |   3.645133   .7056569     5.17   0.000     2.240831    5.049435 
     _iyr_85 |   3.693188   .7001401     5.27   0.000     2.299865    5.086511 
     _iyr_86 |   3.191698   .7033815     4.54   0.000     1.791924    4.591471 
     _iyr_87 |   3.743639    .724641     5.17   0.000     2.301557     5.18572 
     _iyr_88 |   2.577073   .6911145     3.73   0.000     1.201712    3.952435 
     _iyr_89 |    2.76668   .6763547     4.09   0.000     1.420691    4.112669 
     _iyr_90 |   2.473699   .7485452     3.30   0.001     .9840469    3.963352 
     _iyr_91 |   3.218734   .8641418     3.72   0.000     1.499037    4.938431 
     _iyr_92 |   2.779592   .8411182     3.30   0.001     1.105714    4.453471 
     _iyr_93 |   2.282372   .7332073     3.11   0.003     .8232429    3.741501 
     _iyr_94 |   1.412054   .6865457     2.06   0.043     .0457847    2.778324 
     _iyr_95 |   1.642882   .6978205     2.35   0.021     .2541753    3.031589 
     _iyr_96 |   .6951107   .7308335     0.95   0.344    -.7592944    2.149516 
     _iyr_97 |   1.309677    .739341     1.77   0.080    -.1616583    2.781013 
     _iyr_98 |   1.420772   .7531816     1.89   0.063    -.0781074    2.919651 
     _iyr_99 |   1.309547   .8055926     1.63   0.108    -.2936329    2.912728 
     _iyr_00 |   1.188272   .7201977     1.65   0.103    -.2449675    2.621511 
     _iyr_01 |   1.151759   .7196094     1.60   0.113    -.2803095    2.583827 
     _iyr_02 |    .989203   .8073204     1.23   0.224    -.6174158    2.595822 
     _iyr_03 |   .9506248   .6195301     1.53   0.129    -.2822793    2.183529 
     _iyr_04 |   .6044719   .5934157     1.02   0.311     -.576463    1.785407 
     _iyr_05 |   .2981229   .5927206     0.50   0.616    -.8814287    1.477674 
     _iyr_06 |   .1822802   .5918932     0.31   0.759    -.9956249    1.360185 
     _iyr_07 |   .0561097   .6116009     0.09   0.927    -1.161015    1.273234 
     _iyr_08 |    .436761   .6154977     0.71   0.480    -.7881184     1.66164 
     _iyr_09 |    .093282   .6140456     0.15   0.880    -1.128708    1.315272 
     lpopm |  -1.294287   .1732277    -7.47   0.000    -1.639021   -.9495525 
      lrev |   .2975939   .1041258     2.86   0.005     .0903769    .5048109 
       _cons |  -12.54346   1.800135    -6.97   0.000    -16.12584   -8.961078 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
IV (2SLS) estimation 
   D.lexpe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lk |  -.0747246   .1108016    -0.67   0.500    -.2918917    .1424426 
    lgdpD1 |   .6861081   .2036489     3.37   0.001     .2869637    1.085253 
    lexpeLD |   .3692866    .081854     4.51   0.000     .2088556    .5297176 
       lpi |  -.7528778   .2554782    -2.95   0.003    -1.253606   -.2521496 
        lgv |   .1750276   .4644735     0.38   0.706    -.7353237    1.085379 
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        lexp |   .3745599   .1053987     3.55   0.000     .1679822    .5811377 
     _iyr_83 |   .3595251   .5654665     0.64   0.525    -.7487689    1.467819 
     _iyr_84 |   .5569952   .5757132     0.97   0.333    -.5713819    1.685372 
     _iyr_85 |   .1538333     .58038     0.27   0.791    -.9836907    1.291357 
     _iyr_86 |   .5173304   .5545319     0.93   0.351    -.5695321    1.604193 
     _iyr_87 |   -.073573    .581925    -0.13   0.899    -1.214125    1.066979 
     _iyr_88 |   .1197049   .5447587     0.22   0.826    -.9480026    1.187412 
     _iyr_89 |    .901014   .5386214     1.67   0.094    -.1546645    1.956693 
     _iyr_90 |  -.7045906   .6191218    -1.14   0.255    -1.918047    .5088658 
     _iyr_91 |   .5712312   .7404855     0.77   0.440    -.8800938    2.022556 
     _iyr_92 |   .4523684   .7227594     0.63   0.531     -.964214    1.868951 
     _iyr_93 |  -.1121222   .6158592    -0.18   0.856    -1.319184     1.09494 
     _iyr_94 |  -.2541765   .5640329    -0.45   0.652    -1.359661    .8513076 
     _iyr_95 |   .7205707   .5764042     1.25   0.211    -.4091607    1.850302 
     _iyr_96 |  -.2735242   .6138889    -0.45   0.656    -1.476724    .9296759 
     _iyr_97 |   .4570254   .6214949     0.74   0.462    -.7610823    1.675133 
     _iyr_98 |   .5661618   .6240507     0.91   0.364     -.656955    1.789279 
     _iyr_99 |  -.8965279   .6992699    -1.28   0.200    -2.267072    .4740159 
     _iyr_00 |  -.4768783   .6286849    -0.76   0.448    -1.709078    .7553214 
     _iyr_01 |    .134913   .6291854     0.21   0.830    -1.098268    1.368094 
     _iyr_02 |   .5694499   .7101356     0.80   0.423    -.8223902     1.96129 
     _iyr_03 |   .0426841   .5409185     0.08   0.937    -1.017497    1.102865 
     _iyr_04 |  -.0559539   .5170688    -0.11   0.914     -1.06939    .9574823 
     _iyr_05 |   .2590315    .517094     0.50   0.616    -.7544541    1.272517 
     _iyr_06 |   .3028839   .5167779     0.59   0.558    -.7099821     1.31575 
     _iyr_07 |   .2795133   .5376435     0.52   0.603    -.7742486    1.333275 
     _iyr_08 |   .3305521   .5417894     0.61   0.542    -.7313356     1.39244 
     _iyr_09 |   .4822416    .539003     0.89   0.371    -.5741848    1.538668 
       _cons |  -2.638567   1.556444    -1.70   0.090    -5.689142    .4120078 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):          50.698 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.0000 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):               31.538 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           0.006 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.9394 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Pooled OLS 
     lexpe |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lgdp |   .6851032    .091741     7.47   0.000     .5040347    .8661716 
       lpi |  -.9696738   .1071447    -9.05   0.000    -1.181144   -.7582033 
       lge |  -.2022283    .152449    -1.33   0.186    -.5031156    .0986589 
        lexp |   .9000697   .0373148    24.12   0.000     .8264219    .9737175 
        logk |  -.1561663   .0283494    -5.51   0.000    -.2121192   -.1002134 
       _cons |  -2.005427   .6102579    -3.29   0.001    -3.209888   -.8009662 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Autocorrelation 
 
H0: no first order autocorrelation 
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    F(  1,       5) =     13.214 
       Prob > F =      0.0150 
Heteroskedasticity  
Ho: Disturbance is homoskedastic 
Pagan-Hall general test statistic   :  41.216  Chi-sq(34) P-value = 0.1842 
Redundant 
IV redundancy test (LM test of redundancy of specified instruments):    10.654 
                                          Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.0011 
Ramsey Test 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of logexpe 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 171) =     51.54 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000 
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Appendix B 
1. Monetary Policy and Economic Institutions 
Result: GMM 
       lm2 |      Coef   Std. Err      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     lpopm |  -.0089729   .0340129    -0.26   0.792    -.0756369    .0576911 
        lgdp      |   .1061954   .0473847     2.24   0.025     .0133231    .1990677 
      lm2L |   .9068316   .0289725    31.30   0.000     .8500465    .9636166 
     leco |  -.0078672   .0114834    -0.69   0.493    -.0303743    .0146399 
      ldcp |   .0582606   .0189198     3.08   0.002     .0211786    .0953426 
     _iyr_82 |  -.2206459   .0866071    -2.55   0.011    -.3903927   -.0508991 
     _iyr_83 |  -.2024248   .0867568    -2.33   0.020     -.372465   -.0323846 
     _iyr_84 |  -.2023464   .0855558    -2.37   0.018    -.3700327   -.0346602 
     _iyr_85 |  -.1884585   .0758792    -2.48   0.013    -.3371791   -.0397379 
     _iyr_86 |  -.2127564    .076234    -2.79   0.005    -.3621723   -.0633405 
     _iyr_87 |  -.1767607   .0713483    -2.48   0.013    -.3166009   -.0369206 
     _iyr_88 |  -.1612157   .0697557    -2.31   0.021    -.2979344    -.024497 
     _iyr_89 |  -.1612332   .0680688    -2.37   0.018    -.2946455   -.0278209 
     _iyr_90 |  -.1755514   .0637032    -2.76   0.006    -.3004074   -.0506954 
     _iyr_91 |  -.1026867   .0607631    -1.69   0.091    -.2217802    .0164069 
     _iyr_92 |  -.1181018   .0569025    -2.08   0.038    -.2296286   -.0065749 
     _iyr_93 |  -.0964298   .0569516    -1.69   0.090    -.2080529    .0151934 
     _iyr_94 |  -.0848898   .0505022    -1.68   0.093    -.1838722    .0140926 
     _iyr_95 |  -.0799353   .0568679    -1.41   0.160    -.1913942    .0315237 
     _iyr_96 |  -.1233135   .0457483    -2.70   0.007    -.2129785   -.0336486 
     _iyr_97 |  -.0298909   .0553033    -0.54   0.589    -.1382834    .0785015 
     _iyr_98 |   -.117663   .0404414    -2.91   0.004    -.1969265   -.0383994 
     _iyr_99 |  -.0726858    .047992    -1.51   0.130    -.1667484    .0213768 
     _iyr_00 |  -.0643206   .0333527    -1.93   0.054    -.1296907    .0010496 
     _iyr_01 |   -.052092   .0303225    -1.72   0.086    -.1115231    .0073391 
     _iyr_02 |  -.0504968   .0365076    -1.38   0.167    -.1220505    .0210568 
     _iyr_03 |  -.0730721   .0335908    -2.18   0.030    -.1389089   -.0072353 
     _iyr_04 |  -.0360589   .0259054    -1.39   0.164    -.0868326    .0147149 
     _iyr_05 |  -.0469432    .027802    -1.69   0.091    -.1014341    .0075476 
     _iyr_06 |  -.0217008   .0268061    -0.81   0.418    -.0742397    .0308382 
     _iyr_07 |  -.0192037   .0254321    -0.76   0.450    -.0690497    .0306424 
     _iyr_08 |   .0032461   .0374037     0.09   0.931    -.0700638    .0765561 
     _iyr_09 |   .0552548   .0258041     2.14   0.032     .0046796      .10583 
       _cons |   .3124467   .3406017     0.92   0.359    -.3551203    .9800137 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):             20.960 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.0000 
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Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):               26.197 
 Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):         0.304 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.5812 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Result: 2SLS 
First Stage Regression 
      lpopm |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     lY |   .7869175   .1187876     6.62   0.000     .5520533    1.021782 
      lm2L |   .6672093   .1088557     6.13   0.000     .4519822    .8824364 
     leco |  -.3483989   .0193886   -17.97   0.000    -.3867337   -.3100641 
      ldcp |  -.1835484   .0715776    -2.56   0.011      -.32507   -.0420269 
     _iyr_82 |     2.5522   .3395694     7.52   0.000     1.880811    3.223589 
     _iyr_83 |   2.466741   .3317123     7.44   0.000     1.810887    3.122595 
     _iyr_84 |   2.366182   .3174098     7.45   0.000     1.738606    2.993757 
     _iyr_85 |   2.222136   .3053884     7.28   0.000     1.618329    2.825943 
     _iyr_86 |    2.21381   .3001166     7.38   0.000     1.620426    2.807194 
     _iyr_87 |   2.131022   .2918704     7.30   0.000     1.553943    2.708102 
     _iyr_88 |   2.055867   .2864187     7.18   0.000     1.489566    2.622168 
     _iyr_89 |   1.966642   .2757994     7.13   0.000     1.421338    2.511947 
     _iyr_90 |   1.883409   .2671904     7.05   0.000     1.355126    2.411692 
     _iyr_91 |   1.801375   .2573905     7.00   0.000     1.292468    2.310282 
     _iyr_92 |   1.682416   .2435555     6.91   0.000     1.200863    2.163968 
     _iyr_93 |    1.56538   .2310246     6.78   0.000     1.108603    2.022157 
     _iyr_94 |   1.497139   .2232589     6.71   0.000     1.055717    1.938562 
     _iyr_95 |   1.434733   .2177573     6.59   0.000     1.004189    1.865278 
     _iyr_96 |   1.294299   .2057789     6.29   0.000     .8874378    1.701161 
     _iyr_97 |   1.250926   .2006262     6.24   0.000     .8542524      1.6476 
     _iyr_98 |   1.140087   .1896992     6.01   0.000     .7650183    1.515156 
     _iyr_99 |   .9664324   .1809979     5.34   0.000     .6085674    1.324297 
     _iyr_00 |     .77848   .1748054     4.45   0.000     .4328586    1.124101 
     _iyr_01 |   .6973659     .16896     4.13   0.000     .3633019     1.03143 
     _iyr_02 |   .6201371   .1644808     3.77   0.000     .2949293     .945345 
     _iyr_03 |   .5381363   .1616434     3.33   0.001     .2185386     .857734 
     _iyr_04 |   .5274908   .1574151     3.35   0.001     .2162532    .8387285 
     _iyr_05 |   .4430809   .1544255     2.87   0.005     .1377542    .7484077 
     _iyr_06 |   .3635418   .1527353     2.38   0.019     .0615569    .6655267 
     _iyr_07 |   .2552308   .1499952     1.70   0.091    -.0413363     .551798 
     _iyr_08 |   .2199122   .1490254     1.48   0.142    -.0747375    .5145619 
     _iyr_09 |   .0883842   .1466888     0.60   0.548    -.2016456     .378414 
      linf |  -.0982429    .049409    -1.99   0.049    -.1959332   -.0005525 
      lrev |   .1742859    .024978     6.98   0.000        .1249    .2236719 
       _cons |  -10.36163   .3695507   -28.04   0.000     -11.0923   -9.630964 
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IV (2SLS) estimation 
       Lm2 |      Coef   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     lpopm |  -.0066437   .0324717    -0.20   0.838    -.0702871    .0569996 
     lgdp |   .1004162     .04539     2.21   0.027     .0114535    .1893789 
      lm2L |   .9095839   .0266058    34.19   0.000     .8574375    .9617303 
     leco |  -.0072952   .0112428    -0.65   0.516    -.0293307    .0147403 
      ldcp |   .0550889   .0167184     3.30   0.001     .0223214    .0878564 
     _iyr_82 |  -.2165468   .0837283    -2.59   0.010    -.3806513   -.0524423 
     _iyr_83 |  -.1963166   .0811623    -2.42   0.016    -.3553917   -.0372415 
     _iyr_84 |  -.2010334   .0791596    -2.54   0.011    -.3561835   -.0458834 
     _iyr_85 |   -.186442   .0768944    -2.42   0.015    -.3371522   -.0357318 
     _iyr_86 |  -.2090918   .0746322    -2.80   0.005    -.3553682   -.0628154 
     _iyr_87 |  -.1736272   .0727581    -2.39   0.017    -.3162305    -.031024 
     _iyr_88 |  -.1578889    .070492    -2.24   0.025    -.2960508   -.0197271 
     _iyr_89 |  -.1568509   .0684014    -2.29   0.022    -.2909151   -.0227867 
     _iyr_90 |   -.172398   .0653258    -2.64   0.008    -.3004342   -.0443619 
     _iyr_91 |  -.1012597   .0626521    -1.62   0.106    -.2240555    .0215361 
     _iyr_92 |   -.115602   .0597293    -1.94   0.053    -.2326694    .0014653 
     _iyr_93 |  -.0957822   .0574148    -1.67   0.095    -.2083131    .0167488 
     _iyr_94 |  -.0832572   .0553474    -1.50   0.133     -.191736    .0252217 
     _iyr_95 |  -.0789549   .0538137    -1.47   0.142    -.1844279    .0265181 
     _iyr_96 |  -.1217426   .0508029    -2.40   0.017    -.2213144   -.0221708 
     _iyr_97 |  -.0292919   .0499414    -0.59   0.558    -.1271753    .0685914 
     _iyr_98 |  -.1163899    .046597    -2.50   0.012    -.2077183   -.0250615 
     _iyr_99 |  -.0726263   .0451969    -1.61   0.108    -.1612107     .015958 
     _iyr_00 |    -.06346    .043573    -1.46   0.145    -.1488614    .0219415 
     _iyr_01 |  -.0532545   .0418515    -1.27   0.203    -.1352819    .0287728 
     _iyr_02 |  -.0519463   .0404178    -1.29   0.199    -.1311637    .0272711 
     _iyr_03 |  -.0766104   .0391899    -1.95   0.051    -.1534211    .0002003 
     _iyr_04 |   -.035549   .0384669    -0.92   0.355    -.1109426    .0398447 
     _iyr_05 |  -.0462784   .0373023    -1.24   0.215    -.1193895    .0268328 
     _iyr_06 |  -.0214434   .0365566    -0.59   0.557     -.093093    .0502061 
     _iyr_07 |  -.0191618   .0356239    -0.54   0.591    -.0889832    .0506597 
     _iyr_08 |   .0049241   .0350376     0.14   0.888    -.0637484    .0735966 
     _iyr_09 |   .0558991   .0344362     1.62   0.105    -.0115946    .1233927 
       _cons |   .3279136   .3197101     1.03   0.305    -.2987067    .9545339 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):          47.633 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.0000 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):               26.197 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           0.264 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.6075 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Pooled OLS 
lm2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lgdp |   1.063262   .2556356     4.16   0.000     .5587366    1.567788 
     lecoi |   .0767542   .0661904     1.16   0.248      -.05388    .2073885 
      lprc |   1.269923    .100374    12.65   0.000     1.071824    1.468023 
     lpopm |   -.336639   .1526123    -2.21   0.029    -.6378365   -.0354416 
       _cons |  -1.277002   1.277124    -1.00   0.319    -3.797549    1.243546 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Autocorrelation 
H0: no first order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,       5) =      6.185 
           Prob > F =      0.0554 
Heteroskedasticity test 
Ho: Disturbance is homoskedastic 
    Pagan-Hall general test statistic   :  43.165  Chi-sq(34) P-value = 0.1348 
Redundant 
IV redundancy test (LM test of redundancy of specified instruments):    45.136 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.0000 
Ramsey Test 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of logm2 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 172) =     19.32 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000 
 
2. Monetary Policy and Political Institutions 
Result: GMM 
       lm2 |      Coef   Std Err      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ldcp |   .1160293   .0524616     2.21   0.027     .0132064    .2188522 
     lgdp     |   .2556406   .0609701     4.19   0.000     .1361413    .3751399 
      lm2L |   .7405953   .0619309    11.96   0.000     .6192131    .8619776 
         lpi |  -.0535817   .0302158    -1.77   0.076    -.1128036    .0056402 
     lpopm |   .0253929   .0102201     2.48   0.013      .005362    .0454239 
       lop |  -.0429774   .0099634    -4.31   0.000    -.0625052   -.0234495 
     _iyr_82 |  -.6832759   .1496845    -4.56   0.000    -.9766522   -.3898996 
     _iyr_83 |  -.6546444   .1555522    -4.21   0.000     -.959521   -.3497678 
     _iyr_84 |  -.6444261   .1493421    -4.32   0.000    -.9371313   -.3517209 
     _iyr_85 |  -.6157961   .1387534    -4.44   0.000    -.8877478   -.3438445 
     _iyr_86 |  -.6211869   .1348056    -4.61   0.000    -.8854009   -.3569728 
     _iyr_87 |  -.5713806   .1275604    -4.48   0.000    -.8213944   -.3213667 
     _iyr_88 |  -.5370436   .1214829    -4.42   0.000    -.7751458   -.2989415 
     _iyr_89 |  -.5224784    .121513    -4.30   0.000    -.7606395   -.2843173 
     _iyr_90 |   -.515925   .1080398    -4.78   0.000    -.7276791    -.304171 
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     _iyr_91 |  -.4192337   .0986599    -4.25   0.000    -.6126036   -.2258637 
     _iyr_92 |    -.40555   .0889803    -4.56   0.000    -.5799482   -.2311517 
     _iyr_93 |  -.3673403   .0854389    -4.30   0.000    -.5347976   -.1998831 
     _iyr_94 |   -.337482   .0796797    -4.24   0.000    -.4936513   -.1813126 
     _iyr_95 |  -.3207468   .0818169    -3.92   0.000    -.4811051   -.1603886 
     _iyr_96 |  -.3396631   .0704036    -4.82   0.000    -.4776516   -.2016747 
     _iyr_97 |  -.2385392   .0794614    -3.00   0.003    -.3942807   -.0827976 
     _iyr_98 |  -.2998022   .0594897    -5.04   0.000    -.4163998   -.1832046 
     _iyr_99 |   -.247464   .0661046    -3.74   0.000    -.3770267   -.1179013 
     _iyr_00 |  -.2215434   .0514054    -4.31   0.000     -.322296   -.1207907 
     _iyr_01 |  -.2022342   .0456803    -4.43   0.000    -.2917659   -.1127024 
     _iyr_02 |  -.1791663   .0445919    -4.02   0.000    -.2665649   -.0917678 
     _iyr_03 |  -.1934869   .0442879    -4.37   0.000    -.2802896   -.1066843 
     _iyr_04 |  -.1447303   .0374504    -3.86   0.000    -.2181318   -.0713289 
     _iyr_05 |  -.1353955   .0359984    -3.76   0.000     -.205951     -.06484 
     _iyr_06 |  -.0970064   .0324089    -2.99   0.003    -.1605267   -.0334862 
     _iyr_07 |  -.0824562   .0306489    -2.69   0.007     -.142527   -.0223854 
     _iyr_08 |  -.0422924   .0367733    -1.15   0.250    -.1143668    .0297819 
     _iyr_09 |   .0333385   .0266777     1.25   0.211    -.0189488    .0856257 
       _cons |   1.002104   .1808397     5.54   0.000     .6476646    1.356543 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):             29.771 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):                9.837 
                         (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic):         11.701 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):         0.391 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.5315 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Result: 2SLS 
      ldcp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Lgdp    |  -.4486101   .2022942    -2.22   0.028     -.848607   -.0486131 
      Lm2L |   1.156037   .1427335     8.10   0.000     .8738097    1.438265 
         lpi |   .5131949   .0834361     6.15   0.000     .3482163    .6781735 
     lpopm |  -.5832807   .1100286    -5.30   0.000    -.8008408   -.3657207 
       lop |    .198965   .0308856     6.44   0.000     .1378947    .2600352 
     _iyr_82 |   3.445628    .502359     6.86   0.000     2.452311    4.438944 
     _iyr_83 |   3.407172   .4854304     7.02   0.000     2.447329    4.367015 
     _iyr_84 |   3.312185    .468435     7.07   0.000     2.385947    4.238423 
     _iyr_85 |   3.176331   .4544263     6.99   0.000     2.277793     4.07487 
     _iyr_86 |   3.047909   .4391363     6.94   0.000     2.179603    3.916214 
     _iyr_87 |   2.900242   .4279645     6.78   0.000     2.054026    3.746457 
     _iyr_88 |   2.763134   .4142411     6.67   0.000     1.944054    3.582214 
     _iyr_89 |   2.662207    .397471     6.70   0.000     1.876286    3.448128 
     _iyr_90 |   2.466153   .3828442     6.44   0.000     1.709154    3.223152 
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     _iyr_91 |   2.169079   .3701163     5.86   0.000     1.437247    2.900911 
     _iyr_92 |   1.978515   .3489475     5.67   0.000      1.28854     2.66849 
     _iyr_93 |   1.842896   .3312204     5.56   0.000     1.187973    2.497819 
     _iyr_94 |   1.754752   .3147434     5.58   0.000     1.132409    2.377095 
     _iyr_95 |   1.779619    .294073     6.05   0.000     1.198147     2.36109 
     _iyr_96 |   1.583929   .2766253     5.73   0.000     1.036957    2.130901 
     _iyr_97 |   1.559647   .2649838     5.89   0.000     1.035693      2.0836 
     _iyr_98 |   1.351902   .2445206     5.53   0.000     .8684104    1.835393 
     _iyr_99 |   1.239698   .2318813     5.35   0.000     .7811985    1.698198 
     _iyr_00 |   1.076503   .2156968     4.99   0.000     .6500048    1.503001 
     _iyr_01 |   .9371834    .203043     4.62   0.000     .5357057    1.338661 
     _iyr_02 |   .8415103   .1928731     4.36   0.000     .4601416    1.222879 
     _iyr_03 |   .7970737   .1839547     4.33   0.000     .4333394    1.160808 
     _iyr_04 |   .7743546    .177631     4.36   0.000     .4231242    1.125585 
     _iyr_05 |   .6435893    .168448     3.82   0.000     .3105164    .9766621 
     _iyr_06 |   .5695496   .1616733     3.52   0.001     .2498724    .8892267 
     _iyr_07 |   .4925104   .1547879     3.18   0.002     .1864476    .7985732 
     _iyr_08 |   .3849811   .1493789     2.58   0.011     .0896137    .6803485 
     _iyr_09 |   .1498504   .1458518     1.03   0.306    -.1385429    .4382437 
        lk |  -.1917168   .0432577    -4.43   0.000    -.2772503   -.1061833 
      lrev |   .0856954   .0308329     2.78   0.006     .0247294    .1466614 
       _cons |  -7.721672   1.239111    -6.23   0.000    -10.17177   -5.271572 
IV (2SLS) estimation 
 
       lm2 |      Coef   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ldcp |   .1187772   .0492336     2.41   0.016     .0222811    .2152733 
     lgdp |   .2619112   .0598929     4.37   0.000     .1445232    .3792991 
      lm2t-1 |   .7341117    .061496    11.94   0.000     .6135817    .8546416 
         lpi |  -.0531957   .0279581    -1.90   0.057    -.1079925    .0016012 
     lpopm |   .0256393   .0122132     2.10   0.036     .0017019    .0495768 
       lop |  -.0438366   .0103686    -4.23   0.000    -.0641587   -.0235144 
     _iyr_82 |   -.698865   .1528671    -4.57   0.000     -.998479    -.399251 
     _iyr_83 |   -.668997   .1499105    -4.46   0.000    -.9628162   -.3751777 
     _iyr_84 |  -.6617732   .1459454    -4.53   0.000    -.9478209   -.3757256 
     _iyr_85 |  -.6282867    .140423    -4.47   0.000    -.9035108   -.3530626 
     _iyr_86 |  -.6336945   .1349989    -4.69   0.000    -.8982874   -.3691016 
     _iyr_87 |  -.5842173   .1297502    -4.50   0.000     -.838523   -.3299116 
     _iyr_88 |  -.5492634   .1246972    -4.40   0.000    -.7936655   -.3048613 
     _iyr_89 |  -.5338901   .1207434    -4.42   0.000    -.7705428   -.2972374 
     _iyr_90 |  -.5272997   .1127268    -4.68   0.000    -.7482402   -.3063592 
     _iyr_91 |   -.428952   .1020594    -4.20   0.000    -.6289848   -.2289192 
     _iyr_92 |  -.4154906   .0938993    -4.42   0.000    -.5995297   -.2314514 
     _iyr_93 |  -.3751435   .0878373    -4.27   0.000    -.5473014   -.2029857 
     _iyr_94 |  -.3450975     .08371    -4.12   0.000     -.509166    -.181029 
     _iyr_95 |  -.3277813   .0832856    -3.94   0.000    -.4910181   -.1645445 
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     _iyr_96 |   -.346898   .0753535    -4.60   0.000    -.4945882   -.1992078 
     _iyr_97 |  -.2463245   .0740239    -3.33   0.001    -.3914086   -.1012403 
     _iyr_98 |  -.3055721   .0650891    -4.69   0.000    -.4331444   -.1779997 
     _iyr_99 |  -.2528442    .061856    -4.09   0.000    -.3740797   -.1316087 
     _iyr_00 |  -.2260246   .0569022    -3.97   0.000    -.3375508   -.1144984 
     _iyr_01 |  -.1969206   .0517025    -3.81   0.000    -.2982556   -.0955856 
     _iyr_02 |  -.1829319   .0480306    -3.81   0.000    -.2770701   -.0887938 
     _iyr_03 |  -.1972426   .0461298    -4.28   0.000    -.2876553   -.1068299 
     _iyr_04 |  -.1476343   .0454164    -3.25   0.001    -.2366489   -.0586197 
     _iyr_05 |  -.1379125     .04178    -3.30   0.001    -.2197998   -.0560253 
     _iyr_06 |  -.0991981   .0400192    -2.48   0.013    -.1776342   -.0207619 
     _iyr_07 |  -.0855199   .0380528    -2.25   0.025    -.1601021   -.0109377 
     _iyr_08 |  -.0434925   .0357491    -1.22   0.224    -.1135594    .0265744 
     _iyr_09 |   .0317879   .0322906     0.98   0.325    -.0315005    .0950763 
       _cons |    1.01935   .1911957     5.33   0.000     .6446134    1.394087 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):          21.710 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.0000 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):                9.837 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           0.395 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.5295 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Pooled OLS 
       lm2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lgdp |   1.371075    .112079    12.23   0.000     1.149866    1.592285 
         lpi |   .2751991   .1810628     1.52   0.130     -.082163    .6325612 
     lpopm |  -.5553135   .0951754    -5.83   0.000    -.7431604   -.3674666 
       lop |  -.0144485   .0502474    -0.29   0.774    -.1136214    .0847243 
      ldcp |   1.125904   .1252648     8.99   0.000     .8786702    1.373139 
       _cons |  -3.077651   .5880833    -5.23   0.000    -4.238346   -1.916956 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Autocorrelation 
H0: no first order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,       5) =     32.742 
           Prob > F =      0.0023 
 
Heteroskedasticity test 
Ho: Disturbance is homoskedastic 
 Pagan-Hall general test statistic   :  45.212  Chi-sq(35) P-value = 0.1157 
Redundant 
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IV redundancy test (LM test of redundancy of specified instruments):     9.224 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.0024 
Ramsey Test 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of logm2 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 171) =     16.09 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000 
3. Monetary Policy and Governance 
Result: GMM 
       lm2 |      Coef   Std Err      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Ldcp |  -.0058608   .0576481    -0.10   0.919     -.118849    .1071275 
     lgdp   |   .1618762   .0829348     1.95   0.051     -.000673    .3244254 
      lm2L |   .8495194   .0845479    10.05   0.000     .6838085     1.01523 
       lgv |   .0572566   .0323827     1.77   0.077    -.0062124    .1207256 
     lpopm |   .0123506   .0112092     1.10   0.271     -.009619    .0343202 
       lop |  -.0333688   .0103867    -3.21   0.001    -.0537263   -.0130113 
     _iyr_82 |  -.4796598   .1900452    -2.52   0.012    -.8521415   -.1071781 
     _iyr_83 |  -.4401695   .2026261    -2.17   0.030    -.8373094   -.0430297 
     _iyr_84 |  -.4437291   .1824925    -2.43   0.015    -.8014079   -.0860503 
     _iyr_85 |  -.3982606   .1761148    -2.26   0.024    -.7434393   -.0530818 
     _iyr_86 |  -.4352111   .1721604    -2.53   0.011    -.7726393   -.0977828 
     _iyr_87 |  -.3818245   .1572304    -2.43   0.015    -.6899904   -.0736586 
     _iyr_88 |  -.3322786    .154079    -2.16   0.031    -.6342678   -.0302894 
     _iyr_89 |  -.3040193   .1496123    -2.03   0.042     -.597254   -.0107847 
     _iyr_90 |  -.3601749   .1351026    -2.67   0.008    -.6249711   -.0953787 
     _iyr_91 |  -.2765054   .1295689    -2.13   0.033    -.5304557   -.0225551 
     _iyr_92 |  -.3090774   .1202086    -2.57   0.010    -.5446819   -.0734728 
     _iyr_93 |  -.2650259    .109967    -2.41   0.016    -.4805573   -.0494946 
     _iyr_94 |  -.2360329   .1055991    -2.24   0.025    -.4430032   -.0290625 
     _iyr_95 |  -.1965486   .1093179    -1.80   0.072    -.4108077    .0177106 
     _iyr_96 |  -.2498163   .0913611    -2.73   0.006    -.4288807   -.0707518 
     _iyr_97 |   -.122682   .0981797    -1.25   0.211    -.3151106    .0697466 
     _iyr_98 |   -.201763   .0757052    -2.67   0.008    -.3501425   -.0533836 
     _iyr_99 |  -.1410719   .0765092    -1.84   0.065    -.2910273    .0088835 
     _iyr_00 |  -.1430903   .0619069    -2.31   0.021    -.2644256    -.021755 
     _iyr_01 |  -.1536047   .0497385    -3.09   0.002    -.2510904   -.0561191 
     _iyr_02 |  -.1284535   .0554361    -2.32   0.020    -.2371063   -.0198007 
     _iyr_03 |  -.1471945   .0477517    -3.08   0.002    -.2407861   -.0536029 
     _iyr_04 |  -.0953675   .0438717    -2.17   0.030    -.1813545   -.0093804 
     _iyr_05 |  -.0984922   .0403442    -2.44   0.015    -.1775655    -.019419 
     _iyr_06 |  -.0608039   .0376082    -1.62   0.106    -.1345147    .0129069 
     _iyr_07 |   -.045309   .0302341    -1.50   0.134    -.1045667    .0139487 
     _iyr_08 |  -.0025137   .0472718    -0.05   0.958    -.0951648    .0901373 
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     _iyr_09 |   .0515759   .0385979     1.34   0.181    -.0240745    .1272263 
       _cons |   .5876942   .1954759     3.01   0.003     .2045685      .97082 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):             14.459 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.0007 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):                8.947 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):         1.024 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.3117 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Result: 2SLS 
First Stage Result 
      ldcp |      Coef   Std Err      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     lgdp |  -.8069607   .1939119    -4.16   0.000    -1.191288   -.4226337 
      lm2L |   .8901794   .1754867     5.07   0.000     .5423705    1.237988 
       lgv |  -.2776895   .1261369    -2.20   0.030    -.5276887   -.0276903 
     lpopm |    .056432   .0556174     1.01   0.313    -.0537999    .1666639 
       lop |    .062307   .0403942     1.54   0.126     -.017753    .1423671 
     _iyr_82 |   .7629067   .6461411     1.18   0.240     -.517724    2.043537 
     _iyr_83 |   .8200525   .6198487     1.32   0.189    -.4084674    2.048572 
     _iyr_84 |   .8432078   .6086725     1.39   0.169    -.3631613    2.049577 
     _iyr_85 |   .7391752   .5991348     1.23   0.220    -.4482905    1.926641 
     _iyr_86 |   .5138929   .6020039     0.85   0.395    -.6792591    1.707045 
     _iyr_87 |   .5502591   .5595008     0.98   0.328    -.5586532    1.659171 
     _iyr_88 |   .6327586   .5347022     1.18   0.239    -.4270037    1.692521 
     _iyr_89 |   .5505188   .5273432     1.04   0.299    -.4946583    1.595696 
     _iyr_90 |   .5402346   .4856483     1.11   0.268    -.4223046    1.502774 
     _iyr_91 |   .5326551   .4657911     1.14   0.255    -.3905277    1.455838 
     _iyr_92 |    .490583   .4355422     1.13   0.262    -.3726476    1.353813 
     _iyr_93 |   .3859689   .4053029     0.95   0.343    -.4173282    1.189266 
     _iyr_94 |   .4781912   .3745921     1.28   0.204    -.2642381     1.22062 
     _iyr_95 |   .5822266   .3519687     1.65   0.101    -.1153639    1.279817 
     _iyr_96 |    .435129   .3302622     1.32   0.190    -.2194399    1.089698 
     _iyr_97 |   .5064686   .3162737     1.60   0.112    -.1203756    1.133313 
     _iyr_98 |    .375677   .2892688     1.30   0.197    -.1976444    .9489983 
     _iyr_99 |   .3142166    .275341     1.14   0.256    -.2315003    .8599334 
     _iyr_00 |   .2530328   .2536187     1.00   0.321    -.2496311    .7556967 
     _iyr_01 |   .1723594   .2362199     0.73   0.467    -.2958207    .6405396 
     _iyr_02 |    .140699    .219507     0.64   0.523    -.2943568    .5757547 
     _iyr_03 |   .1596964   .2059118     0.78   0.440    -.2484142    .5678069 
     _iyr_04 |   .2132409   .1972224     1.08   0.282    -.1776474    .6041293 
     _iyr_05 |   .2131313   .1852456     1.15   0.252    -.1540195     .580282 
     _iyr_06 |   .2397324   .1758178     1.36   0.176    -.1087328    .5881975 
     _iyr_07 |   .1958984   .1666014     1.18   0.242    -.1343002    .5260969 
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     _iyr_08 |   .1671518   .1600462     1.04   0.299    -.1500546    .4843582 
     _iyr_09 |   .0826453   .1539616     0.54   0.593    -.2225016    .3877921 
       lfa |  -.1131933   .0282662    -4.00   0.000    -.1692159   -.0571706 
      lrev |  -.0038262   .0282945    -0.14   0.893     -.059905    .0522526 
       _cons |   .3815516   .9243979     0.41   0.681    -1.450575    2.213678 
IV (2SLS) estimation 
      lm2 |      Coef   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ldcp |  -.0101492   .0519404    -0.20   0.845    -.1119506    .0916521 
     lgpd |   .1573109   .0672626     2.34   0.019     .0254786    .2891432 
      lm2L |    .852838   .0682101    12.50   0.000     .7191487    .9865274 
       lgv |   .0515442   .0285002     1.81   0.071    -.0043152    .1074036 
     lpopm |   .0131213   .0115175     1.14   0.255    -.0094526    .0356951 
       lop |  -.0324764   .0096545    -3.36   0.001    -.0513988   -.0135539 
     _iyr_82 |  -.4769724   .1582459    -3.01   0.003    -.7871288    -.166816 
     _iyr_83 |  -.4266052   .1550941    -2.75   0.006    -.7305841   -.1226263 
     _iyr_84 |   -.441606   .1540421    -2.87   0.004    -.7435229   -.1396891 
     _iyr_85 |  -.3952287   .1489315    -2.65   0.008    -.6871291   -.1033283 
     _iyr_86 |  -.4324401    .142722    -3.03   0.002    -.7121701   -.1527101 
     _iyr_87 |  -.3774203    .133652    -2.82   0.005    -.6393735   -.1154671 
     _iyr_88 |  -.3302283   .1310011    -2.52   0.012    -.5869857   -.0734708 
     _iyr_89 |  -.3012308   .1273975    -2.36   0.018    -.5509254   -.0515362 
     _iyr_90 |  -.3583753   .1173408    -3.05   0.002    -.5883589   -.1283916 
     _iyr_91 |  -.2755236   .1128582    -2.44   0.015    -.4967216   -.0543256 
     _iyr_92 |  -.3078016   .1051053    -2.93   0.003    -.5138041    -.101799 
     _iyr_93 |  -.2636054   .0957623    -2.75   0.006     -.451296   -.0759147 
     _iyr_94 |  -.2341656   .0920925    -2.54   0.011    -.4146637   -.0536676 
     _iyr_95 |  -.1917789   .0907569    -2.11   0.035    -.3696591   -.0138986 
     _iyr_96 |  -.2486836   .0814399    -3.05   0.002    -.4083029   -.0890643 
     _iyr_97 |  -.1274465   .0807392    -1.58   0.114    -.2856924    .0307994 
     _iyr_98 |  -.2015202   .0708101    -2.85   0.004    -.3403054   -.0627349 
     _iyr_99 |  -.1404553   .0665335    -2.11   0.035    -.2708586   -.0100521 
     _iyr_00 |   -.143037   .0607441    -2.35   0.019    -.2620932   -.0239807 
     _iyr_01 |  -.1367231   .0547991    -2.49   0.013    -.2441274   -.0293188 
     _iyr_02 |  -.1307171    .050297    -2.60   0.009    -.2292973   -.0321368 
     _iyr_03 |  -.1469693   .0476753    -3.08   0.002    -.2404112   -.0535274 
     _iyr_04 |  -.0950954     .04697    -2.02   0.043    -.1871549    -.003036 
     _iyr_05 |  -.0969414   .0442043    -2.19   0.028    -.1835803   -.0103024 
     _iyr_06 |  -.0595504   .0426074    -1.40   0.162    -.1430594    .0239587 
     _iyr_07 |    -.04518   .0394191    -1.15   0.252    -.1224399      .03208 
     _iyr_08 |  -.0080539   .0374401    -0.22   0.830    -.0814352    .0653273 
     _iyr_09 |   .0433448   .0343199     1.26   0.207    -.0239209    .1106106 
       _cons |   .6078341   .1869266     3.25   0.001     .2414647    .9742035 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):          20.448 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.0000 
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Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):                8.947 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           1.248 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.2639 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Pooled OLS 
       lm2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lgdp |    1.01245   .0762822    13.27   0.000      .861898    1.163001 
       lge |   .5903481   .2065331     2.86   0.005     .1827318    .9979645 
      lprc |   1.423565   .1001989    14.21   0.000     1.225811    1.621318 
      lk |  -.0902351   .0410405    -2.20   0.029    -.1712331   -.0092371 
     _cons |  -2.045869   .6799144    -3.01   0.003    -3.387757   -.7039815 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Autocorrelation 
H0: no first order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,       5) =     37.158 
           Prob > F =      0.0017 
Heteroskedasticity test 
Ho: Disturbance is homoskedastic 
    Pagan-Hall general test statistic   :  24.632  Chi-sq(35) P-value = 0.9043 
 
Redundant 
IV redundancy test (LM test of redundancy of specified instruments):    18.597 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.0000 
Ramsey Test 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of logm2 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 172) =     10.08 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000 
 
4. Monetary Policy, Economic Institution and Interaction Variable 
Result: GMM 
       lm2 |      Coef   Std Err      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lpopm |  -.0068709   .0327914    -0.21   0.834    -.0711409    .0573992 
     l dp|   .1025366   .0453645     2.26   0.024     .0136238    .1914494 
      lm2L |   .9095245   .0297624    30.56   0.000     .8511913    .9678576 
     leco |  -.0223918   .0304461    -0.74   0.462     -.082065    .0372814 
      legv |   .0144204   .0239683     0.60   0.547    -.0325566    .0613974 
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      ldcp |   .0584763   .0188668     3.10   0.002      .021498    .0954546 
     _iyr_82 |  -.2136989    .089033    -2.40   0.016    -.3882003   -.0391974 
     _iyr_83 |  -.1960909   .0888808    -2.21   0.027     -.370294   -.0218877 
     _iyr_84 |  -.1952461   .0892777    -2.19   0.029    -.3702271   -.0202651 
     _iyr_85 |  -.1813613   .0785486    -2.31   0.021    -.3353136   -.0274089 
     _iyr_86 |  -.2057123     .07876    -2.61   0.009    -.3600791   -.0513455 
     _iyr_87 |  -.1691313   .0744088    -2.27   0.023      -.31497   -.0232927 
     _iyr_88 |  -.1552863   .0716061    -2.17   0.030    -.2956317   -.0149409 
     _iyr_89 |  -.1558438   .0701608    -2.22   0.026    -.2933564   -.0183311 
     _iyr_90 |  -.1706925   .0655515    -2.60   0.009    -.2991711   -.0422139 
     _iyr_91 |   -.096963   .0629471    -1.54   0.123    -.2203371    .0264111 
     _iyr_92 |  -.1138928   .0586668    -1.94   0.052    -.2288776    .0010919 
     _iyr_93 |  -.0928072   .0580754    -1.60   0.110    -.2066329    .0210185 
     _iyr_94 |   -.081881    .051587    -1.59   0.112    -.1829896    .0192276 
     _iyr_95 |   -.076242   .0580045    -1.31   0.189    -.1899288    .0374448 
     _iyr_96 |  -.1196425   .0472371    -2.53   0.011    -.2122256   -.0270594 
     _iyr_97 |  -.0259738   .0569824    -0.46   0.649    -.1376573    .0857097 
     _iyr_98 |  -.1150224   .0418194    -2.75   0.006    -.1969869   -.0330579 
     _iyr_99 |  -.0698482   .0499482    -1.40   0.162    -.1677449    .0280485 
     _iyr_00 |  -.0619356   .0344252    -1.80   0.072    -.1294078    .0055367 
     _iyr_01 |  -.0502166   .0307482    -1.63   0.102    -.1104819    .0100486 
     _iyr_02 |  -.0486558   .0374511    -1.30   0.194    -.1220587     .024747 
     _iyr_03 |  -.0720432   .0339079    -2.12   0.034    -.1385015   -.0055849 
     _iyr_04 |  -.0350747   .0264769    -1.32   0.185    -.0869684    .0168189 
     _iyr_05 |  -.0470565   .0278457    -1.69   0.091    -.1016332    .0075201 
     _iyr_06 |  -.0216593   .0269636    -0.80   0.422    -.0745071    .0311885 
     _iyr_07 |  -.0181413   .0252808    -0.72   0.473    -.0676907    .0314082 
     _iyr_08 |   .0042002   .0377197     0.11   0.911    -.0697291    .0781295 
     _iyr_09 |   .0558747   .0258472     2.16   0.031     .0052152    .1065342 
       _cons |   .2791904   .3646467     0.77   0.444    -.4355041    .9938848 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):             21.503 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.0000 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):               27.738 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):         0.305 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.5808 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Result: 2SLS 
    lpopm |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          lY |   .7633789   .1184331     6.45   0.000     .5292007    .9975571 
      lm2t-1 |   .7166117   .1111359     6.45   0.000     .4968624     .936361 
     leco |  -.5378831   .1037809    -5.18   0.000    -.7430895   -.3326766 
      legi |   .1793612   .0965372     1.86   0.065    -.0115222    .3702446 
      ldcp |  -.1853044   .0709608    -2.61   0.010    -.3256154   -.0449935 
     _iyr_82 |   2.701273   .3460437     7.81   0.000     2.017039    3.385507 
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     _iyr_83 |   2.607409   .3374285     7.73   0.000     1.940211    3.274608 
     _iyr_84 |   2.512689   .3243772     7.75   0.000     1.871297    3.154082 
     _iyr_85 |   2.364317   .3122525     7.57   0.000     1.746899    2.981735 
     _iyr_86 |   2.356042   .3071955     7.67   0.000     1.748623     2.96346 
     _iyr_87 |   2.277896   .2999347     7.59   0.000     1.684834    2.870958 
     _iyr_88 |   2.180176   .2917022     7.47   0.000     1.603393     2.75696 
     _iyr_89 |   2.082233    .280388     7.43   0.000     1.527821    2.636645 
     _iyr_90 |   1.989112   .2709058     7.34   0.000     1.453449    2.524775 
     _iyr_91 |   1.918029   .2627615     7.30   0.000      1.39847    2.437589 
     _iyr_92 |   1.778328   .2468925     7.20   0.000     1.290147    2.266509 
     _iyr_93 |   1.650143   .2335135     7.07   0.000     1.188416     2.11187 
     _iyr_94 |   1.570939   .2248517     6.99   0.000     1.126339    2.015539 
     _iyr_95 |    1.51562   .2202081     6.88   0.000     1.080201    1.951038 
     _iyr_96 |   1.372051    .208236     6.59   0.000     .9603053    1.783797 
     _iyr_97 |    1.33034    .203421     6.54   0.000     .9281151    1.732565 
     _iyr_98 |   1.200127   .1908042     6.29   0.000     .8228489    1.577405 
     _iyr_99 |   1.022484   .1819409     5.62   0.000      .662732    1.382237 
     _iyr_00 |   .8266788   .1752149     4.72   0.000     .4802259    1.173132 
     _iyr_01 |   .7366832   .1688207     4.36   0.000     .4028733    1.070493 
     _iyr_02 |   .6568993   .1642452     4.00   0.000     .3321366    .9816619 
     _iyr_03 |   .5648342   .1608793     3.51   0.001      .246727    .8829415 
     _iyr_04 |   .5518675   .1565954     3.52   0.001     .2422309    .8615042 
     _iyr_05 |   .4526488   .1531678     2.96   0.004     .1497895    .7555081 
     _iyr_06 |   .3727545   .1514869     2.46   0.015     .0732189    .6722902 
     _iyr_07 |   .2751843   .1490768     1.85   0.067    -.0195858    .5699544 
     _iyr_08 |   .2377829   .1480409     1.61   0.111    -.0549389    .5305048 
     _iyr_09 |   .0967867   .1454822     0.67   0.507    -.1908757    .3844491 
      linf |  -.1012422   .0490055    -2.07   0.041    -.1981409   -.0043435 
      lrev |   .1785477   .0248666     7.18   0.000     .1293789    .2277165 
       _cons |  -11.03944   .5170016   -21.35   0.000    -12.06171   -10.01717 
IV (2SLS) estimation 
      lm2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lpopm |  -.0049873   .0317979    -0.16   0.875      -.06731    .0573355 
       lgdp |   .0975453   .0445241     2.19   0.028     .0102796    .1848109 
      lm2L |   .9117964   .0273745    33.31   0.000     .8581434    .9654495 
     leco |  -.0195254   .0279876    -0.70   0.485    -.0743802    .0353293 
      legv |   .0121209   .0230185     0.53   0.598    -.0329946    .0572364 
      ldcp |   .0552838   .0166866     3.31   0.001     .0225787    .0879889 
     _iyr_82 |  -.2107461   .0857863    -2.46   0.014    -.3788841   -.0426081 
     _iyr_83 |    -.19095   .0830183    -2.30   0.021    -.3536628   -.0282372 
     _iyr_84 |   -.195086   .0813383    -2.40   0.016    -.3545062   -.0356659 
     _iyr_85 |  -.1805257   .0790713    -2.28   0.022    -.3355025   -.0255488 
     _iyr_86 |  -.2031842   .0768277    -2.64   0.008    -.3537638   -.0526046 
     _iyr_87 |  -.1672653   .0752104    -2.22   0.026     -.314675   -.0198557 
     _iyr_88 |   -.152935   .0722151    -2.12   0.034     -.294474    -.011396 
 156 
 
     _iyr_89 |   -.152329   .0699361    -2.18   0.029    -.2894011   -.0152568 
     _iyr_90 |  -.1684118   .0666178    -2.53   0.011    -.2989804   -.0378433 
     _iyr_91 |  -.0964013   .0643768    -1.50   0.134    -.2225776     .029775 
     _iyr_92 |  -.1119411   .0609073    -1.84   0.066    -.2313172     .007435 
     _iyr_93 |  -.0926657   .0583687    -1.59   0.112    -.2070663    .0217349 
     _iyr_94 |  -.0807705   .0560506    -1.44   0.150    -.1906277    .0290866 
     _iyr_95 |  -.0758904   .0547512    -1.39   0.166    -.1832009      .03142 
     _iyr_96 |  -.1186483   .0517483    -2.29   0.022     -.220073   -.0172236 
     _iyr_97 |   -.026006   .0509831    -0.51   0.610    -.1259311    .0739191 
     _iyr_98 |   -.114239   .0471669    -2.42   0.015    -.2066844   -.0217936 
     _iyr_99 |  -.0704338   .0457749    -1.54   0.124    -.1601509    .0192834 
     _iyr_00 |  -.0614686   .0440708    -1.39   0.163    -.1478457    .0249084 
     _iyr_01 |  -.0517283   .0421858    -1.23   0.220    -.1344109    .0309543 
     _iyr_02 |  -.0504635   .0407298    -1.24   0.215    -.1302924    .0293654 
     _iyr_03 |  -.0756708   .0393359    -1.92   0.054    -.1527677     .001426 
     _iyr_04 |  -.0347662    .038566    -0.90   0.367    -.1103542    .0408217 
     _iyr_05 |  -.0463605   .0372488    -1.24   0.213    -.1193669    .0266459 
     _iyr_06 |  -.0214173    .036517    -0.59   0.558    -.0929892    .0501546 
     _iyr_07 |   -.018233   .0356975    -0.51   0.610    -.0881988    .0517329 
     _iyr_08 |   .0057545   .0350808     0.16   0.870    -.0630025    .0745116 
     _iyr_09 |   .0563311   .0344225     1.64   0.102    -.0111357    .1237979 
       _cons |   .2992261   .3363526     0.89   0.374    -.3600129    .9584652 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):          49.891 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.0000 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):               27.738 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           0.261 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.6094 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Pooled OLS 
       lm2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lgdp |   1.089504   .2573323     4.23   0.000     .5816095    1.597399 
     lecoi |  -.1222926   .2262046    -0.54   0.589    -.5687505    .3241654 
      legv |   .1881907   .2044981     0.92   0.359    -.2154255    .5918069 
      lprc |   1.278801   .1008803    12.68   0.000     1.079695    1.477908 
     lpopm |  -.3319697   .1527634    -2.17   0.031    -.6334775    -.030462 
       _cons |  -1.785593   1.392088    -1.28   0.201    -4.533145    .9619595 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Autocorrelation 
H0: no first order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,       5) =      6.737 
           Prob > F =      0.0485 
 
Heteroskedasticity test 
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Ho: Disturbance is homoskedastic 
    Pagan-Hall general test statistic   :  41.150  Chi-sq(35) P-value = 0.2193 
Redundant 
IV redundancy test (LM test of redundancy of specified instruments):    47.325 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.0000 
Ramsey Test 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of logm2 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 171) =     20.33 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000 
 
 
5. Monetary Policy, Political Institutions and Interaction Variable 
Result: GMM 
      lm2 |      Coef   Std Err      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lk |   -.020604   .0065857    -3.13   0.002    -.0335117   -.0076963 
     lgdp  |   .1623618   .0354524     4.58   0.000     .0928765    .2318472 
   lm2L|   .8644125   .0349776    24.71   0.000     .7958577    .9329674 
         lpi |   -.028495   .0264803    -1.08   0.282    -.0803954    .0234055 
     lpgv |   .0116834   .0066356     1.76   0.078     -.001322    .0246889 
      ldcp |   .0810823   .0239445     3.39   0.001     .0341519    .1280127 
     _iyr_82 |  -.3187705   .0881362    -3.62   0.000    -.4915144   -.1460267 
     _iyr_83 |  -.2896548    .093177    -3.11   0.002    -.4722784   -.1070312 
     _iyr_84 |  -.2838631   .0826377    -3.44   0.001    -.4458301   -.1218962 
     _iyr_85 |  -.2395327   .0817713    -2.93   0.003    -.3998015   -.0792638 
     _iyr_86 |  -.2804896   .0793187    -3.54   0.000    -.4359513   -.1250278 
     _iyr_87 |   -.237864    .073224    -3.25   0.001    -.3813803   -.0943477 
     _iyr_88 |  -.1980563   .0729532    -2.71   0.007     -.341042   -.0550705 
     _iyr_89 |  -.1859542   .0682484    -2.72   0.006    -.3197187   -.0521897 
     _iyr_90 |   -.239765   .0649445    -3.69   0.000     -.367054    -.112476 
     _iyr_91 |  -.1622665   .0631282    -2.57   0.010    -.2859954   -.0385376 
     _iyr_92 |  -.1983431   .0602122    -3.29   0.001    -.3163569   -.0803293 
     _iyr_93 |  -.1367727   .0626921    -2.18   0.029    -.2596471   -.0138984 
     _iyr_94 |  -.1303515     .05616    -2.32   0.020    -.2404231   -.0202799 
     _iyr_95 |  -.1112532   .0624775    -1.78   0.075    -.2337069    .0112004 
     _iyr_96 |  -.1665232   .0476825    -3.49   0.000    -.2599791   -.0730673 
     _iyr_97 |  -.0513257   .0579872    -0.89   0.376    -.1649786    .0623272 
     _iyr_98 |  -.1330967   .0414253    -3.21   0.001    -.2142888   -.0519047 
     _iyr_99 |  -.0713151   .0452156    -1.58   0.115    -.1599359    .0173058 
     _iyr_00 |  -.0798866   .0332498    -2.40   0.016    -.1450549   -.0147182 
     _iyr_01 |  -.0853682   .0351346    -2.43   0.015    -.1542308   -.0165055 
     _iyr_02 |  -.0728753   .0418377    -1.74   0.082    -.1548756     .009125 
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     _iyr_03 |  -.0946249    .035832    -2.64   0.008    -.1648545   -.0243954 
     _iyr_04 |  -.0537314   .0308802    -1.74   0.082    -.1142555    .0067926 
     _iyr_05 |  -.0648936   .0324537    -2.00   0.046    -.1285016   -.0012856 
     _iyr_06 |  -.0376791   .0316394    -1.19   0.234    -.0996912     .024333 
     _iyr_07 |  -.0296181   .0287876    -1.03   0.304    -.0860406    .0268045 
     _iyr_08 |  -.0039391   .0357485    -0.11   0.912    -.0740049    .0661267 
     _iyr_09 |   .0521474   .0287478     1.81   0.070    -.0041972    .1084919 
       _cons |     .31712   .1148369     2.76   0.006     .0920439    .5421962 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):             39.944 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.0000 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):               24.210 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):         0.505 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.4774 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Result: 2SLS 
First-stage regressions 
       lk |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     lgdp   |   2.344898   .5703859     4.11   0.000     1.214411    3.475384 
    lm2L |  -.2034443   .5693632    -0.36   0.722    -1.331904    .9250151 
         lpi |  -.9279657   .4190733    -2.21   0.029    -1.758555   -.0973761 
     lpgv |  -.1413973   .1441051    -0.98   0.329    -.4270088    .1442142 
      ldcp |  -.6816576   .3752804    -1.82   0.072    -1.425451    .0621359 
     _iyr_82 |  -4.441882   1.898616    -2.34   0.021    -8.204876   -.6788874 
     _iyr_83 |   -4.56883   1.801883    -2.54   0.013    -8.140104   -.9975558 
     _iyr_84 |  -3.752002   1.755664    -2.14   0.035    -7.231671   -.2723327 
     _iyr_85 |  -3.865065   1.742287    -2.22   0.029     -7.31822    -.411909 
     _iyr_86 |  -4.852803   1.756594    -2.76   0.007    -8.334314   -1.371291 
     _iyr_87 |  -4.179213   1.633161    -2.56   0.012    -7.416085   -.9423418 
     _iyr_88 |  -3.657048   1.577007    -2.32   0.022    -6.782625   -.5314704 
     _iyr_89 |      -4.27   1.553075    -2.75   0.007    -7.348144   -1.191857 
     _iyr_90 |   -3.37229   1.440516    -2.34   0.021    -6.227346   -.5172338 
     _iyr_91 |  -2.996379   1.406865    -2.13   0.035    -5.784739   -.2080181 
     _iyr_92 |  -2.719637   1.327675    -2.05   0.043    -5.351046    -.088228 
     _iyr_93 |  -2.114891   1.226711    -1.72   0.088    -4.546192    .3164105 
     _iyr_94 |  -1.707299   1.165884    -1.46   0.146    -4.018044     .603446 
     _iyr_95 |  -1.484973    1.09841    -1.35   0.179    -3.661986    .6920393 
     _iyr_96 |  -1.506482   1.036908    -1.45   0.149      -3.5616     .548636 
     _iyr_97 |  -1.317959   1.004025    -1.31   0.192    -3.307904    .6719863 
     _iyr_98 |  -1.215776   .9248564    -1.31   0.191    -3.048811    .6172593 
     _iyr_99 |  -1.238811   .8784707    -1.41   0.161    -2.979911    .5022896 
     _iyr_00 |  -1.227925   .8186075    -1.50   0.137    -2.850378    .3945284 
     _iyr_01 |   -1.29184    .766256    -1.69   0.095    -2.810534    .2268546 
     _iyr_02 |  -1.075073   .7189981    -1.50   0.138    -2.500104    .3499576 
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     _iyr_03 |  -.8942744   .6845956    -1.31   0.194    -2.251121    .4625718 
     _iyr_04 |   -.715351   .6719036    -1.06   0.289    -2.047042      .61634 
     _iyr_05 |  -.5468929   .6541545    -0.84   0.405    -1.843406      .74962 
     _iyr_06 |  -.3631087   .6409451    -0.57   0.572    -1.633441    .9072237 
     _iyr_07 |  -.3257423   .6175967    -0.53   0.599    -1.549799    .8983144 
     _iyr_08 |   -.307985   .6078186    -0.51   0.613    -1.512662    .8966917 
     _iyr_09 |   -.013275   .5961374    -0.02   0.982      -1.1948     1.16825 
       lfa |  -.6833535   .1133215    -6.03   0.000    -.9079529   -.4587541 
      lrev |   .1998028   .1053682     1.90   0.061    -.0090335     .408639 
       _cons |  -2.544629   2.028683    -1.25   0.212    -6.565413    1.476156 
IV (2SLS) estimation 
       lm2 |      Coef   Std. Err      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lk |  -.0204815   .0079631    -2.57   0.010    -.0360889   -.0048741 
     lgpL  |   .1612496    .034965     4.61   0.000     .0927194    .2297798 
      lm2 |   .8648462   .0303388    28.51   0.000     .8053833    .9243091 
         lpi |  -.0251608   .0243784    -1.03   0.302    -.0729416    .0226199 
     lpgv |   .0108376   .0076609     1.41   0.157    -.0041776    .0258528 
      ldcp |   .0789862   .0197332     4.00   0.000     .0403099    .1176626 
     _iyr_82 |  -.3195484   .0900874    -3.55   0.000    -.4961164   -.1429803 
     _iyr_83 |  -.2896666   .0832071    -3.48   0.000    -.4527496   -.1265836 
     _iyr_84 |  -.2846397   .0821709    -3.46   0.001    -.4456916   -.1235877 
     _iyr_85 |  -.2389208    .080743    -2.96   0.003    -.3971742   -.0806675 
     _iyr_86 |  -.2821088   .0778665    -3.62   0.000    -.4347244   -.1294933 
     _iyr_87 |  -.2378835   .0768122    -3.10   0.002    -.3884326   -.0873343 
     _iyr_88 |  -.1979722   .0754008    -2.63   0.009     -.345755   -.0501894 
     _iyr_89 |  -.1846693   .0723304    -2.55   0.011    -.3264344   -.0429043 
     _iyr_90 |  -.2400123   .0689569    -3.48   0.001    -.3751653   -.1048593 
     _iyr_91 |  -.1631131    .068222    -2.39   0.017    -.2968257   -.0294006 
     _iyr_92 |  -.1991031   .0648111    -3.07   0.002    -.3261305   -.0720757 
     _iyr_93 |  -.1376507   .0594188    -2.32   0.021    -.2541094   -.0211919 
     _iyr_94 |  -.1305649   .0566563    -2.30   0.021    -.2416092   -.0195207 
     _iyr_95 |  -.1100183   .0542398    -2.03   0.043    -.2163262   -.0037103 
     _iyr_96 |  -.1666776   .0511481    -3.26   0.001     -.266926   -.0664291 
     _iyr_97 |  -.0582582   .0500311    -1.16   0.244    -.1563173     .039801 
     _iyr_98 |  -.1335633    .046312    -2.88   0.004    -.2243332   -.0427933 
     _iyr_99 |  -.0712199   .0449151    -1.59   0.113    -.1592519     .016812 
     _iyr_00 |  -.0799431   .0429123    -1.86   0.062    -.1640496    .0041634 
     _iyr_01 |   -.077494   .0399311    -1.94   0.052    -.1557575    .0007695 
     _iyr_02 |  -.0725231    .038121    -1.90   0.057    -.1472389    .0021926 
     _iyr_03 |  -.0958227   .0367872    -2.60   0.009    -.1679242   -.0237212 
     _iyr_04 |   -.053894   .0362711    -1.49   0.137    -.1249841    .0171961 
     _iyr_05 |  -.0646491   .0355608    -1.82   0.069    -.1343469    .0050487 
     _iyr_06 |  -.0384268   .0350451    -1.10   0.273    -.1071139    .0302604 
     _iyr_07 |  -.0304663   .0340298    -0.90   0.371    -.0971635     .036231 
     _iyr_08 |  -.0035131   .0335176    -0.10   0.917    -.0692064    .0621803 
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     _iyr_09 |   .0510634   .0329972     1.55   0.122    -.0136099    .1157367 
       _cons |   .3217191   .1048011     3.07   0.002     .1163127    .5271254 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):          44.600 
                                                       Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.0000 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):               24.210 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           0.531 
                                                       Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.4661 
Pooled OLS 
    lm2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lgdp |   .9929844   .0849571    11.69   0.000     .8253053    1.160663 
         lpi |  -.5470596   .2227809    -2.46   0.015    -.9867603   -.1073589 
     lpgv |   .6293408   .2198838     2.86   0.005     .1953581    1.063324 
      lprc |   1.390118   .1189112    11.69   0.000     1.155424    1.624812 
        lk |  -.0863754   .0417776    -2.07   0.040    -.1688315   -.0039194 
       _cons |  -2.114378   .6937085    -3.05   0.003    -3.483545   -.7452116 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Autocorrelation 
H0: no first order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,       5) =     13.272 
           Prob > F =      0.0149 
Heteroskedasticity  
Ho: Disturbance is homoskedastic 
Pagan-Hall general test statistic   :  37.945  Chi-sq(35) P-value = 0.3366 
Redundant 
IV redundancy test (LM test of redundancy of specified instruments):     4.631 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.0314 
Ramsey Test 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of logm2 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 171) =     22.95 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000 
 
6. Monetary Policy, Economic Institutions and Governance 
Result: GMM 
       lm2 |      Coef   Std Err      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     lpopm |  -.0070087   .0328012    -0.21   0.831    -.0712978    .0572804 
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      lgdp      |   .1026857   .0453453     2.26   0.024     .0138105    .1915608 
      lm2L |   .9095361   .0298228    30.50   0.000     .8510844    .9679877 
     leco |  -.0079951   .0115524    -0.69   0.489    -.0306374    .0146472 
         lge |   .0140224   .0240092     0.58   0.559    -.0330347    .0610795 
      ldcp |   .0584208   .0188677     3.10   0.002     .0214408    .0954008 
     _iyr_82 |  -.2137585   .0891575    -2.40   0.017    -.3885039   -.0390131 
     _iyr_83 |  -.1961338   .0889965    -2.20   0.028    -.3705637   -.0217039 
     _iyr_84 |  -.1953147   .0894239    -2.18   0.029    -.3705823   -.0200471 
     _iyr_85 |  -.1814496   .0786693    -2.31   0.021    -.3356385   -.0272607 
     _iyr_86 |  -.2058023    .078882    -2.61   0.009    -.3604082   -.0511964 
     _iyr_87 |  -.1692443   .0745385    -2.27   0.023     -.315337   -.0231516 
     _iyr_88 |   -.155365   .0717028    -2.17   0.030    -.2958999   -.0148301 
     _iyr_89 |   -.155816   .0703267    -2.22   0.027    -.2936537   -.0179783 
     _iyr_90 |  -.1707936   .0656023    -2.60   0.009    -.2993717   -.0422155 
     _iyr_91 |  -.0970595   .0630347    -1.54   0.124    -.2206052    .0264862 
     _iyr_92 |  -.1139208   .0587513    -1.94   0.052    -.2290713    .0012297 
     _iyr_93 |  -.0929281   .0581026    -1.60   0.110    -.2068072    .0209509 
     _iyr_94 |  -.0819203   .0516356    -1.59   0.113    -.1831242    .0192837 
     _iyr_95 |  -.0762861   .0580633    -1.31   0.189    -.1900879    .0375158 
     _iyr_96 |  -.1197346   .0472765    -2.53   0.011    -.2123949   -.0270744 
     _iyr_97 |  -.0260719   .0570135    -0.46   0.647    -.1378163    .0856726 
     _iyr_98 |  -.1150903   .0418339    -2.75   0.006    -.1970833   -.0330974 
     _iyr_99 |  -.0699257   .0499441    -1.40   0.161    -.1678143    .0279629 
     _iyr_00 |  -.0620196   .0344392    -1.80   0.072    -.1295191    .0054799 
     _iyr_01 |    -.05029   .0307521    -1.64   0.102    -.1105629     .009983 
     _iyr_02 |  -.0488479   .0373757    -1.31   0.191     -.122103    .0244072 
     _iyr_03 |  -.0720512   .0339398    -2.12   0.034     -.138572   -.0055305 
     _iyr_04 |   -.035037    .026499    -1.32   0.186    -.0869741    .0169001 
     _iyr_05 |  -.0470894   .0278545    -1.69   0.091    -.1016831    .0075043 
     _iyr_06 |   -.021791   .0269593    -0.81   0.419    -.0746302    .0310482 
     _iyr_07 |  -.0183582   .0252798    -0.73   0.468    -.0679058    .0311894 
     _iyr_08 |   .0041664   .0377514     0.11   0.912     -.069825    .0781578 
     _iyr_09 |   .0557523   .0258593     2.16   0.031      .005069    .1064356 
       _cons |   .2792888   .3656704     0.76   0.445     -.437412    .9959897 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):             21.485 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.0000 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):               27.764 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):         0.303 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.5817 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Resuslt: 2SLS 
First-stage regressions 
     lpopm |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       lgdp |   .7626863   .1183799     6.44   0.000     .5286132    .9967594 
      lm2L |   .7179994   .1111181     6.46   0.000     .4982852    .9377135 
     leco |   -.358683   .0199589   -17.97   0.000    -.3981478   -.3192183 
         lge |   .1827861   .0962833     1.90   0.060    -.0075951    .3731674 
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      ldcp |  -.1857563   .0709255    -2.62   0.010    -.3259975   -.0455151 
     _iyr_82 |   2.703296   .3457146     7.82   0.000     2.019714    3.386879 
     _iyr_83 |   2.609287   .3371113     7.74   0.000     1.942716    3.275859 
     _iyr_84 |   2.514622   .3240487     7.76   0.000     1.873879    3.155365 
     _iyr_85 |   2.366128   .3119235     7.59   0.000     1.749361    2.982896 
     _iyr_86 |   2.357878   .3068706     7.68   0.000     1.751102    2.964655 
     _iyr_87 |   2.279806   .2995988     7.61   0.000     1.687408    2.872203 
     _iyr_88 |   2.181648   .2914023     7.49   0.000     1.605457    2.757839 
     _iyr_89 |   2.084681   .2802328     7.44   0.000     1.530575    2.638786 
     _iyr_90 |   1.989698   .2705724     7.35   0.000     1.454694    2.524702 
     _iyr_91 |   1.919318   .2624666     7.31   0.000     1.400342    2.438294 
     _iyr_92 |   1.779581   .2466665     7.21   0.000     1.291847    2.267316 
     _iyr_93 |   1.649973   .2331869     7.08   0.000     1.188892    2.111054 
     _iyr_94 |     1.5714   .2246249     7.00   0.000     1.127248    2.015551 
     _iyr_95 |   1.516517   .2200026     6.89   0.000     1.081505    1.951529 
     _iyr_96 |   1.372319   .2079746     6.60   0.000     .9610898    1.783548 
     _iyr_97 |    1.33061   .2031518     6.55   0.000     .9289177    1.732303 
     _iyr_98 |   1.200185   .1905921     6.30   0.000     .8233264    1.577043 
     _iyr_99 |   1.022366    .181726     5.63   0.000     .6630385    1.381694 
     _iyr_00 |   .8264093   .1750191     4.72   0.000     .4803434    1.172475 
     _iyr_01 |   .7364188   .1686572     4.37   0.000     .4029323    1.069905 
     _iyr_02 |   .6550243   .1639904     3.99   0.000     .3307654    .9792832 
     _iyr_03 |   .5649226   .1607684     3.51   0.001     .2470346    .8828106 
     _iyr_04 |   .5525935   .1565189     3.53   0.001     .2431081     .862079 
     _iyr_05 |   .4518455   .1530675     2.95   0.004     .1491846    .7545065 
     _iyr_06 |   .3708354   .1513724     2.45   0.016     .0715263    .6701446 
     _iyr_07 |   .2729198   .1489004     1.83   0.069    -.0215015     .567341 
     _iyr_08 |   .2377362   .1479456     1.61   0.110    -.0547971    .5302696 
     _iyr_09 |   .0954224   .1453807     0.66   0.513    -.1920393    .3828842 
      linf |  -.1013712   .0489806    -2.07   0.040    -.1982207   -.0045216 
      lrev |     .17845   .0248443     7.18   0.000     .1293253    .2275747 
       _cons |  -11.05197    .516018   -21.42   0.000    -12.07229   -10.03164 
IV (2SLS) estimation 
     lm2 |      Coef    Std. Err      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lpopm |  -.0051038   .0318023    -0.16   0.872    -.0674351    .0572275 
   lgsp     |   .0976737   .0445102     2.19   0.028     .0104353    .1849121 
      lm2L |   .9117965   .0274184    33.25   0.000     .8580574    .9655357 
     leco |  -.0074222    .011286    -0.66   0.511    -.0295423     .014698 
         lge |    .011745   .0230111     0.51   0.610    -.0333559    .0568458 
      ldcp |   .0552403   .0166891     3.31   0.001     .0225302    .0879504 
     _iyr_82 |  -.2108184    .085865    -2.46   0.014    -.3791108   -.0425261 
     _iyr_83 |  -.1910153   .0830901    -2.30   0.022    -.3538689   -.0281618 
     _iyr_84 |   -.195175   .0814134    -2.40   0.017    -.3547423   -.0356077 
     _iyr_85 |  -.1806191   .0791432    -2.28   0.022    -.3357368   -.0255013 
     _iyr_86 |  -.2032837   .0768967    -2.64   0.008    -.3539985    -.052569 
     _iyr_87 |  -.1673841   .0752795    -2.22   0.026    -.3149291    -.019839 
     _iyr_88 |  -.1530186   .0722705    -2.12   0.034    -.2946661   -.0113711 
     _iyr_89 |   -.152329   .0700233    -2.18   0.030    -.2895721   -.0150859 
     _iyr_90 |  -.1685093   .0666454    -2.53   0.011    -.2991318   -.0378868 
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     _iyr_91 |   -.096501   .0644219    -1.50   0.134    -.2227656    .0297636 
     _iyr_92 |  -.1119858   .0609529    -1.84   0.066    -.2314513    .0074797 
     _iyr_93 |   -.092777   .0583755    -1.59   0.112    -.2071908    .0216369 
     _iyr_94 |  -.0808125   .0560749    -1.44   0.150    -.1907172    .0290923 
     _iyr_95 |  -.0759368   .0547851    -1.39   0.166    -.1833137    .0314401 
     _iyr_96 |  -.1187386   .0517623    -2.29   0.022    -.2201907   -.0172864 
     _iyr_97 |   -.026105   .0509966    -0.51   0.609    -.1260566    .0738465 
     _iyr_98 |  -.1143033   .0471763    -2.42   0.015    -.2067672   -.0218394 
     _iyr_99 |  -.0705102   .0457797    -1.54   0.124    -.1602366    .0192163 
     _iyr_00 |   -.061547   .0440723    -1.40   0.163    -.1479271    .0248331 
     _iyr_01 |  -.0517866   .0421885    -1.23   0.220    -.1344744    .0309013 
     _iyr_02 |  -.0506242   .0406989    -1.24   0.214    -.1303925    .0291442 
     _iyr_03 |   -.075682   .0393445    -1.92   0.054    -.1527958    .0014317 
     _iyr_04 |  -.0347346   .0385826    -0.90   0.368    -.1103551    .0408859 
     _iyr_05 |  -.0463886   .0372469    -1.25   0.213    -.1193912    .0266139 
     _iyr_06 |  -.0215254   .0365076    -0.59   0.555     -.093079    .0500283 
     _iyr_07 |  -.0184124   .0356752    -0.52   0.606    -.0883345    .0515098 
     _iyr_08 |   .0057169   .0350817     0.16   0.871    -.0630419    .0744757 
     _iyr_09 |   .0562302   .0344179     1.63   0.102    -.0112277     .123688 
       _cons |   .2994486   .3370655     0.89   0.374    -.3611877    .9600849 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):          49.925 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.0000 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):               27.764 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           0.260 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.6100 
Pooled OLS 
    lm2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lgdph |   1.098234   .2579399     4.26   0.000     .5891406    1.607328 
     lecoi |   .0638288   .0674223     0.95   0.345     -.069242    .1968996 
         lge |   .1843253   .2039807     0.90   0.367    -.2182697    .5869203 
      lprc |   1.278542   .1008115    12.68   0.000     1.079571    1.477512 
     lpopm |  -.3372826   .1529914    -2.20   0.029    -.6392404   -.0353249 
       _cons |  -1.821562   1.395932    -1.30   0.194    -4.576701    .9335773 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Autocorrelation 
H0: no first order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,       5) =      6.700 
           Prob > F =      0.0489 
 
Heteroskedasticity 
Ho: Disturbance is homoskedastic 
    Pagan-Hall general test statistic   :  41.240  Chi-sq(35) P-value = 0.2164 
 
 164 
 
Redundant 
IV redundancy test (LM test of redundancy of specified instruments):    33.447 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.0000 
Ramsey Test 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of logm2 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 171) =     20.18 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000 
 
 
7. Monetary Policy, Political Institutions and Governance 
 
Result: GMM 
 
       lm2 |      Coef   Std Err      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ldcp |  -.0291531   .0457411    -0.64   0.524    -.1188041    .0604978 
     lgdp     |   .1821921   .0656901     2.77   0.006     .0534419    .3109422 
      lm2L |    .858059   .0568318    15.10   0.000     .7466708    .9694472 
         lpi |   .0397019   .0271297     1.46   0.143    -.0134713    .0928752 
       lgv |   .0581381   .0297509     1.95   0.051    -.0001725    .1164487 
        limp |  -.0270108   .0089661    -3.01   0.003    -.0445841   -.0094375 
     _iyr_82 |  -.4519476   .1355074    -3.34   0.001    -.7175372   -.1863581 
     _iyr_83 |  -.3898425   .1535116    -2.54   0.011    -.6907197   -.0889653 
     _iyr_84 |  -.4146585   .1277887    -3.24   0.001    -.6651196   -.1641973 
     _iyr_85 |   -.371546   .1236028    -3.01   0.003    -.6138031   -.1292889 
     _iyr_86 |  -.4082605   .1230437    -3.32   0.001    -.6494216   -.1670994 
     _iyr_87 |  -.3544051   .1098685    -3.23   0.001    -.5697435   -.1390668 
     _iyr_88 |  -.3086203   .1081552    -2.85   0.004    -.5206005   -.0966401 
     _iyr_89 |  -.2783311   .1037933    -2.68   0.007    -.4817623   -.0748999 
     _iyr_90 |  -.3388353   .0946765    -3.58   0.000    -.5243979   -.1532728 
     _iyr_91 |  -.2598387   .0922278    -2.82   0.005     -.440602   -.0790755 
     _iyr_92 |  -.2952499   .0857484    -3.44   0.001    -.4633136   -.1271861 
     _iyr_93 |  -.2567195   .0798001    -3.22   0.001    -.4131248   -.1003142 
     _iyr_94 |  -.2294959   .0753437    -3.05   0.002    -.3771667    -.081825 
     _iyr_95 |  -.1796077   .0801182    -2.24   0.025    -.3366364    -.022579 
     _iyr_96 |  -.2383768   .0656754    -3.63   0.000    -.3670983   -.1096553 
     _iyr_97 |  -.1126863   .0785641    -1.43   0.151    -.2666692    .0412966 
     _iyr_98 |  -.1894097    .055662    -3.40   0.001    -.2985053   -.0803142 
     _iyr_99 |  -.1300712   .0596241    -2.18   0.029    -.2469323   -.0132101 
     _iyr_00 |  -.1341322   .0465986    -2.88   0.004    -.2254637   -.0428006 
     _iyr_01 |  -.1224743   .0479288    -2.56   0.011    -.2164129   -.0285356 
     _iyr_02 |  -.1223406    .048911    -2.50   0.012    -.2182044   -.0264767 
     _iyr_03 |  -.1368855    .037497    -3.65   0.000    -.2103783   -.0633926 
     _iyr_04 |  -.0861465   .0347165    -2.48   0.013    -.1541895   -.0181034 
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     _iyr_05 |  -.0904237   .0321225    -2.81   0.005    -.1533827   -.0274647 
     _iyr_06 |  -.0558824   .0304378    -1.84   0.066    -.1155395    .0037746 
     _iyr_07 |  -.0384316   .0262615    -1.46   0.143    -.0899032      .01304 
     _iyr_08 |  -.0013569   .0513702    -0.03   0.979    -.1020406    .0993269 
     _iyr_09 |   .0407576   .0391463     1.04   0.298    -.0359677    .1174829 
       _cons |   .3700174    .141233     2.62   0.009     .0932059     .646829 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):             19.051 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.0001 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):               15.670 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):         0.513 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.4737 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Result: 2SLS 
First-stage regressions 
      ldcp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     lgdp |  -1.371194   .2406135    -5.70   0.000    -1.848082   -.8943055 
      lgm2L |   1.175386   .1818874     6.46   0.000     .8148911    1.535881 
         lpi |   .2693164   .0891334     3.02   0.003     .0926569    .4459759 
       lgv |  -.2260582   .1202427    -1.88   0.063    -.4643753    .0122589 
        limp |  -.3051305   .0902988    -3.38   0.001    -.4840998   -.1261612 
     _iyr_82 |   2.053925   .5913463     3.47   0.001     .8818956    3.225954 
     _iyr_83 |   2.224277   .5766818     3.86   0.000     1.081313    3.367242 
     _iyr_84 |   2.077911   .5611809     3.70   0.000     .9656684    3.190153 
     _iyr_85 |   1.974054   .5552546     3.56   0.001      .873558    3.074551 
     _iyr_86 |   1.790108   .5513782     3.25   0.002     .6972939    2.882921 
     _iyr_87 |   1.697105   .5095918     3.33   0.001     .6871108      2.7071 
     _iyr_88 |   1.713841   .4920363     3.48   0.001     .7386413    2.689041 
     _iyr_89 |   1.627362   .4771382     3.41   0.001     .6816892    2.573034 
     _iyr_90 |   1.471128    .438327     3.36   0.001     .6023785    2.339878 
     _iyr_91 |   1.376129   .4203524     3.27   0.001     .5430041    2.209254 
     _iyr_92 |   1.251185   .3928557     3.18   0.002     .4725582    2.029813 
     _iyr_93 |   1.083444   .3698739     2.93   0.004     .3503659    1.816522 
     _iyr_94 |   1.082705   .3422327     3.16   0.002     .4044114       1.761 
     _iyr_95 |   1.142075   .3175542     3.60   0.000     .5126934    1.771458 
     _iyr_96 |   .9725913   .2977058     3.27   0.001     .3825481    1.562634 
     _iyr_97 |   1.000417   .2838653     3.52   0.001     .4378057    1.563029 
     _iyr_98 |    .832306   .2590644     3.21   0.002     .3188488    1.345763 
     _iyr_99 |   .7392889   .2483681     2.98   0.004     .2470313    1.231546 
     _iyr_00 |   .6262095   .2301841     2.72   0.008     .1699921    1.082427 
     _iyr_01 |   .5064077   .2119702     2.39   0.019     .0862897    .9265257 
     _iyr_02 |   .4335883   .1964495     2.21   0.029     .0442318    .8229447 
     _iyr_03 |   .4258091   .1845166     2.31   0.023     .0601032    .7915151 
     _iyr_04 |   .4404687   .1767503     2.49   0.014     .0901553    .7907822 
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     _iyr_05 |   .4083654   .1678984     2.43   0.017     .0755962    .7411346 
     _iyr_06 |   .3799491   .1592515     2.39   0.019     .0643179    .6955803 
     _iyr_07 |    .321626   .1505694     2.14   0.035     .0232024    .6200496 
     _iyr_08 |   .2805958   .1455003     1.93   0.056    -.0077811    .5689726 
     _iyr_09 |   .1041596   .1396682     0.75   0.457    -.1726583    .3809775 
        lexp |   .4623731   .1045477     4.42   0.000      .255163    .6695832 
       lfa |  -.0616168   .0251547    -2.45   0.016    -.1114725   -.0117611 
       _cons |  -.0928797   .5650374    -0.16   0.870    -1.212765    1.027006 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
IV (2SLS) estimation 
      lm2 |      Coef   Std Err      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ldcp |  -.0251988   .0443776    -0.57   0.570    -.1121774    .0617798 
     lgdp     |   .1764832   .0595014     2.97   0.003     .0598626    .2931037 
      lm2L |   .8627776   .0504092    17.12   0.000     .7639775    .9615778 
         lpi |   .0351339   .0256499     1.37   0.171     -.015139    .0854068 
       lgv |   .0547254    .028264     1.94   0.053    -.0006711    .1101219 
        limp |  -.0263129   .0090931    -2.89   0.004     -.044135   -.0084908 
     _iyr_82 |   -.436367   .1251271    -3.49   0.000    -.6816115   -.1911224 
     _iyr_83 |  -.3788275   .1199854    -3.16   0.002    -.6139945   -.1436605 
     _iyr_84 |  -.4004752   .1211999    -3.30   0.001    -.6380225   -.1629278 
     _iyr_85 |  -.3574886   .1172594    -3.05   0.002    -.5873129   -.1276644 
     _iyr_86 |  -.3953401    .112665    -3.51   0.000    -.6161595   -.1745206 
     _iyr_87 |  -.3396667   .1063233    -3.19   0.001    -.5480566   -.1312769 
     _iyr_88 |  -.2953336   .1035931    -2.85   0.004    -.4983723   -.0922949 
     _iyr_89 |  -.2656399   .1006733    -2.64   0.008    -.4629559   -.0683239 
     _iyr_90 |  -.3269484    .093944    -3.48   0.001    -.5110753   -.1428216 
     _iyr_91 |  -.2485861   .0911473    -2.73   0.006    -.4272316   -.0699406 
     _iyr_92 |  -.2845213   .0851532    -3.34   0.001    -.4514186    -.117624 
     _iyr_93 |  -.2447719   .0791095    -3.09   0.002    -.3998236   -.0897202 
     _iyr_94 |  -.2192035   .0750322    -2.92   0.003    -.3662638   -.0721431 
     _iyr_95 |  -.1722955   .0732854    -2.35   0.019    -.3159322   -.0286589 
     _iyr_96 |  -.2306404   .0670912    -3.44   0.001    -.3621367   -.0991442 
     _iyr_97 |  -.1088975   .0661921    -1.65   0.100    -.2386317    .0208367 
     _iyr_98 |  -.1840786   .0594469    -3.10   0.002    -.3005925   -.0675648 
     _iyr_99 |  -.1243752    .056761    -2.19   0.028    -.2356246   -.0131257 
     _iyr_00 |  -.1291064   .0527398    -2.45   0.014    -.2324744   -.0257383 
     _iyr_01 |  -.1250122   .0483011    -2.59   0.010    -.2196807   -.0303438 
     _iyr_02 |  -.1187133   .0454725    -2.61   0.009    -.2078378   -.0295889 
     _iyr_03 |  -.1340432   .0435393    -3.08   0.002    -.2193787   -.0487078 
     _iyr_04 |  -.0834707   .0428067    -1.95   0.051    -.1673703    .0004289 
     _iyr_05 |  -.0880287   .0406411    -2.17   0.030    -.1676839   -.0083735 
     _iyr_06 |  -.0531362   .0395233    -1.34   0.179    -.1306003     .024328 
     _iyr_07 |  -.0370871   .0377741    -0.98   0.326    -.1111229    .0369487 
     _iyr_08 |  -.0020641   .0364273    -0.06   0.955    -.0734602     .069332 
     _iyr_09 |   .0437698   .0347021     1.26   0.207     -.024245    .1117847 
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       _cons |   .3639941   .1289727     2.82   0.005     .1112123     .616776 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):          32.381 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.0000 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):               15.670 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           0.658 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.4171 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Pooled OLS 
  lm2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 lgdp |   .9929844   .0849571    11.69   0.000     .8253053    1.160663 
 lpi |   .0822812   .1567182     0.53   0.600    -.2270322    .3915946 
 lge |   .6293406   .2198838     2.86   0.005     .1953578    1.063323 
 lprc |   1.390118   .1189112    11.69   0.000     1.155424    1.624812 
  lk |  -.0863754   .0417776    -2.07   0.040    -.1688315   -.0039194 
  _cons |  -2.114378   .6937086    -3.05   0.003    -3.483544   -.7452109 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Autocorrelation 
H0: no first order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,       5) =     13.739 
       Prob > F =      0.0139 
Heteroskedasticity  
Ho: Disturbance is homoskedastic 
 Pagan-Hall general test statistic   :  26.572  Chi-sq(35) P-value = 0.8462 
Redundant 
IV redundancy test (LM test of redundancy of specified instruments):     7.565 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.0059 
Ramsey Test 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of logm2 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 171) =     22.95 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000 
Principal Component Analysis 
Principal components (Economics)  
 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable |    Comp1     Comp2     Comp3     Comp4 | Unexplained  
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    -------------+----------------------------------------+------------- 
              gs |   0.6262    0.1978    0.3093   -0.6878 |           0  
              m2 |   0.5519   -0.1291   -0.8180    0.0975 |           0  
           score |   0.2502    0.8179    0.1003    0.5082 |           0  
            infs |   0.4905   -0.5246    0.4744    0.5091 |           0  
    -------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
        Variable |     kmo  
    -------------+--------- 
              gs |  0.5329  
              m2 |  0.6305  
           score |  0.5178  
            infs |  0.5200  
    -------------+--------- 
         Overall |  0.5305  
    ----------------------- 
 
Principal components (Political)  
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable |    Comp1     Comp2     Comp3     Comp4     Comp5     Comp6 | 
Unexplained  
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------+------------- 
            liec |   0.3994   -0.4512    0.3444    0.4757    0.5395   -0.0313 |           0  
            eiec |   0.4388   -0.3351    0.1552    0.1196   -0.8033    0.1071 |           0  
              pg |   0.3572    0.4114   -0.6257    0.5552   -0.0072    0.0572 |           0  
            pol2 |   0.4633   -0.0500   -0.2077   -0.4170    0.0719   -0.7488 |           0  
          xconst |   0.4546   -0.0471   -0.1814   -0.5259    0.2413    0.6507 |           0  
           actot |   0.3148    0.7143    0.6243   -0.0271   -0.0110   -0.0120 |           0  
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
           Variable |     kmo  
    -------------+--------- 
            liec |  0.8283  
            eiec |  0.8156  
              pg |  0.9017  
            pol2 |  0.7180  
          xconst |  0.7430  
           actot |  0.9651  
    -------------+--------- 
         Overall |  0.7968  
    ----------------------- 
Principal components (Governance)  
 
    ------------------------------------------------ 
        Variable |    Comp1     Comp2 | Unexplained  
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    -------------+--------------------+------------- 
              pr |   0.7071    0.7071 |           0  
              cl |   0.7071   -0.7071 |           0  
    ------------------------------------------------ 
 
       Variable |     kmo  
    -------------+--------- 
              pr |  0.5000  
              cl |  0.5000  
    -------------+--------- 
         Overall |  0.5000  
    ----------------------- 
 
Data of Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal 
         id exp/gdp m2/gdp id exp/gdp m2/gdp id exp/gdp m2/gdp 
1 5.3026 219.24 2 0.674651 291.152 3 10.7106 348.776 
1 5.19557 240.017 2 0.652386 277.608 3 11.3467 395.05 
1 5.11903 323.837 2 0.696913 242.779 3 11.049 430.392 
1 5.04815 419.649 2 0.763116 255.065 3 11.4336 489.108 
1 4.97109 462.171 2 0.749739 309.039 3 12.0078 531.208 
1 5.14628 515.405 2 0.635827 307.616 3 12.5379 599.172 
1 5.06257 590.323 2 0.50186 283.518 3 13.0479 664.985 
1 4.99438 656.773 2 0.439744 322.709 3 12.5543 727.902 
1 4.89857 759.338 2 0.626318 410.037 3 12.4828 801.548 
1 4.6431 791.292 2 0.474007 415.219 3 12.23 868.021 
1 4.58646 870.689 2 0.451098 512.925 3 12.0818 1037.89 
1 4.84236 928.679 2 0.464099 570.428 3 11.8492 1153.59 
1 5.17235 981.428 2 0.370784 676.434 3 11.9833 1263.23 
1 5.13492 1125.22 2 0.373124 806.031 3 11.3906 1427.3 
1 5.00648 1202.68 2 0.315991 1031 3 11.4149 1467.96 
1 4.74622 1272.95 2 0.541916 1057.76 3 11.1061 1627.39 
1 4.65003 1325.55 2 0.626657 1595.14 3 11.8749 1841.55 
1 5.00433 1403.48 2 0.544827 1721.68 3 12.5468 2066.9 
1 4.7991 1545.37 2 0.52614 2127.35 3 12.9301 2190.37 
1 4.5716 1740.87 2 0.562912 2322.39 3 12.6069 2527.96 
1 4.53676 2418.85 2 0.584765 2341.18 3 12.2957 2609.6 
1 5.17747 2509.61 2 0.581415 2728.41 3 11.8113 3091.03 
1 5.56754 2751.11 2 0.617714 2558.03 3 11.2458 3221.49 
1 5.79813 2933.95 2 0.653517 2840.72 3 10.842 3484.88 
1 5.89978 3257.7 2 0.777259 2921.19 3 10.802 3644.35 
1 5.86296 3666.19 2 0.773581 3089.49 3 10.2594 4030.23 
 170 
 
1 5.86164 4018.89 2 0.786212 2959.87 3 10.2379 4429.89 
1 5.71932 4325.27 2 0.783146 3709.82 3 10.8769 5238.6 
1 5.72753 4985.21 2 0.831777 4978.73 3 11.4855 5627.77 
1 5.87924 5664.05 2 0.728546 5407.6 3 11.3065 6061.7 
 
Data of India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka 
            
id exp/gdp m2/gdp id exp/gdp m2/gdp id exp/gdp m2/gdp 
4 0.119879 283.056 5 8.69664 368.109 6 0.080692 370.821 
4 0.14707 329.913 5 8.87546 420.951 6 0.09362 446.395 
4 0.184063 408.511 5 9.81092 476.659 6 0.09478 515 
4 0.161835 421.62 5 10.4774 474.762 6 0.100669 568.498 
4 0.156952 478.223 5 10.396 506.332 6 0.124897 610.671 
4 0.158223 545.812 5 10.8421 557.066 6 0.129158 609.965 
4 0.161176 657.049 5 11.5333 609.141 6 0.127761 692.196 
4 0.174297 745.429 5 11.1832 609.582 6 0.129038 775.889 
4 0.188807 864.186 5 12.8291 623.758 6 0.134535 821.79 
4 0.160496 980.708 5 11.8924 666.662 6 0.135307 925.826 
4 0.168588 1131.5 5 11.2628 754.754 6 0.146114 1078.71 
4 0.122315 1309.71 5 9.63419 906.081 6 0.147746 1206.85 
4 0.137856 1576.68 5 11.1491 1051.9 6 0.140113 1392.09 
4 0.133894 1719.01 5 9.64973 1190.14 6 0.158658 1577.53 
4 0.161415 1917.71 5 9.696 1290.45 6 0.198365 2031.08 
4 0.157452 2042.86 5 9.87713 1477.8 6 0.187421 2177.06 
4 0.157057 2519.2 5 8.961 1798.44 6 0.187794 2365.05 
4 0.157358 2718.89 5 9.334 1899.86 6 0.177613 2557.28 
4 0.149731 3168.53 5 8.3809 1832.77 6 0.155533 2780.14 
4 0.15431 3545.82 5 8.64301 2028.33 6 0.178181 2960.18 
4 0.145786 3951 5 7.99776 2121.5 6 0.170384 3415.38 
4 0.151984 4051.18 5 8.91231 2440.58 6 0.220598 3723.98 
4 0.157828 4295.65 5 9.11264 2817.83 6 0.219799 4059.31 
4 0.172819 4640.45 5 8.60843 3080.87 6 0.236911 4603.03 
4 0.192178 4921.37 5 8.12851 3391.37 6 0.272959 5040.65 
4 0.202481 5569.86 5 11.3551 3693.13 6 0.344632 5618.03 
4 0.234918 6384.08 5 9.7143 4155.65 6 0.367161 6137.2 
4 0.291183 8353.77 5 13.2797 4276.29 6 0.46215 6206.3 
4 0.311526 10358.6 5 8.77701 4756.05 6 0.501874 7192.98 
4 0.341774 10830.3 5 9.55556 5256.13 6 0.484042 7769.06 
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List of Instruments used in Different Models 
Log Revenue 
Log Domestic Credit to Private Sector 
Log Imports 
Log Population 
Log Foreign Assets 
Log Inflation 
Log Capital 
Log Exports 
Orthog Results 
Fiscal Models 
Model 1 
-orthog- option: 
Hansen J statistic (eqn. excluding suspect orthog. conditions):          2.144 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.1432 
Model 2 
-orthog- option: 
Hansen J statistic (eqn. excluding suspect orthog. conditions):          1.011 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.3146 
Model 3 
orthog- option: 
Hansen J statistic (eqn. excluding suspect orthog. conditions):          2.661 
                                                  Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.1028 
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Model 4 
-orthog- option: 
Hansen J statistic (eqn. excluding suspect orthog. conditions):          0.588 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.4433 
Model 5 
-orthog- option: 
Hansen J statistic (eqn. excluding suspect orthog. conditions):          0.692 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.4056 
Model 6 
orthog- option: 
Hansen J statistic (eqn. excluding suspect orthog. conditions):          0.540 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.4626 
Model 7 
-orthog- option: 
Hansen J statistic (eqn. excluding suspect orthog. conditions):          0.002 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.9684 
Monetary models  
Model 1 
-orthog- option: 
Hansen J statistic (eqn. excluding suspect orthog. conditions):          2.393 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.1219 
 Model 2 
orthog- option: 
Hansen J statistic (eqn. excluding suspect orthog. conditions):          0.364 
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                                     Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.5461 
Model 3 
orthog- option: 
Hansen J statistic (eqn. excluding suspect orthog. conditions):          1.669 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.1964 
Model 4 
-orthog- option: 
Hansen J statistic (eqn. excluding suspect orthog. conditions):          2.476 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.1156 
Model 5 
-orthog- option: 
Hansen J statistic (eqn. excluding suspect orthog. conditions):          0.641 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.4233 
Model 6 
-orthog- option: 
Hansen J statistic (eqn. excluding suspect orthog. conditions):          2.497 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.1141 
Model 7 
orthog- option: 
Hansen J statistic (eqn. excluding suspect orthog. conditions):          0.525 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.4687 
